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he conference on the future of Montenegro held in CEPS on 26
February, attracted considerable interest from the media and from the
policy-making community. At the time, the official position of the EU
and US was that Montenegro should not contribute further to what they saw
as a ten-year long process of Balkan disintegration. A number of the
contributors to this conference agreed. Many Montenegrins, represented in
substance here by President Djukanoviæ, Foreign Minister Branko Lukovac
and  Mijat  Šukoviæ, put forward a serious case for Montenegrin
independence.
The results of the parliamentary elections of April 2001 have changed the
dynamic to one of greater caution on all sides, but the issues have not gone
away and the basic positions of the actors remain the same. Michael
Emerson's proposals for a very thin confederation may indeed prove to be
close to the eventual shape of the constitutional settlement.
Greater consensus was generated by the discussion of Montenegro's
economic prospects, led by  Veselin  Vukotiæ and Daniel  Gros. Without
reforms, the gaping hole in Montenegro's public finances cannot be filled.
The new government has very difficult choices to make.
This conference would not have been possible without the assistance of Dr
Werner Rechmann, Stefanie Ricken and Anja Dargatz of the Friedrich Ebert
Stiftung; Gareth Evans, Mark Pierce, Katy Cronin, Sascha  Pichler and Theo
Adekunle of the International Crisis Group; and  Slavica  Milaèiæ of the
Montenegrin Representative Mission. My thanks to them, and to my many
colleagues at CEPS who contributed to the success of this event.
Nicholas Whyte
Brussels
June 2001
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Keynote Address
Milo Djukanoviæ
President of the Republic of Montenegro
Mr. Emerson, Ladies and Gentlemen, Distinguished Friends of Montenegro,
Let me start with my thanks to the Centre for European Policy Studies, the
International Crisis Group and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation for organising
this conference. The presentations of international and local experts will
make a contribution to our consideration of the future of Montenegro. I find
it especially important that this debate allows for a wide diversity of political
views on the subject of Montenegro’s future.
The ambition of this European gathering is to shed new light on the options
for the development of Montenegro concerning its future policy, economy
and security. My presentation here will include comments about all of these
aspects, as well as the related historical background. I do hope that such an
approach will contribute to a better understanding of what Montenegro’s
aspirations are today.
It has been four years now that Montenegro has been successfully
implementing its project of economic and democratic reforms. Today, we are
on a stable and irreversible path to the European and transatlantic structures.
The pre-history of this road was hard and traumatic. Montenegro went
through the bloodstained disintegration of the second Yugoslavia; it had an
episodic role in Miloševiæ’s third Yugoslavia; it was a determined fighter
against his dictatorship, and a herald of democratic changes in the region.
While the devastating wars were going on around Montenegro, it managed to
preserve peace and multi-ethnic tolerance on its territory. It provided shelter
for all refugees from the victimised regions both of the present and the ex-
Yugoslavia – the Serbs from Bosnia and Croatia, the Moslems from Bosnia,
the Albanians, and then the Serbs, the Montenegrins and the  Romas from
Kosovo. There was a time when the number of refugees was more than 20%
of our total population. Even today, there are about fifty thousand of these
unfortunate people in Montenegro.
At the time of the NATO campaign in Yugoslavia, Montenegro made a wise
and firm decision not to participate in Miloševiæ’s war. Montenegro’s choice
was to stand for peace and a diplomatic solution for Kosovo. In the outcome
of its democratic choice, Montenegro spent three-and-a-half years under the
political, economic, public and military pressure of the dictatorship from
Belgrade. Nevertheless,  Miloševiæ suffered three electoral defeats in
Montenegro during the same period. In addition, we opened the process ofThe Future of Montenegro
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reform and democratisation, and we assisted the strengthening of the
democratic forces in Serbia in every possible way. The world recognised
Montenegro’s significant role in that process, and it offered to Montenegro
strong political support, which was later followed by financial help.
Meanwhile, the democratic forces in Serbia managed to overthrow
Miloševiæ’s regime by winning the federal elections last fall. The democratic
Montenegro did not participate in those elections because they were
organised on the grounds of the constitutional violation, namely the coup that
Miloševiæ pulled off in July of 2000. By this unconstitutional act, Miloševiæ
abolished even the formally existing equality of Montenegro in this
federation, and he denied Montenegro’s statehood. Practically, this was the
annulment of the constitutional foundations of the joint state with Serbia that
Montenegro voted for in the referendum of 1992.
All of these facts are relevant for understanding our future plans, and the
latest initiative of our Government with the aim to resolve our future
relations with Serbia. It was only when the changes in Serbia took place that
we were able to open a democratic dialogue about a host of problems in our
mutual relations. This is also the response to the international community to
the question: Why is Montenegro opening up the issue of its statehood status
now, when Miloševiæ is no longer in the political arena? The answer is that
during his dictatorship we did not want to trigger the fifth war in the Balkans.
We demonstrated patience and tolerance, and we weakened  Miloševiæ by
political means. We preserved peace and our own safety. At the same time,
we were and have remained a reliable partner to the International
Community in the implementation of its strategy for political and economic
revival of the region. But even then we kept on reminding the key figures on
the international scene that there is more to it than just  Miloševiæ in the
problem of the Montenegrin-Serbian relationship. He only catapulted the
problem to a threat of a military conflict.
A climate that is being created in the international community today is that
all of the problems are solved by Miloševiæ’s departure. It would be good if
it were so. Unfortunately, that is not the case. His removal eliminated the key
problem that stood in a way of solving the crucial problems for stability of
the region. The Montenegro-Serbian relationship is one of those problems.
Being a responsible government, which demonstrated its capability to deal
with crisis in the most difficult times, we made a proposal for a long-term
solution of our relations with Serbia. The substance of this proposal is
already known. The starting point of our initiative is international recognition
of the independence of both, Montenegro and Serbia, and forming of the
Union of the two states on the bases of a bilateral agreement. This would end
the case of the ex-Yugoslavia’s dissolution, which started at the beginning of
the 1990s. This would be a European epilogue of the Yugoslav drama that
started in a typically Balkan style. It would also be a marker that a 10-yearKeynote Address by President Djukanoviæ
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engagement of the European Union and the international community on the
territory of the ex-Yugoslavia was not wasted. I am afraid that any other
solution would be just a postponement of the problem, with the uncertain
consequences.
What is it that underlies our proposal? Both Montenegro and Serbia are the
traditional Balkan and European states. Both were recognised at the
Congress in Berlin in 1878. Mildly phrased, under the dim circumstances,
which have been kept under the carpet for almost the whole century,
Montenegro united with Serbia joined the first Yugoslavia after World War
One. Montenegro emerged from World War Two with its statehood restored,
and it formed the second Yugoslavia with other five republics on an equal
footing in 1943. The assembly of the Anti-Fascist Council of the Yugoslav
Liberation Army recognised the right to self-determination to all of the
Yugoslav peoples, and Montenegro was no exception. The equality of the six
Yugoslav republics was emphasised in all constitutional documents of the
second Yugoslavia. Their respective statehood was reconfirmed in the
Constitution of 1974. When the federal Republic of Yugoslavia started to fall
apart, the European Union’s position with respect to the former Yugoslav
republics was expressed through the findings of the Badinter Commission in
1991. This was when all of the ex-republics were granted the right of
independence and international recognition. Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia
and Bosnia passed their declaration of independence. Montenegro and
Serbia, as the two states, formed the third, The Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, as it was written in the Constitution of 1992.
The third Yugoslavia never affirmed itself as a state. Serbia, headed by
Miloševiæ, immediately started to function as an independent state. As of
today, it has never tried to coordinate its constitution with the Federal one. In
practice, The Government of Serbia was in charge of the policy in economy,
customs, defence and foreign affairs. In the last four years, Montenegro has
also been functioning as an independent state. As we were protecting
ourselves from Miloševiæ, we were taking over – one by one – the functions
of the federal authorities. Today, Montenegro is sovereign in its monetary,
foreign trade, customs, foreign policy and internal security affairs. The
Yugoslav Army is practically the only function that Montenegro and Serbia
share. When Miloševiæ was in power, the army was actually a constant threat
to the democratic processes in Montenegro.
In sum, we think that our proposal is a rational one because it starts with the
actual state of affairs. Internally, Yugoslavia does not exist because there is
no Parliament, no Government, no jurisdiction and no legislation to be
enforced on the territory of the joint state. After the fall of  Miloševiæ,
Yugoslavia was internationally recognised on behalf of Serbia and
Montenegro, which in reality function as two states. We felt the international
recognition of Yugoslavia to be the support to the democratic changes inThe Future of Montenegro
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Serbia rather than an opinionated approach to our relationship. The nine-
year-old experience has shown that it is impossible to ensure equality
between such disproportional partners in a joint state. Serbia is almost twenty
times bigger than Montenegro. To the new authorities in Serbia we proposed
a dialogue as a mode to reach the solution that would relax both Montenegro
and Serbia of the unnecessary misunderstandings. It will also enable us to
devote our energies to our respective problems in the right way. Instead of a
joint state we proposed the Union of the independent states, which would
fully respect the historical and other ties of the two peoples. We proposed a
unified monetary system based on the hard currency, a unified principles of
the foreign policy, and a fully reformed joint defence force. Montenegro’s
idea is that our relationship with Serbia would be established at the level of
openness which already functions in the united Europe – with no passports,
no customs, and with the same conditions for work and education for all of
our citizens – with a full mutual guarantee of personal and state property.
Such a solution would enable the preservation of the state and national
identity both of Montenegro and Serbia, and it would improve the low-level
condition of their present relationship. Especially, it would allow the creation
of a responsible development policy that would lead both Montenegro and
Serbia in the fastest possible way into the environment of developed
European integration. All of these would considerably contribute to the
strengthening of peace and stability in the region. Such a model, if agreed
upon, could be simultaneously presented to the citizens in Serbia and in
Montenegro for public vote.
For the time being, Belgrade is not showing much appreciation for our
proposal. This confirms our evaluation that  Miloševiæ was not the only
problem in our relations. The way of thinking that produced Miloševiæ in the
1990s did not cease to exist with the end of his rule. The illusion of a Great
Serbia project, which for a century and a half has been the source of many
evils in the Balkans – including the most recent bloody inter-ethnic conflicts,
is still alive in Belgrade. In all plans that come from the Great Serbia’s
nationalists, Montenegro is an inescapable factor. The duration of this
illusion coincides with the span of time of the attempts to deny the
Montenegrin state, its national and cultural identity, and its right to take
responsibility for the shaping of its future. The eyes of Serbian nationalists
have always seen Montenegro as a part of the Serbian corpus. As long as
Montenegro stays with Serbia in whatever form of a united state, the project
of the Great Serbia will continue to live and will be a threat to the peace and
stability of the region. Our model for the definition of our mutual relations is
a chance that this illusion finally gets destroyed, and that the most dangerous
source of instability in the Balkans gets eliminated.
The lack of understanding for Montenegro’s position is visible in the
proposal made by Belgrade, which is better known as Mr.  Koštunica’sKeynote Address by President Djukanoviæ
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Platform, with regard to the definition of our future relations. As a starting
point, the proposal suggests that instead of the two functioning states there
should be a so-called functional federation. In many aspects this proposal
puts Montenegro in a worse position than it was according to the
Constitution of 1992. All joint functions, which in essence present the actual
levers of sovereignty of a state, would be in the authority of the federation.
The part of the proposal that we agree with is the evaluation about the
present unsatisfactory relationship between Montenegro and Serbia, and that
it should be changed. This is why we proposed a dialogue, and we shall
persist in this proposal. For us, a democratic way is the only way to come to
a solution. There is a saying that both Montenegrin and Serbian people have
in common: everything you can do today, do not leave for tomorrow.
Political experience from the territories of ex-Yugoslavia teaches us that
problems should be solved sooner rather than later. As I think that our
approach is a logical one, I also think that one could ask a logical question –
why is it that the authorities in Belgrade do not want to run the affairs of
their own state of Serbia? In all of the contacts I have had with their
representatives so far, I have not heard a single convincing argument to that
effect, with the exception of one political catch – we need no further
Balkanisation of the Balkans. This formulation seems to be acceptable for
the European Union and the international community as a whole. We, too,
oppose “Balkanisation” by interpreting the term in its pejorative sense. But I
also think that the keeping of the status quo at any cost means to bury one’s
head in the ground, and to skip the problems. This is what I see as the
Balkanisation of the Balkans. On the contrary, we propose that a long-lasting
problem gets resolved in a normal way, and that its resolution adds to the
“Europeanisation” of the Balkans. Does the sovereign international status of
all member countries present an obstacle to their respective integration into
the European Union? Of course, it does not. Among other things, it
stimulates their position of equality in the integration processes. Our model
is based on the same premises.
A part of public opinion in Belgrade is trying to frighten Europe and the
world with the fact that the sovereign status of Montenegro and that of Serbia
will destabilise the region. The world is not used to good news coming from
the Balkans. I think that this initiative coming from Montenegro is sending
positive political vibrations from this region to Europe and the democratic
world. In the most difficult conditions of the previous years we gave our
unselfish contribution to the region’s stability. Peace and stability are in the
greatest interest to Montenegro. It is, therefore, sheer logic that in no way we
could act against our own interest. This is out of question. That is why we
have called for the pre-due parliamentary elections in Montenegro to be held
on April 22. Our goal is to stabilise our political scene. By doing so, and byThe Future of Montenegro
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our rehabilitation of the unhealthy relationship with Serbia, we are also
making our biggest contribution to the regional security.
Kosovo is an old inherited problem, and a very difficult one to be solved at
this moment. It would be politically immoral and unjust to tie the destiny of a
people, in this case the people of Montenegro, to this regional problem for
which no one has a solution at this time. Even more so because Montenegro
and its citizens – Montenegrins, Serbs, Albanians, Moslems and Croats who
live in harmony –have in no way contributed to the creation of the Kosovo
problem, and to its escalation. At present, it is only certain that Kosovo has a
long time ahead as a protectorate of the international Community. A
democratic way of resolving the Montenegro-Serbia relationship can only
serve as a positive example in looking for a solution to the Kosovo problem
along the same lines. Whatever model gets applied in solution of the
relationship between Montenegro and Serbia, the problem of Kosovo, with
all of its specifics, will remain to be resolved, and it will be within a triangle:
Belgrade – Priština – International Community. What I see to be a way for
better understanding between Belgrade and Priština is also through a process
of normalisation of relations between Serbia and Albania, with which
Montenegro has been building good neighbourly relations. This has been
Montenegro’s policy with all countries in the region. I am fully convinced
that wars in the Balkans are the past. We are entering a more peaceful period,
which is also a chance for this region to get closer to the European
integration. A promising factor to that effect is also a new generation of
political leaders in the Balkans – the generations who are turned to the future
rather than to the past and the historical myths.
There is also an exaggerated fear that Bosnia might be destabilised. The
people there have had enough of bloody conflicts. There will be no
destabilisation of Bosnia unless it gets to be stimulated by Belgrade and by
Zagreb. The new Croatian leadership has taken a clear stand with regards to
the position of Croats in Bosnia. The clear European position of Belgrade
with regard to the Republic of Srpska will be a guarantee of a long-lasting
peace in Bosnia. Making references to Montenegro in connection with
Kosovo and the Republic of Srpska is wrong both politically and historically.
Montenegro was, is, and will be a state. Namely, these are completely
different political notions, and they are beyond any comparison in the
context of trying to minimise Montenegro’s initiative.
We want to live in peace with all of our neighbours, to decide on our own
about our destiny, and to take upon us the responsibility for our future.
Maybe for the first time in Montenegro’s history, the present generations
want to make use of their education, and put their knowledge and wishes into
the service of proper valorisation of the natural, economic and human
resources. They want to live from their work and not from the outside
assistance. We want to build a free, open society of a market economy, andKeynote Address by President Djukanoviæ
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to finalise the process of privatisation in a transparent way. Everything that
we have accomplished so far in those areas we did with the expert and
technical assistance from the European Union and the United States. The
most qualified financial experts gave credit to our budget reform, and we
applied European standards in reforming of our monetary, banking, and the
overall financial system. We are making preparations for reform of our
education system, the judiciary and public administration. Another of our
priorities is tax reform. Our Adriatic coast is attractive for development of
tourism, and it offers excellent possibilities for the maritime trade. Our
resources are in the production of organic food, the abundance of drinking
water, the aluminium and steel production. In our Constitution Montenegro
is defined as an ecological state. The population of Montenegro is 650,000.
We have developed the legal framework that would attract foreign investors.
We have prepared profitable project proposals. We do expect that the
European Union and the democracies of the world will support us in our
endeavours to live and work in compliance with the rules of our European
surroundings. The greatest assistance we could get would be the appreciation
of our democratic goals. Unfortunately, everything we are doing, and we
have done so far, in the area of reforms and democratisation has been kept
under the veil of politics. We are, and we want to be a constructive partner of
the European Union and the international Community. We hope that our
offered hand will be accepted. During the last few years, Montenegro and
Serbia not only did not take the same road, but they literally went in two
different directions. An artificial merging of these two directions under the
political pressures might be a source of instability. Neither Europe nor we
would stand for that. Development of democracy, reforms and integration –
these are our common strategic goals. It is also the best road for stability and
security of the region, which is yet another of our common interests. The
state policy of Montenegro is today in full compliance with the goals and the
strategy of the European Union with regards the  South-East Europe. My
expectations are that the period ahead of us will be the time when
Montenegro will demonstrate this in a more visible way, and when the
European Union and the democracies of the world will understand it in the
right way. I do believe that today’s Conference will also make the right
contribution to that effect.
Thank you very much for your attention. Should you have any questions, I
will be glad to answer them.The Future of Montenegro
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Discussion
During the question and answer period, President  Djukanoviæ made the
following points:
•  Although the threat of war in Montenegro is no longer a primary concern
of the people, the republic’s problems are not completely resolved. The
next few months will be crucial to the future of Montenegro. The
referendum and election in Montenegro must be conducted in an open
and democratic matter to ensure Montenegro’s stability.
•  A democratic and open solution to the current state of Montenegrin
affairs could be a positive example for Kosovo. Montenegro has a
natural interest in keeping the stability of Kosovo intact.
•  Today the people of Montenegro live in a paradox. They are now
required to leave behind the moral argument and to take up the political
and economic arguments that support their independence from Serbia
and the FRY.
•  Montenegro supports and recognises the International Tribunal for war
crimes in The Hague completely. President  Djukanoviæ recently
promised Carla Del Ponte, the Chief Prosecutor, further cooperation
from the Montenegrin government.
•  Montenegro, although sympathetic, will not become involved in the
affairs of Kosovo. The future of Kosovo needs to be resolved by
negotiation between Belgrade, Priština and the international community.
•  President  Djukanoviæ is here in Brussels for the CEPS-ICG-FES
conference. While here he will meet with Javier Solana, Chris Patten and
Bodo  Hombach, and will also speak to the European Parliament’s
Foreign Affairs Committee.
•  In the realm of military issues, President  Djukanoviæ stated that the
Yugoslav army has no other purpose in Montenegro then to oppose
democratic processes and reforms in the region.
•  President Djukanoviæ’s main goal now is to develop a democratic and
European society in Montenegro.
•  The President stated that the people and government of Montenegro
hoped for so much by entering the 2
nd FRY and got so little in return.
Now the Montenegrins have begun to accept that independence is
possible and feel empowered to establish their own state.
•  It is the President’s belief that you cannot stop the current trend in
Montenegro towards greater support for independence, which hasKeynote Address by President Djukanoviæ
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increased from 10 to 60 percent in the last 10 years. The young people of
Montenegro are particularly keen.
•  President Djukanoviæ has always claimed that Montenegro is a nation
with its own identity – they are not a part of Serbia or the Serbian state.
At one time he supported the link to Serbia, but times change and he no
longer believes in Montenegro’s membership of the FRY.  Djukanoviæ
first claimed that Montenegro had the economic means to support itself
in 1994 and he was denounced as a separatist. Today the support behind
him has grown and he believes that Montenegro has the democratic
capacity and the right to independence.
•  Djukanoviæ described the past relationship between Montenegro and
Russia as a good one that continues today. He understands why Russia,
the EU and the US are hesitant to support Montenegro and their goals;
they all have a right to doubt the Balkans. He does believe that Russia
can be persuaded that Montenegrin independence is a good thing. The
primary attitude of Russia, however, is that Montenegro’s future is to be
a result of relations between Montenegro and the FRY – democratic and
transparent relations.
•  When discussing the referendum there are two questions that remain: 1.)
Who should vote? All citizens of Montenegro (all people that live within
the borders of Montenegro) are allowed to vote in the referendum. The
discrepancy concerns those Montenegrins (by birth) that live outside the
borders – should they be able to vote? And 2.) What should the majority
margin be for complete independence? How great a voter turnout is
necessary? 50%? In the past, more than 70% of the electors have cast
their votes. Djukanoviæ does not believe that getting 50% of the people
in Montenegro to vote would be a problem.
•  Agreements with Serbia would be concluded to grant open markets to
each country so that Serbia would have access to the sea and be allowed
to transport goods by rail through Montenegro. Montenegro hopes that
this open market will not only apply to Montenegro and Serbia, but to
the entire Balkan region.
•  Djukanoviæ believes that no country is incapable of economic
development, especially Montenegro.10
Session I
Montenegro’s Legal Status: Options for the Future
Independence of the State of Montenegro:
An Efficient Option for the Future
Professor Dr Mijat Šukoviæ
* *
I shall concisely and systematically enunciate my factual findings about the
constitutional and further legal status of the state of Montenegro and the
options for its future status.
The factual ground of this finding is drawn from analysis of the present
overall reality of Montenegro. This includes the economic, cultural-spiritual,
political and international realities, not just the normatively constitutional
and further legal reality. With this comprehensive approach, it is possible to
understand better the content, meaning and effects of the potential
constitutional and further legal destinations. It is also possible to use it more
efficiently for evaluation of options for the future state status of Montenegro.
Although it is based on wider grounds, I present findings restricted to the
constitutional and further legal settlements of Montenegro’s state status. I do
that because the economic and other aspects of Montenegro’s state status
shall be considered later today. I shall enunciate my findings concisely
because of space constraints.
I have not softened my findings, nor have I adjusted them so that – someone
might find them more suitable. It is not allowable to make the truth subject to
a wish to retain the status quo. It is more efficient to tell the truth, even if that
would expose us to the possibility of suffering and unjustified accusations of
separatism, than to avoid that and to cause injustice to the truth.
I. Relevant Facts
All options for the future about the state status as well as about everything
else, and their assessment in order to select the most efficient one, have their
origins in the present, rather than in wishful thinking about the future. The
theoretical basis of statehood, formulated in the nineteenth century, is that
both the state and its status are based on the social and national materials that
exist on the territory for which the state is built. History has verified that
respecting this rule leads to stable and prosperous states, and disrespect of
that rule led to the establishment of unstable states. We may take it that this
rule “has the quality of algebraic rules and geometry”, and not the rules “of
tennis play”. That is why I shall begin my finding with an evaluation of those
present legal facts which are significant or relevant for identification of
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options for the future and for the selection of the most efficient one, or at
least, the most acceptable one under the given circumstances. These legal
facts are principles of the aforementioned “social and national material”
whereof the future status of Montenegro will be built.
Those legal facts are:
1. Montenegro is a state whose historical duration has lasted for centuries.
It gained its status of an internationally recognised state 122 years ago, at the
1878 Berlin Congress.
It is also explicitly stated in the Constitution of Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (clause 6) that Montenegro has the status of a state even as its
member.
As a state, Montenegro has a separate Montenegrin identity – historical,
national, and cultural. It is the result of separation over centuries, separate
political, social and state organisations, distinctive conditions and way of
life, which have brought not only a separate state, but also a distinctive
Montenegrin mentality, Montenegrin ethics and culture, understood in the
broadest meaning of the word, and a variety of other specialities.
It is constitutionally governed by its Constitution, as a state symbol. It was
first constitutionally regulated by Constitution of Montenegro in 1905, and
after that successively by Constitutions in 1946, 1953, 1963, 1974 and 1992.
The borders of Montenegro have the legal character of state borders,
including the border with Serbia, with which Montenegro forms a
normatively existent federative union. And that part of the border legally has
the status and character of a state border, not just an administrative border.
The state status of border between Serbia and Montenegro was established
on 30 October 1913, by the Agreement on the Serbian-Montenegrin border
concluded between the Kingdom of Serbia and the Kingdom of Montenegro,
which was ratified in the Parliaments of both Montenegro and Serbia. (It was
signed, based on special royal authority, on behalf of the King of Serbia, by
the honorary adjutant of King Petar Karadjordjeviæ and the Minister of War,
general Miloš  Božanoviæ, and on behalf of the King of Montenegro, by the
Minister of Education and Religious Affairs, Mirko Mijuškoviæ).
The border ratified by that agreement was altered in the region of Kosovo
and  Metohija by an agreement between governments of Montenegro and
Serbia, to the advantage of Serbia. This updated border was established by
the Constitutions of the People’s Republic of Serbia and the People’s
Republic of Montenegro in 1946, by identical formulations in the respective
constitutions. The constitutions give state character to everything that is
arranged by them. Definition of border in it gives the border state character
also. That condition has not legally changed. The fact that the border ofThe Future of Montenegro
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Montenegro has the character of a state border, and not an administrative
border, is significant for the evaluation of options for the future and their
implications.
2. The state of Montenegro is legally a member of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, which was only recently, eight years after its foundation,
internationally admitted. This state exists legally, but presently it is unnatural
and non-functional, with a legal system that is inanimate, and unaccepted.
Its unnatural character results from the fact that it is normatively a state of
Montenegro and Serbia, between which there is no factual togetherness. Both
republics act completely independently and perform all state functions,
internal and international, as independent state. They have established
separate, mutually different systems, both political and economic. They have
different regimes for property relations, customs and external-commerce, and
visas. They have different currencies, and they do not have a mutual banking
transfer system. Their border, for more than a year now, has been the most
rigid in Europe in respect of the trade of goods. Economic relations between
them are far less and more unstable than relations between any two
neighbouring sovereign states within the European Union. They also have
different social and political realities.
There are different views on the Montenegrin identity, the Montenegrin
cultural and national character, and the purpose of the Montenegrin state, and
those are three key questions for their relations. The piercing and extensive
charges to the mutual oneness have been unjustifiably overlooked and
neglected. Unjustifiably, because it is not possible to understand and
comprehend deeply and as a whole, the basis and meaning of the present
relations between Serbia and Montenegro, nor to estimate their future based
on grounds.
Their togetherness only expresses the existence of institutional structure that
was commonly established in 1992, and which is still described as “federal”.
However, that structure, since more than three years ago, has not really been
a federal one. It has no legislative or executive power, either on the territory
of Serbia, or on the territory of Montenegro, which removes from it all
attributes and characteristics of state power. In spite of the atrophy of that
structure for the exercise of its functions, that structure has been continually
misused for the oppression and destruction of the Montenegrin state, both
nationally and cultural, which is in contradiction to the essence and the
purpose of a federal state.
This (non) togetherness of Serbia and Montenegro does not contribute to the
benefits of unity. Neither to Serbia, nor to Montenegro. It is non-functional.
It can not be efficient at all. In contrary, it is a burden for both Serbia and
Montenegro. It produces instability and disagreement in Montenegrin-
Serbian relations, instability and a poisonous uncertainty for citizens.Session I. Montenegro’s Legal Status: Options for the Future
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The recent international recognition of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
which has gained its place in the international community, has not changed
and it could not have changed the fact that it is an unnatural state.
3. Montenegro has been administering all state functions independently for
the last few years – legislative, executive, administrative, juridical –
internally without limits. It has been administering international functions
also, but with limits caused by its membership of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, and which is therefore restricted by international law and the
standards of international relations. Those limits are a real and big barrier to
development reforms in Montenegro.
Through its independent administration of state functions, the state of
Montenegro has built a distinctive legal system and legal order, including the
system of property relations and the economic system as a whole; a system
of values and culture, based on the historical achievements and values of
Montenegrin society; and institutions for administering those state functions
that are normatively still under the authority of federal structure. It has won
during the last few years, by its civilised politics, in spite of the limitations
caused by membership in the federal state, an enviable position and high
rating in Europe and international relations in a whole.
There is presently, therefore, parallelism or unnatural coexistence between
the normatively defined status of Montenegro and its factually established
status. The differences are so big that their coexistence cannot be allowed
much longer.
II. The Living Reality has Priority over Normative Definitions
It is a known and accepted rule that the established living reality has priority
over inanimate and unaccepted normative definitions. Applied to
Montenegro, this rule obliges us to start from the living in visions of the
future, not the inanimate normative.
It becomes more obligatory when considering that the favouring of
normative as a start for establishing a future, would with no doubt lead to a
conflict with strong and rising cultural-spiritual and political direction in
Montenegro so as to preserve what was factually built and further more to
make it more secure with state independence. Because, different would
imply and request: the destruction of the Montenegrin legal system and a
number of institutions – state, monetary, custom, financial, informative and
cultural – which were built with hard labour and deprivation, and all with the
purpose of enabling the state of Montenegro to administer all these functions
as an independent state; and annulment of the achieved level of subjectivity
of Montenegro in international affairs, which was gained with lot of effort.
And that would have caused, under present conditions, a big shake-up in
Montenegro in the legal system, the international corpus, economy and inThe Future of Montenegro
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cultural-spiritual field. It would have stopped reforms and the revival of
production. It would also make conflicts in the cultural-spiritual field more
severe. In political relations, it would have caused tapering, different profiles
of political totalitarianism and totalitarian shapes of populism. A political
head in Montenegro could not neutralise it. It also has no legitimacy to
control all that disintegration.
If those shake-ups had emerged in Montenegro, they would have continued
and made the instability of Serb-Montenegrin relations last longer, and
strengthened the barriers for establishing harmony in those relations. That
would not contribute to the stability of the  region nor to achieving the goals
of the European Community.
III. Montenegro’s State Rights of Independence
The set and composite of facts undeniably demonstrate that Montenegro
fulfils all conditions and that it has, by internal and by international law, two
rights:
a) the right of independent state status, and
b) the right of using right for a full independence.
Use of these rights:
1) Does not hurt and does not endanger any right nor any legitimate interest
of any other state. It does not hurt and it does not endanger any right of
Serbia nor any legitimate interest of its.
2) Does not hurt and does not endanger, or at least it does not have to,
acquired rights of Montenegro and Serbia’s citizens. Including rights of real
estate. In contrary, the principle of option for Montenegro’s state
independence, according to the Montenegro government’s official
proposition, specifically provides legally-contracted interstate guarantee of
acquired citizens’ rights and equal conditions, in Montenegro and Serbia, for
acquiring citizens’ rights in the future, including rights of work.
3) Does not change state borders, or their legal character. On the part of
border between Serbia and Montenegro, only regime would have changed.
But established in such a way, according to the Montenegro government’s
official proposition, so that the regime should assure non-passport and non-
visa passage for citizens from Serbia and Montenegro and custom-free traffic
of goods between them.
4) Does not narrow market space nor in Montenegro, nor in Serbia. Or at
least, it is possible to resolve its narrowing. Because, the principle of option
for using those two stated rights, according to the Montenegro government’s
official proposition, plans that the common market should be established by
an agreement between Montenegro and Serbia on their territories, freedom ofSession I. Montenegro’s Legal Status: Options for the Future
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traffic of goods, services, capital, labour. In contrary, by increasing stability
and intensifying of reforms, improving chances for faster involving into
European integration, and thereby for extension of market space.
Both rights of Montenegro have been stated both in finding and opinion of
the Badinter Commission.
Stated rights, together with content of cultural-spiritual, political, economical
and overall reality of Montenegro and Serbia, including their mutual
relations, as well as content of overall circumstances that exist, recites and
determines – determines both need and justification, social and legal-
systematic, historical and civilised, that Montenegro, in this time, realises
both of its stated rights. Those facts recite and determine that it is the
healthiest and the most efficient option for the future of Montenegro under
given circumstances and in this historical moment.
Delay of their realisation is not a constructive solution.
Realisation of stated rights implies civilised dissociation of Montenegro and
Serbia out of their federative union and establishing an independent state
status of Montenegro. Serbia as well.
IV. The Efficiency of this Option
This option is efficient for Montenegro because it follows its line of interest,
decides about its destiny, its human and material resources, to have a full
international subjectivity and direct membership in international institutions
and organisations of states, that its development rise depends on itself, to be
responsible itself for its future. Independent state of Montenegro is the safest
guarantee of Montenegrin identity –not only stately, but also national and
cultural –the biggest values of every nation. It does not matter not so
numerous or big nation. As an independent state, Montenegro gains a
possibility to direct and engage its entire cadre and other potentials, all its
creative force in order to resolve present weaknesses of Montenegrin state
and to build it and reinforce it based on European principles. It should
conduct necessary reforms in all fields; to rationalise and professionally
improve its state organisation, to clear up grey economy, corruption and
other negativity.
This option is efficient because it also creates a healthier ground for the
future relations between Serbia and Montenegro, for lasting stability in those
relations. Stability that would have positive effect on the stability of relations
in the region.
That makes this option efficient for Serbia also. For relations between Serbia
and Montenegro. For stability in the region. And thereby for achieving goals
of European Union in Balkan region.The Future of Montenegro
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V. Reality of this Option
The prevailing majority of young people and the educated strata of
Montenegrin society who are categorically support this option give it reality.
In economic structures, fields of culture and information, political fields.
Their vitality and determination are real and a significant fact that deserves
respect.
The fact that idea about independent Montenegro has survived its suffocating
through decades and prohibition of its spreading asserts the reality of this
option. Through those decades, in spite of intensive suffocating, the idea has
persistently lived, as an ideal, in the body of people and society. Sometimes
among many of them, sometimes among a few. As Valtazar Bogišiæ, a well
known and acknowledged scientist, wrote, “the most reliable sign that some
idea has in itself necessary living force so it can spread and develop, exists if
it, despite everything, suffocating and restrains of spreading still advances
and gets more and more space” (Ljetopis Matice srpske, book 111, for 1886,
page 31).
There are political factors in Montenegro against this option and against the
estimation on its efficiency and reality. They claim and tend to prove that it
is the opposite to the state and national interests of Montenegro. Those
factors had no success in disproving evaluation of value and advantage of
destination for Montenegro independence so far, nor to stop the realisation of
direction about referendum.
With all respect for these factors, the existence of these factors does not
decrease the reality of this option.
Result of coming referendum about independence, shall show their real
power, that will clearly determinate the reality of achieving the ultimate goal
of this option.
VI. The Consequences of Realisation
The consequences of realising this option, contrary to some malicious
stories, are not or should not be a source of anxiety.
Consequences are directly dependent on relation of political head of Serbia
towards realisation of Montenegrin direction to have a referendum about
independence
There will be no negative consequences, or there will be relatively few, if the
state head of Serbia, before the referendum about independence of
Montenegro is held, and which is scheduled for June this year, agrees:
a) to respect visible facts: that created conditions qualify direction of
Montenegro for dissociation with Serbia and retrieving independence; thatSession I. Montenegro’s Legal Status: Options for the Future
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the realisation of that direction is unstoppable, even if the majority of
Montenegro citizens does not vote for that on this year referendum; and that
is better for Serbia also to have civilised-cultural relation towards direction
of Montenegro, such as brothers have when they divide common household,
rather than opposing to that or encouraging some factors in Montenegro to
cause conflicts for the stopping or boycott of the referendum; and
b) To accept proposition of Montenegrin government that the governments
of Serbia and Montenegro should with no delay start dialogues about future
functional relations between Serbia and Montenegro, about the way of their
institutional providing, with a direction of clarification and assertion whether
or not those relations can be maintained after dissociation, in the frame of
union of states created by interstate contract, by model of relations between
states of European Union.
If these two topics were realised, the main causes and reasons of divisions in
Montenegro about its state status would have been excluded. Those divisions
would not have existed, or at least not to that extent, if there were not their
both spiritual and material support from Serbia.
After that forces in Montenegro that are against the independence, would
lose their vitality, motivations, support, which would provide peace and
restrained any stresses. That would be solid foundation for balanced relation
between Serbia and Montenegro during the process of holding a referendum
and later.
Maintenance and non-maintenance of cultural and democratic dialogues of
Serbian and Montenegrin governments about these questions, therefore, will
determine volume and character of eventual negative consequences of this
option’s realisation.
The European Union can play a big and immeasurable role during that
process. That is why responsibility for eventual negative consequences of
dissociation and establishing of independence is not nor can it be only on the
Montenegrin side.
It is natural to expect that the present state authority of Serbia will accept
denoted dialogs, validate stated facts and accept proposition about organised
and institutionalised establishing of functional relations between states of
Montenegro and Serbia. Besides other and because it would be wise stately
action and because that government knows that it is the one of the most
important tests of its democratic direction. It is natural to expect that, in spite
of hitherto manifestation of secret anger, revolting negligence and
contemptuous relation in moral and political sense, which is not a merit of
stately acts and interstate communications.
VII.  Relative Meaning of Living in One StateThe Future of Montenegro
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In our time, role and meaning of living in one state have been made more
relative. It is the result of the bigger and bigger democratisation of relations
between state, creating bigger and bigger technical and other possibilities for
direct connection of citizens, industrial subjects, scientific and other
intuitions, through the line of their needs and interests, purely human and
business, without participation of state mechanisms, without state filters.
That relativism will increase by the rate with which the possibility for mutual
communication independent of state borders grows, and with whom the
democratisation of relations in state and between them increases.
That shows that it is the most important for the people of Serbia and
Montenegro, for their citizens to democratise their states as much as possible
and to establish relations between them that will provide both citizens of
Montenegro and Serbia free non-passport and non-visa pass and custom-free
traffic of goods through their border; so that they would guarantee acquired
rights through their interstate agreement, including real estate property right,
as well as acquiring of rights in the future under equal conditions. Interstate
agreement should establish a common market on their territories, including
the labour market, so as to enable all citizens employment and undertaking
market on territories both Serbia and Montenegro. That would mean to
establish relations that are existent now between state members of European
Union.
It is more important than whether they live in the same state or not.
Dissociation of Montenegro and Serbia out of federal union and establishing
of their independence, therefore, is not or at least it does not have to be a
dissociation of their people and citizens. Nor decreasing, nor rupture of
relations between their people and citizens. Not in the present, nor in the near
future.
Proof for that is also an experience from hitherto relations between people
and citizen of Montenegro and Serbia. Experience argues that their relations
have never been settled through, and that are not settled even now, only to
their relations through state agencies and through interceding. Their relations
are beside state mechanisms and their interceding, and always have been, and
now they are interlaced by many out-state threads –economic, cultural,
scientific, educational, personal, human and other. Relations that are more
comprehensive, lively for human interests more useful and efficient than
state ones. Even through periods of hardest prohibition of paycheque traffic
between Serbia and Montenegro, life has overcome political madness. It is
overcoming them even now, when although normatively there is one state,
border between Serbia and Montenegro is still “though”.
Such relations and conditions for non-border relations of citizens and
institutions from Serbia and Montenegro, for their people, can create only
good will of political and cultural-spiritual structures of Montenegro andSession I. Montenegro’s Legal Status: Options for the Future
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Serbia and in conditions of establishing of independent states of Montenegro
and Serbia. Far more convenient, therefore, than the existent conditions or
the one that unstable, maladjusted, uncertain federation could ever provide.
It is a duty of these structures to follow interests, needs and directions of
citizens and to constitute such a will.
They can create it even without especially institutionalised union. More
stable and secure, however, they can do that by creating their union in a form
of confederation, union or some similar alliance, without international
subjectivity that overpower speciality of full international subjectivity both
Montenegro and Serbia. That alliance would be additional column of
stability and peace on Balkan.
VII. The Merits of the Proposition of Reorganising SRJ
Second official option of the future state status of Montenegro, has been
outspoken in the Proposition for reorganisation of Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, which was made and on 10, January this year declared by the
President of FRY, Vojislav Koštunica, and which was accepted after that by
state-political establishment of Serbia.
It is planed in it that state status of Montenegro should remain status quo.
That would mean, planned its stay within federation with Serbia. Federation
with full international subjectivity, that excludes independence of
Montenegro.
Merits of contents of denoted Proposition which relate to Montenegro are:
1) Outset for the conception of federation planned by Proposition, potentate
aspiration for a unique state. In the part of constitutional directions, two
unitary solutions have been built in, resumed from known unitary
Constitutional amendments from 6 July on Constitution of FRY. Those
solutions are free mandate of deputy in the Council of Republics and a
proportional principle of their election. First issue makes Montenegro
stateless, and the second creates institutional and legal ground for election of
deputies in Montenegro from those layers that fight for the “Serbian
interests”, and not the interests of Montenegrin, and that would in Council of
Republics follow politics and directions of Serbia, even when they are
opposite to state and national interests of Montenegro (as it did happen on
occasion of making and accepting Constitutional amendments from 6. July,
through which though violence has been executed over Montenegro), and
would make a factor of providing outvote over Montenegro. In that way,
Montenegro would have neither equality, nor the institutions and legal
resources to protect its equality.
The unitary direction of the Proposition also states the determinant
“functional federation”. According to the source theoretical concept ofThe Future of Montenegro
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“functional federation”, unity and central deciding about all question of its
inherence, make two the most important merits of concept of that form of
federation. Premise of that concept finds efficiency the most important value
of state. It is considered for a value that justifies and to which all other needs
and principles must be subjected to, including the equality of members and
their participation in making decisions about questions that are in
competence of common state. Such value direction in that concept, has arisen
from and became an imposed by social-economic situation of big economic
crisis in 1929 year, during which the concept had originated and theoretically
constituted. (See Harold J. Laski, Liberty in the Modern State, 1930.)
There is no mention in the introduction or in the whole of its contents that
Montenegro is a state, nor is there any explicit respect for Montenegrin
national and cultural identity. There are no tough barriers and guarantees that
misuse of common state with damage for Montenegrin side such as the one
experienced in practice, would not become a thorough reality.
Even though the new government of Serbia asks from the Montenegrin
people officially to put up with inequality in a common state, to be in that
position that obligates them to live with a sense of degradation of their
dignity!
Montenegro has no reason, nor the interest – historical, present or future that
can be seen nor economic, cultural, political, international – to accept live in
a state that through its dominant cultural-spiritual being does not guarantee
its identity and individuality, its equality and the right to decide about its
future.
Signifying national identity and its protection, is not the act of nationalism.
To preserve and protect one’s own, with respect for others and their rights,
civilised values and standards, represent the very fight against nationalism. It
does not also represents the creation of national state. Montenegro has
through long-lasting practice proved that it has firmly determination to build
society and state based on the multicultural, multi-ethnic and multi-religious
principles.
I can only conclude that the option planned for reorganisating the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia is not efficient for Montenegro. The option of
dissociating Montenegro and Serbia and establishing their independence is
more efficient. It is more efficient for creating an alliance of states, but even
without it.
IX. Purpose and Utility of the Alliance of States
Both options agree or do not differ to a great extent in determination that it is
useful and needful to renew, establish and stabilise functional relations
between Serbia and Montenegro. Option that was analysed first plans thatSession I. Montenegro’s Legal Status: Options for the Future
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those functional relations would be realised within alliance of the states of
Montenegro and Serbia, and the second, in the frame of federation.
Alliance of the states is not the same as federal state. It can not make up for
all the federal functions.
It is wrong and harmful for the future relations of Serbia and Montenegro,
however, to minimise the role and the meaning of their alliance of the states,
which is done when it adds up to the state-legal form, just to the relations of
states, when it comprehended statically and when it is denied a value that it
can objectively have.
It is right to consider the alliance of states of Serbia and Montenegro in the
widest association, social and cultural frame. Comprising width and depth of
mutual relations and intimacies that rule in human associations. With
focusing of acting-functional strength of the alliance of states. The strength
that facilitates numerous dynamic relations between citizens and people, that
are based and built on needs and interests of acting industrial cultural,
educational, medical and other subjects in Montenegro and Serbia, as well as
parental, friendly, professional, working and other human relations.
When analysed and judged like that, its value is unmistakable.
An idea to form an alliance between states of Montenegro and Serbia, is not
contradictory nor with the goals of federation, nor with the goals of
independence of states. In contrary, through existence of alliance of states
majority of federal goals can be achieved, as well as it can serve as a suitable
frame for developed and stable relations between independent states of
Serbia and Montenegro, their people and citizens.
That make dialogs of two governments about these functional relations an
imperative, with initial disregard of differences in fundamental directions,
with a direction to clarify during conversations and to identify the way how
those relations should be established and institutionally provide. Clarification
and identifying of that will bring to the clarification and identifying of what
option of state status has priority.
Necessity and effectiveness of dialogs between two governments about
functional relations, for which both options aspire, is undoubted. As soon as
possible, is better. Delay of dialogs about that, is not a constructive solution.22
A European Solution for the
Constitutional Future of Montenegro
Michael Emerson in collaboration with
Daniel Gros, Wolfgang Hager, Nathalie Tocci & Nicholas Whyte
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Abstract
This paper does not take position on the binary choice between
‘independence’ versus ‘federation’ that presently dominates the debate over
the future of Montenegro, both of which pose some problems. It does,
however, point to various examples of ‘asymmetric unions’, which have
been devised to accommodate the special case where there are just two
entities, one big and one small, that form a common state. It also describes
how it might be possible technically, if it was desired politically, to arrange
the main institutional and policy elements in a compromise ‘European
solution’, which could function adequately in the near future. This would
require constructive good will on the part of the EU as well as Podgorica and
Belgrade. In a longer-term perspective the common integration into the EU
could largely dissolve today’s tensions between the two parties. Both parties
look forward to a European future, but their proposals do not really reflect it.
The paper therefore offers some ideas on this. The main idea is to approach
the question of Montenegro’s constitutional future by looking at how the
major functions and institutions of government might each best be organised
in the immediate future and in the longer run. The system might then be
made to fit the objective needs. There is every reason to devise a tailor-made
solution, rather than be constrained to choose between stereotyped
constitutional models which are both conflictual and increasingly out of line
with the realities of the integrating Europe.
The starting point is that the EU is itself evolving as a multi-tiered political
structure (EU, member state, federated/autonomous sub-states or regions,
local government, to which are added some  trans-national euro regions). The
EU polity is now one in which the primacy of the ‘sovereign nation state’
becomes greatly diluted, especially for the small states, with EU citizenship
acquiring increasing legal substance alongside national and regional
identities. Some member states experience transfers of functions of
government simultaneously both upwards to the EU level (economic and
monetary union, justice and home affairs, external and security policies), and
downwards to the level of regional autonomies (education, culture, regional
economic development etc). In this modern Europe old-fashioned struggles
over independence and sovereignty of the state fade away, giving way to
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multi-tier, overlapping political structures. These are not just academic
abstractions of political scientists. This is the modern European formula for
peaceful multi-national and multi-ethnic integration.
The Montenegro question is now pressing for decision. The EU, rather than
simply saying ‘no’ to independence and ‘yes’ to a federal solution, might
offer elements of a special solution under which Montenegro would begin to
fit already into this European model, and which should take into account the
Republic’s recent history and its current objective priority needs. A really
substantive offer might change the terms of the political debate within
Montenegro away from simply divisive alternatives.
Introduction
Montenegro is to be credited for the scale of its autonomous reforms in
recent times, notably from 1999, and for its courageous resistance during this
period against the Miloševiæ regime, to whose non-violent end Montenegro
made an important contribution.
As a matter of international law the Badinter Commission in 1991 and 1992
found
1 that the former Yugoslavia had effectively ceased to exist and that it
was for the Republics (i.e. including Montenegro, but not sub-republican
entities) to “constitute, if appropriate, a new association with democratic
institutions of their choice”. Having decided in 1992 to remain in a joint state
with Serbia, Montenegro is now reassessing that relationship. It is of course
for the governments and peoples directly concerned to work out and decide
what this relationship should be.
This paper first reviews the current proposals of Podgorica for the future
relationship between Montenegro and Serbia, which would amount to a
confederation (Annex A), and those of Belgrade for a new federation (Annex
B). Both proposals aim to resolve the future of the Montenegro-Serbia
                                                                
1 The EC Arbitration Commission, (Badinter Commission) in their Opinion No.
1 of 1991 found the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia “no longer met the
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and that it was “incumbent upon the Republics to settle such problems as state
succession ..”. In a subsequent Opinion No. 8 of 1992 the Badinter Commission
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themselves as sovereign states with the result that federal authority may no
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Crisis Group, Current Legal Status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and or
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relationship and both are using the language of ‘union’ or ‘unification’ to
refer to the new structure. The term ‘Union’ is used in the present paper as a
shorthand name
2 for the future regime.
The current official proposals may be read alongside two academic papers
prepared by experts from Belgrade (Mijatoviæ, Popoviæ and Samardžiæ
3) and
Podgorica (Šukoviæ
4). It is encouraging that the search for a solution is being
supported by analytical contributions, which relate the official proposals to
well-established principles of political science and law.
Also here considered are some other constitutional models, including
‘asymmetric union’ and intermediate formulas which may draw on a mix of
federal and confederal elements. Finally the paper sets out in some detail
elements for a ‘European solution’, given the perspective of European
integration for the whole of South East Europe, which is the official policy of
both the EU and the region itself, including the authorities in Belgrade and
Podgorica. However, the proposals of the parties, EU as well as Belgrade and
Podgorica, are lacking in content or vision on this European dimension. Yet
the substance of a ‘European solution’ could be crucial in turning the trend in
the Balkans, away from continuing destructive fragmentation, and towards a
reintegration process which would be both regional and European at the
same time. Montenegro will in any case become part of the ‘Europe of the
regions’, which involves simultaneous decentralisation and integration for a
vast number of administrative units of around the size of Montenegro, but
whose political status encompass the whole range from county to sovereign
state.
5
1. Confederation
The Government of Montenegro proposes independence within a common
state, which would be called the ‘Union of Montenegro and Serbia’ (see the
‘Platform’ proposal in Annex A). The Union would have the following
responsibilities:
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3 B.  Mijatoviæ, D.  Popoviæ and S.  Samardžiæ, “The Union of Serbia and
Montenegro – proposal for the constitutional reconstruction of FRY”, Centre for
Liberal-Democratic Studies, Belgrade, 2000.
4 M. Šukoviæ, “Relations between Montenegro and Serbia in the Light of their
Legal Status and States”, Podgorica, 2001.
5 There are about 200 administrative regions in the European Union (at the level
of NUTS 2 classification), with an average population size of a little under 2
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•  Defence. Montenegro and Serbia would have separate armies. The
common activities of these armies would be under the command of the
President of the Union, acting however on the basis of decisions of a
Supreme Defence Council, which would decide by consensus.
•  Foreign policy. The autonomous policies of the states would be
coordinated, with a rotating ‘ Coordinator’ minister. There would be
arrangements for joint use of diplomatic infrastructures. One member
state may entrust certain tasks to the other.
•  Common market and customs area. The customs system would be under
the competence of the states. Customs tariffs could be harmonised, but
with special agreements to take account of specific interests.
•  Common convertible currency. It is not said what the common currency
would be (a new dinar, or the euro?). However each state would retain
the right to its own monetary system, if the monetary union were
unsatisfactory.
There would be a single legislative chamber, with equality of seats per state.
The posts of president and vice-president of the union would be from
different states, rotating every two years. A Council of Ministers would
include posts of a president and vice-president and ministers of foreign
affairs, defence, finance and economics.
This may be described as a confederal structure, although the text does not
use the term. Sovereignty would be vested in the member states, not the
Union itself. The Platform is not explicit on whether there would be joint or
separate citizenship for the peoples of Montenegro and Serbia.
2. Federation
President Koštunica proposes in principle a federal model of state unification
(Annex B), for a ‘joint state of Serbia and Montenegro’. There would be a
number of exclusive federal competences (principally foreign policy,
defence, monetary and customs systems, transport), and a number of shared
competences (principally basic rights and freedoms, taxation, banking, trade
law, pensions). There would be a two-chamber parliament, an upper house
with an equal number of seats for each republic, and a lower house which
would be closer to proportional to population, but still with a minimum
number of seats for Montenegro.
The proposed joint state of Serbia and Montenegro would be a single
sovereign state for the purposes of international recognition and citizenship
(one UN member state, one passport).
This is an orthodox federal model, except in one important aspect. Most
federations that have survived the test of time consist of at least several if notThe Future of Montenegro
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many federated states, whereas Montenegro and Serbia are just two, with one
over ten times bigger than the other. The question of federalisation of Serbia
itself (e.g. for Vojvodina, Sandžak and other regions) is not addressed by
Belgrade, nor is it pursued in the present paper. Since the proposal is for an
‘asymmetric union’ the institutional arrangements for this special case should
be considered explicitly, since there are a number of examples of this kind
(see below).
In any case this structure of 1 big and 1 small state would necessitate a major
reform of government structures in Belgrade. As Annex C shows, Belgrade
inherits much overlapping of Yugoslav and Serbian government departments
and political structures, which need to be rationalised as a matter of urgency.
President  Koštunica proposes a federal government with 5 ministries –
Justice, Defence, Foreign Relations, Finance and Transportation.
The EU has expressed its support for a ‘Federal framework’ or ‘Federal
relationship’ (Foreign Ministers on 22 January 2001). This is clearly
opposing the separation of Serbia and Montenegro into two independent
states, but without saying anything specific on the form of federal (or
confederal, or asymmetric union?) structure. The US position is believed to
be similar. The approach taken in this paper is to interpret the word federal in
a broad sense, since it is obvious that a classic federal structure does not fit
naturally the needs of a very asymmetric union of two states.
3. Status Quo
Prime Minister Djindjiæ of Serbia proposed on 22 January continuation of the
present federation for a period of three years. This sounds like continuing
with the status quo, under which Montenegro is effectively autonomous for
economic and monetary policy and management of the state, while
citizenship and international recognition remain legally vested in the FRY.
This might have the advantage of allowing emotions to calm before
definitive decisions are taken, and also for policy makers in both Belgrade
and Podgorica to see how far they wish to follow common, similar or
different policies. At present Montenegro is more advanced than Serbia in
policies of economic and monetary reform, having started over a year earlier.
It is desirable of course for Serbia to make rapid progress in the reform of its
policies and institutions, not for Montenegro to be slowed down or pushed
back. How Serbia will progress is not yet known. But a period of about three
years would clarify this.
The disadvantage of the status quo is that the FRY does not function
properly, indeed hardly at all. There are important political ambiguities (e.g.
control of the armed forces) needing resolution and an urgent need to
rationalise the structure of overlapping Federal and Serbian governmentSession I. Montenegro’s Legal Status: Options for the Future
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structures in Belgrade. The uncertainty factor is also very bad for the
economy and potentially destabilising politically.
4. Asymmetric Union
The ‘1 big + 1 small state’ structure amounts to a special form of
organisation, which may be called ‘asymmetric union’. This can, however,
embrace elements from either federal or confederal models, with pairs of
states that may be unified or separate as a matter of international sovereignty.
Examples include Belgium-Luxembourg, UK-England-Scotland, Russia-
Belarus, Tanzania-Zanzibar. These offer a range of options in relation to
notions of ‘nation’ and ‘state’, as well as for the structures of government.
While some of these examples may seem rather distant and exotic for the
Balkans, they are at least reminders of the many ingenious solutions that
have been engineered to resolve seemingly intractable constitutional
problems. They should encourage the search for a specific solution for
Montenegro and Serbia, and avoidance of a drift into conflictual attitudes.
Belgium and Luxembourg are two nations and two independent states,
sharing an economic and monetary union, now largely overtaken by the EU’s
economic and monetary union. The main functions of the  Belgo-
Luxembourg union have thus passed to the EU level, although residual
functions remain (such as tax coordination). By contrast Belgium itself is a
rather symmetrical federation, whose two main communities have agreed on
the division of competences between federal and community levels, with
several explicit guarantees of political equality between them (e.g.
assignment of places in the government).
Russia and Belarus are two independent states, formerly unified in the
USSR, but with the particularity that Belarus was always a member of the
UN, with this symbol of formal sovereignty not impeding the functioning of
the integrated USSR. After several years of separation Belarus and Russia
have formed a new union, but still of two sovereign states. They envisage
economic, monetary and military integration, some steps already applicable,
some planned for several years ahead. Common political institutions are
created.
The United Republic of Tanzania is a single sovereign state, with two
entities: mainland Tanzania (population 33 million) and the island of
Zanzibar (population 1 million). Since the end of the 1970s Zanzibar has
been wholly autonomous in its internal affairs. International relations are
handled by Tanzania. There are no separate federal institutions to deal with
these issues. Zanzibar’s presence in Tanzania’s political institutions is
assured through representation in the Tanzanian parliament of nominated
members of the Zanzibar parliament, and in the post of vice-president (if theThe Future of Montenegro
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president comes from the mainland). This is a very clear example of
asymmetric union.
England and Scotland are two nations within a single sovereign state (UK
6),
with single citizenship, and with substantial devolution of functions to
Scotland. Outright independence has been debated politically in recent times.
Democratic consultations have included referenda, as well as regular
elections to the Westminster and Edinburgh parliaments, and local
government, in all of which the Scottish nationalist party has been
prominent. The referendum instrument has been regarded as the ultimate
democratic consultation, but used with very great care, since so much
depends on the precise formulation of the question. The two referenda of
1978 and 1997 both addressed proposals for substantial devolution, and did
not put the independence question. This 1978 referendum was not decisive,
but the 1997 referendum was carried by a large majority.
As with Serbia and Montenegro, the two nations of England and Scotland
have long and proud histories and identities. But the English or Scottish
identity of the individual has no legal status. It is a matter of personal
sentiment, while not less strong for that. Nobody can determine who is a Scot
or Englishman, except the individual himself, who is sovereign in the matter,
including those living in the other’s territory. The issue of separate
citizenship is avoided at the level of law, but very much alive at the level of
social identity.
Support for independence advocated by radical Scottish nationalists has
diminished alongside development of greater autonomy for Scotland and the
growing experience of membership of the EU. Scottish nationalists who
advocate independence from England no longer advocate secession from the
EU. Some Scottish nationalists would like Scotland to join the euro ahead of
England, without necessarily seceding from the UK. Under the current UK
government, Scotland achieved a substantial strengthening of its
constitutional powers and institutions, becoming virtually a federated state –
in the framework of an ‘asymmetric union’. There are in London no
duplicate ministries of finance or education etc. for the UK and England
separately. Instead, some UK government departments have jurisdiction in
Scotland, some do not.
The relationships between the UK, the Isle of Man, the Channel Islands and
the EU also contain some interesting legal provisions. The Isle of Man and
Channel Islands are not part of the UK, but its people have British
citizenship, or can easily have it, and they also have full rights of EU citizens
                                                                
6 We leave aside the cases of Wales, which has a weaker form of autonomy than
Scotland, and Northern Ireland, which now has a complex set of relationships
within the UK and with the Republic Ireland.Session I. Montenegro’s Legal Status: Options for the Future
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in the rest of the EU. Passports are British, but they are explicitly and visibly
issued by the governments of the Isle of Man or Channel Islands. The UK
takes responsibility for their external relations, but has no legal jurisdiction
over the islands, should there be a dispute over competences. These islands
are not part of the EU, but accept a large amount of EU jurisdiction regarding
trade policy and the rights of persons.
The  Åland Islands are in the Baltic Sea half way between Finland and
Sweden. The population of 25 000 are largely Swedish speaking, but the
islands are an autonomous and demilitarised province of Finland and part of
the EU. There is a special Protocol attached to the treaty of Accession of
Finland to the EU defining their relationship with the EU. The Åland Islands
have no authority to enter into international agreements on their own.
However if an international treaty entered into by Finland conflicts with its
Autonomy Act, the legislature of the Åland Islands has to give its assent for
it to be valid on its territory.
An essential difference between an asymmetric union and a regular
federation or confederation is in the handling of the very different weights
between the states. Federal structures provide in principle for equality, with
no single state dominating.  Confederal structures involve even stronger
parity between the states, with the need for unanimity for any decision in a
confederation of two states. In a union of two states of very unequal size the
big state may consider such structures to be excessively generous to the
small state. In an asymmetric union these problems are attenuated. The small
state is effectively able to opt out of the big state’s policies for a certain list
of functions, and the big state is free to decide on its own preferences. The
term ‘associated state’ is sometimes used in connection with asymmetric
unions of a small entity attached to a larger entity.
5. Outright Independence
The question of independence can be discussed for its political and economic
aspects.
Politically, an independent Montenegro would become the 197
th member
state of the UN and member also of many international organisations. The
EU, US do not wish to see Montenegro attempt outright independence. There
are two reasons for this.
The first and most important concern is over demonstration effects elsewhere
in the region, which might encourage other separatist or irredentist moves.
The cases in point include, of course, Kosovo, where indigenous pressures
for independence are very strong. The concern here is that developments in
Kosovo could destabilise and fragment either Macedonia or Albania or both.
While there should be no illusions over the likelihood of any renewed union
between Kosovo and Serbia, it is still an operational political objective of theThe Future of Montenegro
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highest order that the future status of Kosovo be worked out in a general
context of peaceful negotiation, and regional and European integration.
There is also concern for Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose integrity as a state
cannot yet be taken for granted. For example Serb nationalists in the Serb
Republic or Croatian nationalists in the Federation could be encouraged by
independence for Montenegro to demand secession from Bosnia and
accession to Serbia. Within Serbia itself there would be fears of destabilising
the situation in the border region of Sandžak, as well as Vojvodina.
The second concern, especially for the EU, is not to encourage the
proliferation of very small states in a region, all of which now has the official
perspective to accede to the EU. This is partly for institutional reasons. The
Zagreb summit in November 2000 showed that both the EU and all of South-
East Europe support this integration perspective. However the Nice
European Council meeting of December 2000 also showed how sensitive is
the matter of balance within the EU between larger and smaller states, and
concern for the viability of institutions with very many member states. The
EU has another reason, which is a deeper matter of political philosophy of
modern Europe. The EU becomes a multi-tiered political structure (EU,
member state, federated/autonomous sub-states or regions, local government,
to which are added some trans-national euro regions). The EU polity is now
one in which the primacy of the ‘sovereign nation state’ becomes greatly
diluted, with EU citizenship acquiring increasing legal substance alongside
member state citizenship. Some member states experience transfers of
functions of government simultaneously both upwards to the EU level
(economic and monetary union, justice and home affairs, external and
security policies), and downwards to the level of regional autonomies
(education, culture, regional economic development etc). In this modern
Europe old-fashioned struggles over independence and sovereignty of the
state fade away, giving way to multi-tier, overlapping political structures.
These are not just academic abstractions of political scientists. This is the
modern European formula for peaceful multi-national and multi-ethnic
integration.
The strong preference in the EU therefore, shared by official and much
academic thinking, is for a compromise solution for Serbia and Montenegro
in the spirit of these modern European trends. The arguments here are
entirely political.
The argument is also sometimes heard that Montenegro is too small to be an
independent economy. By contrast with the serious political arguments
above, this economic argument is manifest rubbish, given that Europe has a
multitude of small, very small and micro-states which are exceedingly
prosperous. Montenegro has a population comparable to that of Luxembourg,
Cyprus and Malta and many times bigger than various European micro-states
such as Andorra or Monaco.Session I. Montenegro’s Legal Status: Options for the Future
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The question for Montenegro, be it an independent state or as part of a union
with Serbia, is whether it has the potential to become prosperous, and, if so,
whether it can organise economic and monetary policies to realise that
potential. In fact Montenegro has some obvious natural advantages and
specialisation’s on which to base its future prosperity: tourism, the port-
transport-transit sector and hydroelectric power. The coastline is an
extension of the Croatian Adriatic River. The Montenegrin sector begins just
a few kilometres south of Dubrovnik. With an open frontier and an improved
Adriatic highway the Montenegrin  riviera could aim at a progressive
modernisation, expansion and upgrading of its tourist sector. Inland tourism
also has considerable potential. For the port-transport-transit sector, the port
of Bar has a good  locational advantage for supplying the needs of inland
Serbia, Kosovo and parts of Bosnia. Hydroelectric potential also offers real
opportunities for profitable investment. On the basis of these three sectors
the rest of the service and light industrial sector could also develop
adequately.
Prerequisites for achieving this potential are complete economic openness, a
good monetary and banking system, correct state and corporate governance
and a stable international status.
6. Elements of a European Solution
This section reviews the concrete functions that matter in the search for
accommodation between Belgrade’s call for a renewed federation versus
Podgorica’s call for a confederation. It is noted that President Djukanoviæ is
speaking in favour of independence to safeguard the democratic and
economic reforms that Montenegro has achieved in the recent past. It is also
considered here how the European integration context could reduce or dilute
points of friction and bring extra value-added and advantages for all parties.
Three principles are suggested:
1.  Every effort should be made to avoid a brutal separation – i.e. one
resulting simply from the breakdown of negotiations – but instead
achieve a constructive political compromise, which would be a positive
example for the Balkan region.
2.  A hybrid solution somewhere between federation and confederation may
be appropriate. The EU is itself a federal/confederal compromise. There
is no reason not to construct another one.
3.  Where Montenegro wants to differ from Serbia in specific policy
domains, it may be useful to distinguish:
•  A/ essentially local issues suitable for decentralised choice, in which
case Montenegrin competence can be readily agreed; andThe Future of Montenegro
32
•  B/ matters of common interest not only between Serbia and
Montenegro, but which are also domains of actual or emerging EU
policies. In this case there might only be temporary differences
between Serbia and Montenegro, given the common objective of
convergence on EU policies. If in some of these instances
Montenegro wished to converge on the European policy faster than
Serbia, this could in principle be viewed favourably.
The new Union might then fit in with the mainstream EU model of two
parallel processes: on the one hand regional decentralisation in some
domains, alongside on the other hand convergence on EU policies in other
domains. This two way redistribution of competences, ‘upwards’ and
‘downwards’ at the same time, is the modern European way of dissolving
conflicts and struggles over such classic concepts as ‘independence’ and
‘territorial integrity’. For the Balkans as a whole this model would also have
the great advantage of re-integrating the region in a politically acceptable
manner, i.e. through and with the EU.
Citizenship. This issue is not dealt with explicitly in either the Koštunica or
Djukanoviæ documents. At present residents of Montenegro have F.R.
Yugoslav passports. Passports issued in Montenegro include the following
reference:
Issued by: MUP RCG – CB PODGORICA
where the initial letters stand for Ministry of Interior Affairs, Republic of
Montenegro. These passports are used internationally without difficulty.
If Montenegro were to become fully independent, with separate Montenegrin
citizenship, there would be considerable complications. First would be the
position of residents of Montenegro considering themselves to be Serbian,
and the corresponding position of residents of Serbia considering themselves
to be Montenegrin. Common citizenship of the Union would seem to be a far
better solution.
However there could be ways of enhancing Montenegro’s identity within a
system of common citizenship of the Union. For example the reference to the
issuing authority could be made more explicit and prominent. The identity of
the issuing authority would of course be strictly on the basis of residence, not
ethnicity, religion or culture. It could be for consideration whether the
passport should also display a Montenegrin symbol, or both Union and
Montenegrin symbols. The passport could draw further on the model of the
EU, which cites first “European Union” and then has the name of the
member state, and then the symbol of the member state.
7
                                                                
7 N.B. For Bosnia the High Representative decided in September 2000 that the
passports of the citizens in all entities should be identical, with only the  BiHSession I. Montenegro’s Legal Status: Options for the Future
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All citizens of the Union would have the same rights of residence, movement
and employment, irrespective of the place of issue of their passport. There
would be the duty to enrol for military service in one or the other army (as is
usual for persons holding dual nationality). They would vote where they
were resident. National identity could be expressed (Scottish style) very
distinctly, but as a matter of personal choice, not a matter of law.
Citizens of the Union would have equal property rights, notably to own real
estate in either Serbia or Montenegro. This is an obviously important and
practical matter, on which the official documents are silent.
At some stage, in the future, given the perspective of EU membership, the
passport might come to have even a triple identity – for example EU, ‘Union
of M & S’, Montenegro. While this may be a distant perspective, the point
would be already to encourage public opinion to think in terms of the
European citizenship with multiple identities.
Armed forces. In a peaceful Balkan region Montenegro would have no need
for a full army, but rather for specialised local forces for frontier and coastal
protection and internal law and order. Given the recent history of the role of
the Yugoslav army in Montenegro it is understandable that Montenegro
wishes the armed forces on its territory to have an autonomous command
structure, for the time being at least. This could nonetheless be consistent
with a coordination mechanism with Belgrade, and provision for a joint chief
of staff for agreed actions, as proposed in the Platform.
However this assumption of a peaceful region itself calls for a wider
initiative to consider what kind of security order should now be organised for
South-East Europe. The long-term objectives of NATO and/or EU accession
are a part of the answer to this question, but not sufficient for immediate
needs. With the passing of the  Tudjman and Miloševiæ regimes, it is now
time for a fundamental debate on how to secure a change of regional security
paradigm: away from that of regional conflicts and hostilities, and into that
of the Europe where war has become unthinkable. This would require a
political debate for all in South-East Europe to undertake together. It should
also become a dimension to the EU’s new work on its own security and
defence policy. As regards NATO, it would be for Belgrade to decide
whether or when it wished in this context to deepen relations with this
organisation. In the meantime, while a new regional security order was being
shaped, there would be no immediate need for Montenegro’s small local
forces to be subordinated to an integrated command structure.
                                                                                                                                                 
name and symbol, in Bosnian, Croatian and English languages (in Latin script)
and Serbian (in Cyrillic). This was to eliminate tendencies for the entities to
differentiate the passports issued by their authorities. Belgium, however,
provides approach, the citizen choosing the language of his identity card.The Future of Montenegro
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Monetary policy.  There is agreement that there should be a common
convertible currency, which in due course would be euro, given the goal of
European integration. Montenegro is already using the DM/euro for its
budget as well as private transactions, and will be fully euro-ised when the
banknotes are introduced at the beginning of 2002. However Belgrade
wishes at present to have a reformed  dinar. This should be entirely
convertible, allowing also for the fully legal use of the euro in Serbia. In this
case there would be no great problem with Montenegro’s use of the euro.
Montenegro should not be put under pressure to renounce the Euro, since its
use is especially appropriate for an economy specialising heavily in tourism
and entrepôt trade. It would be advisable for Serbia to envisage a policy of
rapid euro-isation, and for the EU to support this policy, and certainly not
discourage it. Euro-isation is by far the best route for monetary re-integration
of the region.
Trade policy. Montenegro has in the last year differentiated its trade policy
from that of FRY, introducing simplified and generally lower tariffs for trade
with third countries. Between Serbia and Montenegro there remains a free
trade regime, with zero tariffs. However the tariff policies for third countries
are substantially different. The FRY average tariff is 15.46%, whereas
Montenegro’s is only 5%. The highest FRY tariff is 40% and Montenegro’s
is only 15%. The Federal authorities in Belgrade have recently submitted
proposals to parliament reducing FRY tariff rates in many cases, eliminate or
reduce differences with Montenegro.
However, in February Belgrade has been taking steps to establish customs
controls of the Serbia-Montenegro frontier, given that many Montenegrin
tariffs are still lower, with  Podgorica’s budget receiving the customs
revenues of products entering, for example, the port of Bar. (Being de facto a
free trade regime between Serbia and Montenegro, goods of Montenegrin
origin enter Serbia free of tariffs, and vice versa).
Both Belgrade and Podgorica envisage a customs union, but as an exclusive
function of the Union in Belgrade’s view, while Podgorica envisages a
cooperative and coordinated regime.
It would in any case advisable to link trade policy with the wider regional
and European policy context. Serbia and Montenegro could work actively
together in favour of a three stage strategy: [I] to complete free trade for the
whole of South-East Europe in the very near future, [2] preferably also in
conjunction with applications to join CEFTA (as Croatia does already, with
Romania and Bulgaria already members of CEFTA), but this would take a
little more time, and [3] for the whole of the region to join in the enlarged
EU custom union (which includes Turkey already), which calls for
imaginative leadership from the EU itself.Session I. Montenegro’s Legal Status: Options for the Future
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Overall, the attribution of trade policy competence between Belgrade and
Podgorica should not be made into a major stumbling block, since this
function is due to be unified and merged with EU trade policy in due course
in any case. However in the short-run Montenegro should not be forced to
revert to a more protectionist trade policy. Better, Belgrade’s policy would
move towards to the more liberal policy of Podgorica, since that would be in
any case a useful step towards trade policy integration with the EU.
Taxation and the budget. The Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union for a
long time offered an example of tax coordination alongside monetary union.
Over time the EU dimension to tax harmonisation has become more
important, with a common VAT system and limited harmonisation and/or
coordination for excises, the taxation of savings and technical subjects such
as double tax relief. A similar scenario could be envisaged for the Union.
For the immediate future it is probably best that both Serbia and Montenegro
proceed as best they can with their own tax reform agendas, while retaining
the prospect of convergence on EU tax polices. EU integration becomes a
factor for efficient convergence of Serbian and Montenegrin policies.
The EU, and in particular Italy and Greece as neighbouring states, are
concerned about the cigarette contraband trade and consequent loss of tax
revenues for their own budgets. Solutions are not difficult to envisage. For
example Montenegro could introduce levels of excises within the normal
bands for EU excise policy. The EU could offer to Montenegro increased
cooperation in the policing of its coast and land frontiers. Since EU states
would recover very large sums of tax revenue, there could be devised some
special transitional arrangements to help development of the regular tourist
economy of Montenegro.
The budget of Montenegro is now completely separate from Belgrade. No
system of inter-governmental transfers remains. Areas requiring cooperation
will surely include social security and pension entitlements for people with
high mobility between Montenegro and Serbia.
Infrastructure.  A special development programme for Montenegro’s
economic infrastructure could be readily devised on the basis of feasibility
studies already undertaken. The main projects that would be keys for the
rapid development of Montenegro’s natural specialisation in the tourism,
port-transit and hydroelectric sectors could be:
•  Technical modernisation of Podgorica and Tivat airports.
•  Construction of the Verige Bridge over the Boka  Kotorska bay crossing,
an important missing link in the Adriatic highway.
•  Improvement of the coastal road network.The Future of Montenegro
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•  Acceleration of the coastal water pipeline project.
•  Sozina road tunnel on the Bar-Podgorica highway.
•  Investment in a dam and hydroelectric power generation, jointly with
Bosnia.
•  Upgrading of the regional electricity network, running into Bosnia,
Macedonia as well as Serbia.
The EU, EIB, EBRD, and IBRD would be leading financiers of these
projects, whose cost over a period of about five years might be of the order
of 150 million euro. The EIB submitted in September 2000 a report on
priority infrastructure investments in Montenegro, but implementation is held
up because of the constitutional uncertainties.
8
International financial institutions.  Montenegro’s ambiguous constitutional
situation makes access to the international financial institutions currently
impossible. Regarding the IMF this is less of a disadvantage than might
seem, since a fully  euro-ised Montenegro will have little or no need for
recourse to the IMF credits. The World Bank only lends to sovereign states.
The European Investment Bank (EIB) requires guarantees for its investment
operations, which the EU Council of Finance Ministers is not willing to
extend to Montenegro at present. It would be unfortunate for these
institutions to force the choice between an unnatural federation and outright
independence. Montenegro has clear economic development priorities, for
example for the coastal infrastructure linking with the Croatia, which it
wants to pursue without political or bureaucratic hindrance from Belgrade.
If Montenegro went along with the wishes of the EU and international
community to abstain from outright independence, then the World Bank, EIB
and EBRD should deal with an autonomous Montenegro directly, and find
solutions in their own procedures for this case.
Justice and home affairs. As a matter of political and economic strategy it is
vital for Montenegro that its frontiers be completely open for tourists and
business visitor from the EU. It should therefore go for unilateral visa-free
access, just as many EU accession candidate states have done, while adapting
their own justice and home affairs policies to EU standards. Serbia would be
well advised to do the same.
Montenegro may want to modernise its police and judiciary very rapidly, in
which case it should receive every assistance from the EU. Montenegro
could autonomously begin the process of convergence on the EU’s growing
                                                                
8 Basic Infrastructure Investments in the Republic of Montenegro, report to the
Ecofin Council of the Balkan Task Force of the European Investment Bank, 29
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acquis in the domain of justice and home affairs. If Serbia wished to do the
same, that would be even better.
Foreign policy.  At the level of formal international recognition (UN
membership) the Union could be one entity. However this does not impede a
high level of autonomy in external representation. The Union’s diplomatic
missions could include units nominated by and answering to Montenegro
(such as is informally the practice in Bosnian missions). In certain cases
there could be separate missions, able to represent the interests of
Montenegro. Such representations exist for many entities other than formally
recognised sovereign states, especially in Europe. Various international
conferences and organisations have shown the flexibility needed for
substantive business to be conducted by the most relevant parties, with many
possibilities for sub-sovereign state to make external agreements.
Montenegro is already participating in the Stability Pact.
Political institutions. A full federal structure of institutions with overlapping
ministries and a bicameral legislature looks on the heavy side for this
‘asymmetric union’. The lighter confederal structure proposed by Podgorica
with a single parliamentary body with parity of representation and a bilateral
Council of Ministers with rotating presidency looks be more suitable. An
alternative model could be for Montenegrin members to be elected to a
single parliament in Belgrade, but with restricted voting rights on legislation
only having effect in Serbia.
Such a structure, and the design of the Union, could be provisional. There are
several examples of confederations giving way after a period of years to
federal structures. Indeed this has been the experience of the US, Canada,
Germany and Switzerland during the course of their histories. It is quite
possible that a few years of normalisation of relations between Serbia and
Montenegro and restoration of a high level of mutual trust, as well as their
common European integration, might lead the two parties to wish to revert to
a more federalist form of government.
European policy.  While the Union may negotiate a Stabilisation and
Association Agreement with the EU, Montenegro could negotiate a special
Protocol linked to that agreement, but containing individually negotiated
provisions, some of which have been suggested above (taxation, money,
trade, customs). There would be a good case for the EU to show special
understanding in the case of a Montenegro which, as part of a Union with
Serbia, also had the will and organisation to advance fast towards meeting
EU standards and policy norms within the scope of its competences. Such an
understanding might translate into a special status as a ‘European autonomy’,
which was nonetheless part of the Union with Serbia. There already exist
positive examples of highly autonomous and successful special entities
within EU member states, including for example the case of  Catalonia inThe Future of Montenegro
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Spain. The EU needs more generally to devise incentives and opportunities
for entities which want to integrate faster with the EU than the evolution of
the EU’s own institutions allows. In the particular case of Montenegro,
where the EU and international community are anxious to avoid potentially
destabilising demonstration effects on other regional entities, and indeed to
create positive demonstration effects, the EU should be imaginative in
negotiating a special Protocol, giving it real political and economic content.
EU involvement in the process.  Given  the important European integration
dimension to a possible solution, it is highly desirable that the EU makes
available a forward-looking view of the place of the Balkans in the European
Union. The various European policy dimensions summarised above are
complex and often quite fast moving subjects. As the above examples have
shown, there is the need to work out this forward-looking view in more
concrete and immediately operational terms than mere declarations about
long-term perspectives.
7. Conclusions
The position papers of the Government of Montenegro and of President
Koštunica on the future of the Serbia-Montenegro relationship are
significantly different, one advocating a federal model, the other effectively a
confederal model. However both wish the future to include the European
integration dimension, and the threat of use of force in finding the solution is
fortunately absent. Moreover every effort should be made to find a solution
which would set a new standard for the Balkans. This would reject old-
fashioned nationalism, which in modern Europe and the EU in particular has
been overtaken by complex structures of multi-tier governance,
interdependence and shared sovereignty.
In concrete terms a European solution for Montenegro might take into
account the following elements:
•  There is a good case for retaining common citizenship for the peoples of
Montenegro and Serbia, who are brethren, not enemies. To divide them
as a matter of legal rights would pose problems. Separate national
identities can be respected and indeed fostered in other ways.
•  There is a good case for Montenegro to retain the key elements of its
recent economic and monetary reforms, including a low external tariff
and the DM/euro as the currency, and autonomy over of ongoing
microeconomic reforms. Serbia has an enormous agenda of economic
and monetary reform to address, and this process should not retard or
reverse Montenegro’s own reforms. In any case EU integration provides
the road-map for re-integration. To say that Montenegro is too small toSession I. Montenegro’s Legal Status: Options for the Future
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prosper as an autonomous economic unit is complete rubbish, for Europe
is full of very prosperous and small entities.
•  Montenegro has specific needs for infrastructure and other investments,
especially relating to its coastal economy, and these should be supported
by full access to the EU and International Financial Institutions, and
procedures should be adapted to the needs of the situation.
•  Montenegro’s security does not really need a substantial army in the new
context of a democratic South-East Europe integrating with the EU, not
does it need an army controlled in Belgrade. Specialised coastal and
border services are needed, and the EU could help make these efficient.
•  Belgrade does not need an overlapping structure of federal and
republican institutions, where the federal model is now a complete
fiction. If there is to be a form of asymmetric union between Serbia and
Montenegro, this can be done with a single set of government
departments in Belgrade.
•  The old notion of the ‘internationally recognised sovereign state’
becomes increasingly diluted and symbolic in the new Europe, especially
for its many small states. There are ways of organising external
representation, which avoid costly duplication, but allow for
decentralised powers. Apart from issues of symbolism, there remain
really important questions of demonstration effects on other parts of the
former Yugoslavia, which are not yet stabilised. Montenegro could in
fact become a new model example of multi-tier European governance.
This suggests that there could be room for a ‘European solution’ between the
two official positions presently on the table. In essence this could lie
somewhere between federal and  confederal models. Legal purists may
object, but the EU itself is a compromise between the federalist and
confederal. The solution could also draw on the example of several soundly
functioning ‘asymmetric unions’ between two entities of very different size.
If the solution could have these qualities, it would deserve the active support,
both political and economic, of the EU and international community.The Future of Montenegro
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Panel Discussion of Session I
Chairman Gareth Evans (ICG) asked participants to consider three questions
concerning Montenegro’s situation:
•  Is the status quo sustainable?
•  If not, what are the options?
•  What is the process for moving forward on one or another option?
He suggested participants consider whether the FRY constitutional structure
is still a living document, a dead letter, or, as ICG has argued, in process of
dissolution. It is clearly dysfunctional but that alone is not decisive since
muddle does not always require clarity. The issue is whether the  FRY’s
dysfunctionality is sustainable.
If there is need to move beyond the status quo two basic types of options
exist for Montenegro and Serbia: 1) maintain a common sovereignty; 2) have
separate sovereignties whether or not in some kind of union with certain
common functions; and 2a) separate sovereignties with no union and no
common functions. Evans hoped participants would consider the pros and
cons of each option from the viewpoints of both Montenegro and Serbia and
also the wider implications of the independence options for the rest of the
Balkans, especially Bosnia and Kosovo.
Finally the conference should discuss process (timing and sequence). If there
is to be Montenegrin independence, should it be through a unilateral process
as President  Djukanoviæ proposes? A second set of procedural questions
relates to the form of a referendum, including who the voters should be, what
majority is required, and whether the result would be self-executing. He
identified a third set of questions respecting a Montenegro-Serbia dialogue,
in particular, whether it should be direct or mediated, and, if the later, by
whom.
Professor Mijat Šukoviæ of the Montenegrin Academy of Science argued that
the existence of a state can be determined under international law with
almost mathematical precision. Montenegro meets the standard conditions,
including history, international recognition as far back as the Berlin Congress
(1878), the recognition accorded by a series of Yugoslav constitutions, the
distinct cultural identity of its people, and borders that have been
acknowledged as state borders. The present Yugoslav Federation is
unnatural. The two states of Montenegro and Serbia are factually
independent, and the structure that links them is no longer a living one. Since
living structures must be accorded priority over dead ones, there is a need to
come to grips with the living reality of Montenegrin independence.
Montenegro, Serbia and the international community should search forSession I. Montenegro’s Legal Status: Options for the Future
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solutions that confirm realities, not attempt to reconstruct a dead Yugoslavia
which would, in turn, deconstruct what has been built up in recent years in
Montenegro.
Professor Vladimir  Goati from Belgrade University said Montenegro will
soon choose in an election and referendum between independence and
cohabitation. The trend toward independence is not new. It appeared at the
start of the 1990s as Yugoslavia began to disintegrate. The 19 per cent that
favoured independence in the 1992 referendum have now probably become a
majority. The change was spurred by Montenegro’s conflicts with the
Miloševiæ regime. While some say the trend has been encouraged by
political parties greedy for power, almost certainly a large majority favours
independence. This suggests that the parties favouring independence will win
both the April elections and the subsequent referendum. Nevertheless, these
votes will not solve Montenegro’s problems. Society is deeply divided on the
independence issue, with a significant element seeing no future without ties
to Serbia. Montenegrin political processes need to reduce the risk of ongoing
grudges. The winners of the votes should negotiate with the losers and use
dialogue so that all groups in Montenegro “think from the same handsheet.”
Srdjan Darmanoviæ of CEDEM said that the statehood issue has increasingly
dominated Montenegro’s politics throughout the past decade. For a long time
concern about the stability of Montenegro held back the movement. Now
that this concern has disappeared with  Miloševiæ’s fall, the issue is even
more in the forefront. Over the past year, polls have indicated a sizeable and
steady majority, between 55 and 57 per cent of the population, in favour of
independence, and there is no reason to expect a change in the near term.
President Djukanoviæ’s party is likely to win the April election and call a
referendum within 45 days. Support for independence is strongest among
Montenegro’s political and cultural elite. The international community is
acting unrealistically, as it did in the early 1990’s when it planned only for
the less likely outcomes of the political crises in Croatia, Bosnia and
Slovenia. It needs to prepare itself to adjust to Montenegro’s independence.
Dragan  Šoæ of the People’s Party of Montenegro said that the best
perspective for Montenegro is presented by what was official policy in
Podgorica until a few months ago. This includes a loose framework of union
with Serbia that maintains a small number of common functions and
institutions (i.e. defence, foreign affairs and transport). This is something in
between  Koštunica’s and  Djukanoviæ’s policies. The solution could be a
confederal pact in a federal framework that would protect Montenegro’s
interests. Developing successful democratic institutions involves more than
merely resolving the question of statehood. Thirty percent of Montenegrins
live in Serbia. Sixty percent of Montenegrins have close ties to Serbia in one
form or another (i.e. family in Serbia). Unilateral independence for
Montenegro would produce difficult reactions in Kosovo and Bosnia andThe Future of Montenegro
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reduce Montenegro’s international aid from the European Union and other
international bodies.
Michael Emerson of CEPS said that Montenegro clearly has a right to
independence but if that right is exercised it needs to be by a substantial
majority. With respect to whether Montenegro and Serbia can share a degree
of common sovereignty, it is instructive to look at a number of other unions
that are unbalanced in size, population and similarly important indices.
Belgium and Luxembourg, and Russia and Belarus, have certain types of
unions but the participants remain independent states. England and Scotland,
and Tanzania and Zanzibar are two different cases where the participants in a
union are not independent. Whatever the future shared relationship,
Montenegro’s economy should not be returned to the dinar, or pushed from
its present 4 percent average tariff into conformity with Belgrade’s 19
percent average tariff. There can be such differences even in a common state
since undivided sovereignty is an increasingly outmoded concept. Regardless
of what the Montenegro-Serbia relationship eventually becomes, it is
possible to have a special Montenegro-EU relationship.
Daniel Serwer of the US Institute of Peace said he brought little wisdom
from Washington, where the US government was opposed to Montenegrin
independence. Some American officials mistakenly believe the entire
independence issue merely reflects President Djukanoviæ’s ego. Turning to
the process questions the chairman asked: no work done by outsiders can
substitute for what the Montenegrins and Serbs themselves do. The
international community’s real interest is regional stability. The serious
concern is the impact of Montenegrin independence on the  Republika
Srpska, even though the legal and historical situations of Montenegro and RS
are completely different. Nevertheless, unilateral Montenegrin independence
would create problems in the RS. Discussion, agreement, at least a
framework for the future Montenegrin-Serb relationship needs to be worked
out first. The issue of UN membership may be difficult to resolve.
Montenegro and Serbia should use the time before the April election to work
on very practical questions like citizenship. Official talks should start April
23, the day after elections and ahead of the referendum. Everyone’s interests
can be served in a cooperative process.
Gerald Knaus of the European Stability Initiative said it is easy to devise
unsustainable short-term solutions for the Montenegro-Serbia relationship as
was done often in the earlier Yugoslavia. The responsibility of the
international community is to help in finding a sustainable long-term
solution.  Serwer is right to state that process is the key component and
cannot be rushed. It is worrying that there is no serious debate in Serbia
about what it wants in a new federation, what this would be worth, and what
can be given up. Serbia needs to think such questions through if a sustainable
solution is to be found. Until Serbia does so, it will not be able to focus onSession I. Montenegro’s Legal Status: Options for the Future
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the real economic and political problems it needs to solve at home. On
process, ESI has written a paper that calls for an EU role. This is
controversial, but it was proposed in the conviction that the EU must rethink
its real interests. If it takes on a mediation responsibility, the EU would, in
effect, be forced to think through all the implications. Serwer is again right
on the need for the parties to begin the process of discussing and resolving
practical “nitty-gritty” issues. They have failed to date to consider seriously
what functional integration requires; this is a poor omen for an agreed result.
Zoran Kusovac of Jane’s Geopolitical argued that the strategic interests of
Montenegro and Serbia, as indicated in the two published “platforms” for a
future relationship, are competing or incompatible. For example, Montenegro
looks at the military policy issue from a “security” point of view. Serbia
looks at that issue from a “defence” point of view. Such an analysis suggests
Montenegro has every reason to opt for independence. “Yugoslavia,” is a
loaded term in the region. Montenegrin independence is a necessary step to
produce the final dissolution of the Yugoslav idea, as is resolution of
Kosovo’s status. The Yugoslavia idea needs to “hit rock bottom” before
some co-operation becomes possible. Serbia has as yet developed no
proposal for how Kosovo could be viably retained. Any attempt to organise a
new union of Serbia with Montenegro and Kosovo would be a nightmare for
Serbia from all aspects – political, economic and security. The international
community needs to help Serbia see where its real interests lie.
Open Debate
At the start of the discussion period,  Dragan Županjevac, the Yugoslav
Chargé  d’Affaires in Brussels, asked for the floor to remind the audience
that, as several speakers had said, there are deep historical links between
Montenegrins and Serbs and long time aspirations for a common state. There
are now two democratic governments, both of which want many of the same
things including integration into the EU and other European structures. As
recently as 1992, Montenegrins voted overwhelmingly for union with Serbia.
The problems came after that vote and because of “the dictatorship.” Since
Serbia now has a new government, it should be possible to work through the
differences between the expressed positions of the two governments. He
concluded with the observation that the Belgrade point of view should have
been officially included in the conference and that the larger Montenegrin
opposition parties should likewise have been accorded participation.
The Chairman (Evans) asked participants and the audience to use the
remaining time to consider the virtues and vices of, on the one hand, the
unilateral procedures toward independence described by President
Djukanoviæ, and on the other hand, some process of extensive dialogue or
mediation. In addition to these questions, a number of points about the rightsThe Future of Montenegro
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and attitudes of minorities in Montenegro and the reasons for the change in
Montenegrin public opinion about independence during the past decade were
discussed. Among the notable comments:
•  Šoæ observed that there is a deep cleavage of opinion in Montenegro.
This should not be a problem as long as democratic mechanisms are
used. The question is whether or not a referendum is needed by June?
The international community will ultimately accept any decision, he
said, if Montenegrins can overcome their divisions. The UN seat
question is not really important, but it should not be assumed that
Montenegro’s processes will automatically produce the best result. The
conditions for a referendum and the terms for confirming the voters’ will
are the keys to whether the best results are, in fact, obtained.
•  President  Djukanoviæ said that at the time of the 1992 referendum
Montenegrins did not trust enough in their own capabilities. Now
Montenegrins have more self-confidence in their ability to handle their
own affairs. This is why public opinion has shifted as it has on
independence. Montenegro has a long tradition of a multi-ethnic civil
society. Minorities have the right to vote. One can always question
whether, say, 70 percent is a sufficient majority to pass a referendum,
but “are we to accept the will of the majority or the tyranny of the
minority.” He expects the April election will be won by the parties that
favour independence. Those parties will then have a moral responsibility
to offer a referendum. Independence may be in a union with Serbia if the
Serbs want this or it may be without such a union. In either event
Montenegro’s independence represents no threat either to Montenegro or
to the region.
•  Serwer said that it was almost impossible to conceive of serious
negotiations between Montenegro and Serbia without a date being set to
provide impetus to the parties.
The Chairman (Evans) said in concluding remarks that none of the
participants and no one in the audience appeared to support the view which
seems to be driving US and EU positions, namely that a new independent
state in the Balkans would be a negative result. In fact, he said, there
appeared to be an encouraging measure of common ground in the morning’s
discussion.45
Session II
Balancing the Equation between
Public Finance & Foreign Aid
The Economic Situation & Economic Reforms
in Montenegro
Veselin Vukotiæ
* *
I. General Considerations
Since 1989, Montenegro has had negative economic growth or a decrease in
total income. In 1989, Montenegro’s GDP was $1.4 billion; in 2000, it was
$700 million (declining by 50% in one decade). In 2000, a positive GDP
growth was registered for the first time in ten years.
This trend was influenced by the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, wars in
Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo, the NATO bombing campaign,
sanctions imposed by the international community, political pressures and
instabilities, hyperinflation, etc.
In order to explain the current economic situation, however, we must first
answer two questions:
•  What was the key cause of the radical economic downturn from 1989 in
Montenegro until today?
•  Can long-term recession be stopped quickly?
There are two major, endogenous causes of the economic downturn in
Montenegro:
1.  Political factors, or a slower transition of the political sphere in
Montenegro and Serbia and their democratisation, which allowed daily
politics to dominate the economy.
2.  The economic system – a reluctance to abandon a way of thinking that
is based on the past, which held that the state is a major player in the
economy, that industry is basic sector in economy, that the financial system
doesn’t allocate savings and that citizens can reasonably expect government
to solve all their problems.
Can this trend towards an economic downturn be stopped in the short term?
In response to this question, we will point to the most important cause of the
economy’s downturn: Montenegro and the whole Balkan region have
delayed the transition process, unlike the other  South-East European
                                                                
* Institute for Strategic Studies and Prognosis (ISSP), Podgorica.The Future of Montenegro
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countries. We are implementing a so-called delayed transition. In fact,
serious reform in Montenegro only started in 1998, which was instigated by:
1.  Political changes in Montenegro,
1 and the
2.  Beginning of support from the international community.
That is the period when the concept of economic sovereignty of Montenegro
began to be realised. It was also a period when people lived in dire fear of
provoking a conflict with the federal authorities and the army. Put simply,
Montenegro was living in a cage with a python at the same time that it was
trying to proceed with economic reform. In the meantime, Montenegro
survived the NATO bombing. Combined, these causes speeded up reform
and produced results.
Any further delay in the implementation of economic reform would be
catastrophic for the economic and political stability of Montenegro and
would thwart further development of the transition process.
II. Macroeconomic Indicators
Does Montenegro enjoy macroeconomic stability? Perhaps the prior question
to ask is whether one can expect macroeconomic stability to prevail in an
economy that has survived three distinct shocks:
1.  Recession (a 50% decrease in GDP by 2000 from the 1989 level);
2.  Demographic chaos (an increase of the population by 13% over the last
ten years, including a large influx of refugees); and
3.  Delayed transition process (at least seven years compared to Eastern
European countries).
Try to imagine the economy of your country subjected to these three shocks?
Estimate the GDP and the population in your country under these conditions.
The  macroeconomy of Montenegro is characterised by three essential
disequilibria:
1.  External disequilibria, comprising three major components:
a.  external debt of $567 million (vs $12.2 billion debt of FRY);
b.  b. a negative trade balance in 2000 of $193 million or 26% of
GDP;
2 and
                                                                
1 The beginning of government run by an anti-Milosevic coalition.
2 This data should be analysed in the context of the introduction of the DM as
legal tender and the freedom of individuals to use the DM according to their
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c. positive flow of citizens’ transfers from abroad.
2.  Internal disequilibria, characterised by a high unemployment rate. In
Montenegro, the number of employees totals 142,000 of which 54,000
(38%) work in the non-economy sector and 88,000 in the economy
sector. There are some estimates that 15-20,000 employees work in
the informal sector. The unemployment rate is 28%.
The creation of productive employment represents the major problem
of our economy.
3.  Budgetary disequilibria: The budget deficit in 2000 was 156 million
DM, or 12% of the GDP. If non-budgetary payments are included
(pensions, health), then it becomes almost 17% of GDP.
Despite the  disequilibria, current economic activity reveals several positive
trends, e.g.:
1.  Industrial production has grown by 3.7%.
2.  Average wages have increased by 21%.
3.  The employment rate has increased by 2.2%.
4.  In December 2000, the CPI was 2.5%; the RPI, 1.1%.
5.  GDP growth rate in 2000 was 4.5%.
How can macroeconomic equilibrium be achieved?
Disequilibria problems have been solved as a result of two simultaneous
processes:
1.  Support from the international community. The EU has contributed 35
million euro and the US, $52 million. All budget and non-budget deficits
were fully financed by foreign aid.
2.  The carrying out of economic reforms in Montenegro and economic
rehabilitation and reconstruction, as evidence by economic indicators
from 2000.
We understand that support from the international community provided
macroeconomic stability in Montenegro, thereby creating conditions for
faster economic reform processes, the establishment of new institutions and
the integration of Montenegro into regional markets, especially markets of
the former Yugoslavia. Without that support, our reforms would be less
successful.
In light of the current high budget deficit, two questions need to be raised
publicly:The Future of Montenegro
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1.  Can Montenegro conduct economic reforms at the present time,
without foreign aid, and at the same time provide for macroeconomic
stability, especially budgetary equilibrium?
The answer is no. A budget deficit in all transition countries at the
beginning of the reform process is considered quite normal, especially
when one considers the three shocks mentioned above. For example,
in Bulgaria, it was about 11%, in Hungary between 6 and 9%, Ukraine
from 9-25% and Russia, 4-9%.
As a result of the sudden increase in wages in the public sector (which
is a consequence of the increase in the minimum wage negotiated by
the Government and labour unions), budgetary expenditures for wages
will be increased by 13%, while social benefits will be increased by
23%. I expect that this rapid increase, combined with the decline in
foreign aid and the political situation (elections and the referendum)
will create additional problems for the Montenegrin budget and the
country’s macroeconomic stability in 2001.
In light of attempts to solve the problem of the budget deficit, strict
control over wages in public sector is crucial. In the meantime,
Montenegro will continue with radical reform of its fiscal system. A
new GFS budgetary classification has been implemented, which
increases the transparency of the budget and its monitoring, and above
all, increases tax collection, which in turn increases budgetary
revenues. The Institute for Strategic Studies and Prognosis (ISSP) in
Podgorica, estimates that almost 35% of the budget deficit can be
financed if the informal economy is included.
According to ISSP, if Montenegro accelerated the reform trend, it
could reach a budget deficit of less than 3% of GDP by 2004.
2.  Does Montenegro possess the necessary resources, human capital and
government organisation to finance itself independently, and can it
finance itself in the long term from it’s own revenues? The answer is
yes.
These two questions are connected, but must be dealt with separately.
I don’t belong to the school of economists who take a resources
approach to development and industrialisation. I put greater faith in
services, knowledge, information and organisation. Expressed in
another way, I think underdevelopment is caused more caused by
spirit than a lack of resources in any country.
Beyond that, however, Montenegro is no the Sahara Desert. It is,
above all, a part of Europe. It is a Mediterranean state and the sea has
always served as a civilising influence.Session II. Balancing the Equation ￿ Public Finance and Foreign Aid
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Montenegro possesses many production opportunities:
•  Agricultural potential (fruit, vegetables, food, vine, fish).
•  A coastline 293 km in length.
•  The possibility of producing 100,000 tonnes of aluminium.
•  The capacity to produce 400,000 tonnes of raw iron.
•  The capacity to produce 1 million tonnes of bauxite.
•  The capacity to produce 75,000 tonnes of salt.
•  The capacity to produce 2.7 million tonnes of coal.
•  Services:  Brodogradilište  Bijela with potential capacities in
physical units of 2,800,000 and values of $30 million.
•  Port of Bar and overseas and maritime industry.
•  6.6% of the total population has attained a high level of
education, representing 20% of the active work force.
•  13,244 privately owned companies, or 85% of the total number
of registered companies.
•  A special opportunity of Montenegro is tourism. According to
estimates of a German firm – DEG, a financial company that
has developed a tourism strategy for the country ￿ Montenegro
could earn revenues of 1.6 billion DM from tourism over the
next 15 years, not including the multiplication effects. Of
course, this assumes huge investments and an increased level of
services. During the previous year, Montenegro earned 20
million DM in revenues from foreign tourists. (See Appendix
1.)
I personally believe that, above all, an important resource for Montenegro is
the intelligence of young people, which is the basis for software
development, the basic resource in the information economy, and sport,
which is becoming an important part of economic integration. The mentality
of Montenegrins doesn’t correspond to the traditional patterns of industrial
development. We must adjust our concepts of the development of
Montenegro to take account of the Montenegrin mentality and our
traditions.
3
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Despite all of our resources, I believe that they will be of value only if
Montenegro continues to build a new economic system, new institutions,
new rules of the game, new laws and new ways of thinking that will provide
integration into the region and Europe and develop modern concepts of state
organisation. The building of a new economic system based on European
standards is a precondition for solving the majority of the problems faced by
Montenegro today.
4
Thus, Montenegro doesn’t have problems with resources, but rather has
difficulty in creating institutions that would strengthen the competitiveness
of Montenegro in regional and European markets. The problem of statehood
status should be viewed from this perspective. The prospect of attaining
statehood should act as an additional incentive to introduce democratic and
economic reforms in Montenegro. Would it be easier for Montenegro to
conduct reforms as an independent country or as a part of a federation with
Serbia?
In ISSP’s estimation, Montenegro would solve the problem of its budget
deficit and all the other problems more efficiently as an independent state.
Montenegro and Serbia have different economies in terms of:
•  size (Serbia is almost 15 times larger)
•  the structure of the economy (Montenegro is oriented towards tourism
and services, Serbia on agriculture and industry)
•  the character of reforms (Montenegro has been oriented towards private
ownership and the market, and Serbia on the government’s role and domestic
currency – dinar, as precondition for development) and
•  the size of the reform conducted so far (Montenegro started reform
processes three years ago, whereas Serbia is only preparing to start reform
processes now).
Also, there are big differences in economic power which make  Montenegro
unequal to the federation in running monetary policy (Montenegro represents
only 8% of the total federal economy, excluding Kosovo); and its influence
                                                                
4 For purpose of clarifying my attitudes, I present the opinion of James
Buchanan, winner of the Nobel Prize for Economics: “The economic system is
defined by structure, rules and institutions which limit the choice of individuals
in interrelated interactions in the market. The transmission of the market into a
free market structure is a convenient subject of reform, together with institutions,
which provide the application of laissez-faire to operations in structure and
render as nonsense all proposals for reforms based on nationalistic goals and all
arguments in favour of leadership of political factors.” (J. Buchanan,  The
Economics and Ethics of Constitutional Order, University of Michigan Press,
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on monetary policy would be insignificant. This structure cannot be changed
if Montenegro is equal in Central Bank governance, because votes cannot
change power, size or the structure of the economy. It can be applied on
fiscal, custom tariffs, foreign trade policies. (See Appendix 2.)
According to existing ways of financing the federal budget, expenditures for
Montenegro would be 150 million DM or 10% of GDP, or 35% of current
Montenegrin budget expenditures. This amount would be spent only for
federal administration (army, employee, embassies) so it would be pure cost
for Montenegro. Montenegro doesn’t have the capacity to finance two
administrations: the federal one and the republic. Thus, the most rational
economic model is a union of two states, or, two states with one economic
system, instead of the current situation, which consists formally of one state
with two different economic systems.
Montenegro has its own administration, several representative offices abroad
and does not need an army. Therefore, the question remains: Why should
Montenegro pay 10% of its GDP for a federal army that it doesn’t need
(according to the existing Constitution)?
This is the essential question driving the research team of ISSP. The federal
budget basically covers expenditures for the army and federal administration.
Why do we need federal state, from an economic point of view, because of
the army and the administration?
If economic reform in Montenegro were conducted at the federal-state level,
the process of establishing institutions for the new economic system would
be much slower and our institutional dependence on institutions in Belgrade
would be perpetuated.
In that sense, Montenegro would inevitably become peripheral. It would
become a region whose reforms, their speed and character, would depend on
the federal level. There raises the question: if Montenegro and Serbia are
determined to introduce a European economic system and if Montenegro has
already circled its economic system at that basis, do we need a federal level
for conducting economic reforms? Do we need mediator between Podgorica
and Brussels? Between the Serbian government and Brussels? According to
the theory of transaction costs of Nobel Prize winner Ronald  Couse, a
federation would increase the costs of Serbia and Montenegro to join Europe.
As an economist, I haven’t heard any public reasons justifying the economic
costs of forming a federation and the additional transaction costs of Serbia
and Montenegro joining Europe.
One hears two contradictory statements:
1.  We want a federation where Montenegro is equal.
2.  Montenegro can’t survive economically as an independent state.The Future of Montenegro
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If one pleads for Montenegro to join the federation on grounds that it cannot
survive economically on its own, this raises the question: how can one be
equal with one who supports you and to whom you are asking for money? As
an economist, I don’t understand that concept of freedom, even though I
have studied the concepts of Adam Smith, Mill,  Hayek, and others. Or
perhaps I am too much under the influence of Dostoyevsky who said “money
is malleable freedom”.
In the context of this opinion, I wish to make two additional statements:
1.  Montenegro today has a budget deficit. That deficit exists no matter
whether Montenegro is independent or not. The budget deficit would
be sooner or later paid by the taxpayers (citizens) of Montenegro. No
one expects the international community to finance that deficit in the
long term. It is necessary to accelerate the creation of conditions on
both sides, budget revenues and expenditures, to be able to apply the
principle that “level of revenues is a measure of consumption”.
2.  Montenegro has to orient itself to a wider market, to encompass the
republics of the former Yugoslavia, the Balkan region and the
European Union. It is up to Montenegro to implement an economic
policy and an economic system that realises the country’s potential by
integrating Montenegro into the European economic area. This means
creating an open, stable market economy through the introduction of
further economic reforms
III. Economic Reforms in Montenegro
As I have said, Montenegro has launched a process of economic reform. The
economic system is in place and related laws are in the process of being
formulated. Reforms have started on the broad front of structural and
macroeconomic reforms, in order to introduce capitalism to Montenegro.
A key axis of structural reform is privatisation.
The generally accepted political attitude in Montenegro is that all state
property may be privatised. The legal framework that enables transparent
privatisation has been prepared. According to the Montenegrin concept of
privatisation, the emphasis is being placed on strategic investors from
abroad, because we don’t have them in Montenegro. Our motto is: “We are
not selling companies, but buying strategic investors”. To date, 25% of total
capital has been privatised. We are expecting additional privatisation of 35-
40% in this year: through mass voucher privatisation about 27%, through the
sale of a tobacco company (which is in progress), Telecom of Montenegro
for which tender will be published by end of March 2001, through the sale of
a few hotels (tender has been published for three hotels), and in March, a
batch sale tender will be published for 17 Montenegrin companies. For theSession II. Balancing the Equation ￿ Public Finance and Foreign Aid
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last year, we have been preparing a tender for the sale of the Electrical Power
Company of Montenegro. An international conference on investment in
tourism will be held in May, and Montenegro is suggesting 40 projects for
international investors. By word of mouth, the process of  radical
privatisation has started. For all tender privatisation, according to law, we
have international financial and legal advisors. With experts from US AID,
the EU, DFID and financial and legal company advisers, we have about 100
foreign experts in Montenegro today. Together they lend a character of
transparency and expertise to our overall reform effort.
In the area of monetary reform, we have made even more progress. The DM
is legal tender, which was one of the most important reform decisions taken
in Montenegro. By introducing the DM, Montenegro has determined that it
will not restructure its economy by inflation (printing money), but through
real restructuring. In that way it is preparing its economy for international
competition. At the same time, we are establishing a non-inflationary
environment to encourage development of the financial sector and to
decrease the investment risk.
Implementation of the Central Bank law is in progress. The  Banking law has
been adopted, which together with the Law on Privatisation, forms a basis
for reconstruction and privatisation of the banking sector. The process of
restructuring the largest state bank, Montenegro Bank, has begun. The first
foreign bank has been opened in Montenegro. Four management companies
for handling privatisation funds have been established.
The Security Papers law, which regulates the financial market and the capital
market, has been adopted. Moreover, the Montenegrin Securities
Commission, the Central Depository Agency, the Montenegro Stock
Exchange and a few brokerage houses have been founded.
1.  Fiscal reform and the introduction of VAT are proceeding. Accounting
and statistical standards are being introduced. The transparency of the
budget has been increased, and the figures are published monthly. The
introduction of the DM and the international classification of the budget,
as well as the elimination of disparity between prices for the most part of
the economy of budget deficit has been achieved.
A Foreign investments law has been adopted – all barriers for foreigners are
abolished, and international courts guarantee property and contract rights.
Foreigners have same rights and obligations and procedures as a citizen of
Montenegro. For more than one year, visas for Montenegro have been
abolished.
New regulatory mechanisms for utilities are being established. For example,
a new law on telecommunications has been adopted and a regulatory agency
established, which is a precondition for privatisation of Telecom Crne Gore.The Future of Montenegro
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A regulatory agency for electricity is also under preparation. These agencies
are directly responsible to the Parliament of Montenegro.
The total system of foreign trade and customs is under reform. Customs are
being decreased from an average federal level of about 25% to 0-12%! We
now work with greater professionalism at the custom service, and are giving
formal training to custom officers in order to minimise possible misuse of
their position and eliminate corruption and in order to meet the standards of
the EU.
The effects of these reforms are becoming increasingly visible, but they are
still overshadowed by tempestuousness of previous political events in our
country. In 2000, for the first time in ten years, we experienced a growth in
GDP of about 4.5%.
The Montenegrin economic system is striving to become a liberal market
economy and a functional organisation based on the principles of a
microstate.
The concept of a microstate is foremost a strategic vision. It is contrary to the
vision of daily politics and even more contrary to a vision that sees the future
of Montenegro in its past. The concept of a  microstate makes a connection
between our present situation, the economic reforms in train and the strategy
for development pursued by Montenegro. This concept encompasses, among
others, the following principles:
1.  The basis of the economic system is private property and capitalism
(market). The direct role of the state in the economy is minimal. It is simply
the keeper of rules and laws.
2.  Macroeconomic policies (monetary, fiscal and foreign trade) are
conducted according to rules and standards of openness, with a view towards
European integration and the development of entrepreneurship.
3.  Development of a professional, strong Montenegrin custom service in
order to eliminate misuse, smuggling and corruption.
4.  Development of a small (much smaller than today), professional state
administration with high technological and personal standards.
5.  Greater participation of private initiative in public affairs (education,
health, promotion of foreign investments, promotion of entrepreneurship and
ecological protection).
6.  Montenegro doesn’t need an army or any kinds of expenditure for that
purpose (protection of the border has to be done by professional police and
the custom service).
7.  More professional and smaller police force than presently exists.Session II. Balancing the Equation ￿ Public Finance and Foreign Aid
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8.  Government with few Ministries.
9.  Limited number of trade and diplomatic representative offices in the
world (restricted to only the most important centres – between 10-15).
10. Strengthened role and responsibility of Parliament for the state as well
for the functioning of the economic system and especially the regulation of
utilities, financial markets and the banking sector. Decreased participation of
politics in executive power.
11. Further stimulation of development of non-government sector and the
stimulation of initiatives from this sector.
12. Development of an entrepreneurial economy and an entrepreneurial
class. Good companies should be more important than political parties.
13. An open economy: no intervention of import and export flows of goods,
capital and people. Abolition of any visa regime and respect for the principle
of reciprocity in establishing companies, banks, etc.
14. Functionally strong state organisation that protects contracts, property
rights, citizen’s rights and fights against corruption.
15. Removal from the state all functions that enabled, indirectly through
political parties, the domination of politics over the free choice by citizens
(for example, distribution of apartments, control over payment system and
employment in the public sector).
16. A completely transparent budget and a transparent policy for managing
the budget. Details can be changed only by Parliament.
17. In the administration of the  microstate, conditions must be created for
the realisation of principles of transparency, publicity and free choice of
consumer, voters and citizens in Montenegro.
18. Social policy must be separated from all politics and from managing the
economy. Social policy is the task of the state and the workers unions. The
companies must provide the necessary resources.
19. National treatment of foreign investors and foreign companies and
recognition of international courts. The gradual introduction of English
alongside the Serbian language as the official language over the next 10
years.
This development concept of Montenegro assumes the following path of
integration of the Balkans:
1.  Monetary integration of Balkan territory (same legal tender).
2.  Trade integrity (abolition of all barriers in trade).
3.  Free the region of the obligation to underwrite military expenditures.The Future of Montenegro
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These three steps will lead to the development of markets and market
integration. “And a market is the mechanism that turns enemies into friends”,
as  Hayek once said. That’s why I consider a free market as the only
guarantee for peace and prosperity of this area. I know that we need time,
knowledge and assistance. But I also know that the Balkans represent an
important barometer of Europe.Session II. Balancing the Equation ￿ Public Finance and Foreign Aid
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Appendix 1
Prospects of Tourism Development
in Montenegro, 2001-2020
a)  Capacities at 2000 (estimation)
Total: 155,000 beds
- Main buildings (hotels, tourist camps)  38,342 beds (24.7%)
- Complementary buildings 116,658 beds (75.3%)
With regular engagement of all capacities, the possible tourist turnover
would be 11-12 million nights.
b)  Period from 2001-2005
Main characteristic: privatisation and improvement of quality of
management, positioning at international market, modernisation of
capacities, building new privately owned hotels, improvement of
infrastructure, higher quality of products.
•  Capacities in 2005 – 160,000 beds (40,000 basic, 120,000
complementary)
•  Tourist turnover: 12,000,000 nights (days). Domestic turnover – 50%
(Serbia –5, Montenegro 1 million nights)
•  At the end of the 1980s, before the crisis began, Montenegro had a
turnover of 11 million nights (foreigners – 36.3%)
•  According to FLAG estimations, revenue was 250-$300 million in 1990,
and according to registered revenues, it was $144 million
•  Turnover from tourism in 2000 was 3,300,000 nights and consumption
of tourist was $70 million
•  With assumption that performs are rehabilitate already, estimation for
revenues in 2005 are $300 million
•  Actually, there is some estimation that indicators for tourism in 2005
will be equal as in 1990.
c)  Period from 2006-2020
5
Characteristics: Selective development of tourism, material base
development, infrastructure improvement, restructuring of buildings,
improvement of product quality
•  Capacity will be 200,000 beds (65,000 basic, 135,000 complementary)
•  Consumption will be 1.5 billion DM.
•  The umber of employees in tourism will be 45,000. This number of
workers would provide sustenance for 135,000 citizens.
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Appendix 2
Macroeconomics as a Form of Redistribution of Power
between the State and the Market
6
1.  Size of country and equality in domain of macroeconomic policies. Size
of country in domain of macroeconomic policies plays an important role. For
example, monetary policy. Let’s consider if the Central Bank of Yugoslavia
was independent. It means that, according to the constitution, it is authorised
to take care of the stability of prices and that it is completely autonomous in
the selection of instruments by which it realises this stability (if it fails in this
task, the Governor is replaced). In that case, having in mind that participation
of the Montenegrin economy in Yugoslav is about 5%, and if we exclude
Kosovo, about 8%, its influence on monetary policy would be irrelevant.
This could not be changed so that Montenegro is equal in determining
Central bank policy, having in mind that by voting the size of economy could
not be changed. The same is valid for foreign trade policy, tax policy, etc.
2.  Relation toward type of economic reform in Serbia and Montenegro. It is
reflected as relation towards role of state and private property.
a.  Montenegro is a  microstate. It means that it should have small
authority. Above all, this means that it should not be everywhere, and where
the state does have authority, it should be very strong and strict in control.
Macroeconomic policies in very small states do not have such large
importance.
b.  In Serbia, which is large (about 8.2 million citizens), it is believed that
the state can do a lot and that there is a lot to redistribute (macroeconomic
policy is a form of redistribution through interest rates, inflation, exchange
rate, trade regime, etc.) and that conscious redistribution results in increased
economic efficiency. In states the size of Serbia, this can be achieved, but not
always.
3.  Microstates such as Montenegro should basically rely on  private
property. The reason is that it is a small market and small markets cannot
establish big company, banks and insurance firms. It further means that the
economy of Montenegro cannot be too regulated or closed, that it has to be
liberal and open. If the state is small, then big companies do not have special
motive to “privatise” it, because it cannot provide special benefits. It means
that there are no conditions for oligarchical system. The size of Serbia is
sufficient that many businessmen will want to “privatise the state”, i.e. to
provide monopoly position that brings benefits. So they will be pleading for
stronger regulation and activity of the state in the economy. There are always
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lobbies to do precisely that (lobbies of large-scale companies, agriculture,
energy, etc.)
From this perspective (state and private property), the union of Serbia and
Montenegro cannot function with same types of institutions. There are two
types of economic reform arising from the size and structure of the
economies of both republics.
Foreign trade. Here there are differences. For Montenegro, the best is the
liberalisation of the whole region and liberalisation of trade with the EU.
This means low custom rates and limited protection measures that are in
accordance with the WTO.
Following this solution, the next best is a free trade regime with Serbia and
liberal trade with the rest of the world (regardless of which regime Serbia
has). The worst solution for Montenegro is a custom union with Serbia and
competition protection policy with respect to the rest of the world.
It is important to know the fact that integration with the EU entails the
gradual abolition of customs and non-customs limitations. Integration most
often means liberalisation of trade of industrial products, while agricultural
and some others remain under a protection regime of customs and quotas.
Having in mind the importance of agriculture in Serbia and the strong lobby
for their protection, this fact is more important for Serbia than for
Montenegro. On the other hand, Montenegro relies on tourism and services,
which requires complete openness of the economy.
4.  Monetary policy. There is still no readiness in Serbia to give up the
instruments of monetary policy, i.e. their own money and control of the
Central Bank with the emission function. It would be good to recall the
introduction of two quasi-monetary boards in Yugoslavia 1989 (Ante
Markoviæ) and 1994. (Dragoslav Avramoviæ), both of which failed in about
six months. In both cases, money had been printed for financing agriculture.
Montenegro has already converted to the DM. This is an attempt to avoid
inflation and to create conditions for greater inflows of foreign capital,
because foreigners don’t believe in domestic currencies. Capital is always
afraid of inflation and doesn’t go where the rates are high.
In this way, Montenegro has implicitly said that it wants to pursue solution to
its problems not by printing money (inflation), but by creating conditions to
increase productivity and restructuring. C hanges in the economic system
(rules of the game) and the structure of the economy are far more important
than monetary system and policy. It is important for us to have as many
foreign banks as possible. Foreign banks follow the approach of the Central
Bank of the country where they originate and the existing Central Bank of
the territory where they doing business.The Future of Montenegro
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5.  Fiscal reform. Montenegro cannot withstand all the fiscal burdens that
federal state imposes, especially the army. Should the federal level exist only
because of an army, because it takes 80% of the budget? Will citizens give
money for that structure of budget? Will they give money for army, for
federal administration and their apartments, for Ambassadors,…
The federal level should not lead any macroeconomic policies, because it is
authority of republics. If it does not lead macroeconomic politics, there is a
question of how it obtains it sources of revenues? Perhaps we should to look
at revenues in the context of the contributions of the two republics? This
means that there are no transfers from the union budget towards state
members, i.e. there is no redistribution at the union level.
Although the transfer of Montenegro to real financing would not be easy,
neither is it possible without foreign help. It means, as with all other
countries in transition, that Montenegro will have a high budget deficit and
covering that deficit requires radical reforms and establishing a new
economic system. No one form of state organisation (sovereign Montenegro,
federation, or union) automatically solves this problem. The question is only
which form makes possible the fastest reform in both an economic and
democratic context.
***
Personal note by the author on macroeconomic policy:  Macroeconomic
policy is an activity of the state in the area of economics. It encompasses
decisions by the state and quasi-state bodies in the area of taxes, customs,
interest rates, import regime, exchange rate, state investment policy, social
policy, etc.
Macroeconomic policy is an expression of our belief that the visible hand of the
state (conscious coordination of development) can give better effects than the
invisible hand of the market. In theory, macroeconomic policy is associated with
John Maynard Keynes (former UK Minister of Finance), who proposed that in
order to find solutions to the problems caused by the great economic crisis of the
1930s (unemployment, decreased production) state should replace some
functions of the market or stimulate the market (for example, public investments)
in order to stimulate production. From that period onwards, macroeconomic
policy has become a normal part of state activities.
But macroeconomics policy, according to the latest theory of public choice,
should be understood as connection of politics and economics, connection
between political parties and state, between consumers (in the economic market
of goods, services, capital etc.) and voters (political market - Parliamentary,
President, local elections). Both consumers and voters vote, first for producers
whose goods they are buying and second for political parties. There are attitudes
toward taxes, social policy, import, investments, etc. in the programme ofSession II. Balancing the Equation ￿ Public Finance and Foreign Aid
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political parties. In states that have established institutions that are already
functioning, the influence of the political cycle is smaller. In states without those
institutions and especially in small countries as Montenegro, the influence of the
political cycle, is great and most often results in economic instability.
In the final analysis, macroeconomic policy always means redistribution that is
not the result of prices, i.e. market, but someone’s conscious decision, someone
from the top who sees it better than the market. Thus an increase in taxes means
a redistribution of income from entrepreneurs and companies towards the state
budget, respectively, social groups that are receiving help from budget. An
increase in the interest rate means cash flow from investors (those who are taking
loans) toward citizens from whose savings those loans are financed. Each
redistribution has certain effects at the macro level.The Future of Montenegro
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Panel Discussion of Session II
Chairman Werner  Rechmann (FES) asked participants to focus on the
question of Montenegro’s ability to generate public finance and attract
foreign financial assistance, both in its present political circumstances and in
future independence or non-independence scenarios. Related to this is the
question of how much financial capital was actually needed to see
Montenegro through its transition, ensuring sustainable social and economic
development in the process.
Veselin  Vukotiæ of the Montenegrin Institute for Strategic Studies and
Prognosis presented a paper discussing the state of Montenegro’s economy.
He asked whether one could expect macroeconomic stability in a country
that has had to survive three shocks: that of economic recession,
demographic fluctuation and delayed transition. The three main disequilibria
are external (foreign debt), internal (soaring unemployment, at 28%) and
fiscal (the budget deficit in 2000 amounted to 10% of GDP.). A series of
economic reforms have to be designed and implemented, and trends such as
increased industrial growth encouraged, before macroeconomic equilibrium
can be reached. To this end, the support of the international community is
essential.
There is no question, however, about Montenegro’s ability to survive
economically as an independent entity. Montenegro has considerable
economic potential linked to a well educated work force, raw materials, a sea
coast and the Port of Bar.
The Montenegrin and Serbian economies are very different in terms of size,
structure (Serbia focuses on agriculture and industry while Montenegro
focuses on tourism and services) and the characters of the macroeconomic
policies by which they are governed. The Montenegrin economy could be
reformed more quickly independently of Serbia’s. There is also a
considerable cost implication for Montenegro in maintaining the Federation
with Serbia, as it has to finance two administrations, which amounts to ca.
DM 150 million, or 10% of GDP. The continued existence of the Federation
would increase the costs of either country’s integration into the European
Union.
What is proposed is the concept of a Montenegrin  microstate as a bridge
between economic reforms and long-term development. Defining
characteristics of such a microstate would be:
•  Ultraliberal, very open economy
•  Small government (few key ministries), no army
•  Dual language system (including English)
A free market is a key to peace and stability in the Balkans.Session II. Balancing the Equation ￿ Public Finance and Foreign Aid
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Dragan Djuriæ, a representative of the Montenegrin trade unions, said the
average salary in Montenegro is DM 300 a month, which is not enough to
cover basic needs. As a result, there have been numerous protests by trade
unions. On the other hand, the fears of the international community that
Montenegro is economically unsustainable are unfounded and derive from
experience in Bosnia, which cannot be taken as a model. Montenegro was
able to function independently five years ago, but has faced sanctions and
many other types of problems. It is imperative now that resources be fully
utilised, that the large “grey” economy be integrated into the formal
economy, not least to enlarge the tax base, and that a micro-credit scheme be
set up to help start businesses. A micro-credit scheme could potentially open
up 10,000 new jobs, generating in turn DM 35-40 million, which could make
up for the shortfall in public finance and foreign assistance.
Juliette Dierick of MONET said public finance in Montenegro was neither
transparent nor properly centralised. Parliament does not yet have full control
over public spending, and the budget presented to Parliament is non-binding.
A Budget Law is now in preparation, which is an important step in clarifying
the situation. In 2000 the Montenegrin government agreed to large new
expenditures, which were made possible because DM 150 million of foreign
assistance largely financed the budget deficit. It is unlikely, however, that
foreign assistance will continue to cover the DM 207 million needed every
year for the government’s new welfare policy. Long-term structural
consequences can be expected. The budget deficit is expected to grow to DM
200-280 million in 2001, which will necessitate reductions in current
expenditure and far-reaching structural reforms. The trend in foreign
assistance, meanwhile, appears to be steering away from financing the
budget deficit in general and towards financing specific projects, e.g.
pensions or electricity supply.
Mabel  Wisse  Smit of the Open Society Institute said that the significant
financial assistance Montenegro has received over the last three years, and
especially in 2000, was strategic in nature rather than focused purely on
economic reform. Therefore economic reform has not been handled in
Montenegro in the same way as in other transition countries. Now, after the
removal of the security threat emanating from the  Miloševiæ regime in
Belgrade, Montenegro is finally in the position to undertake economic
reforms. But at this crucial moment, international financial assistance is
being withdrawn, or held hostage to the postponement of the independence
issue. Here, the international community is playing “a very dangerous
game.” Without the resolution of Montenegro’s status, financial flows will
continue to peter out, which would be disastrous for Montenegro. As things
stand, the international financial institutions still cannot work directly with
Podgorica, and the political debate around the statehood question is
distracting from economic reforms. In this respect, it is important not toThe Future of Montenegro
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delay the proposed referendum on independence, as the current state of flux
is more damaging than a decisive vote, regardless of its outcome.
Andrew Levi of the Stability Pact stated that the EU has never ruled out this
or that constitutional arrangement for Montenegro, although it does have a
preferred solution, which is some form of federation with Serbia. The
Stability Pact contains a clause that Montenegro may be assisted “under its
democratic government as a constituent part of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia”, which will have to be rewritten in the event of Montenegrin
independence. In the mean time it is essential to keep aid flowing to
Montenegro.
In the ensuing discussion period the following points were made:
•  The EU was holding up not only aid but also urgent infrastructure
investment in Montenegro, essential for tourism and for the construction of a
key railway for the transport of aluminium.
•  A referendum on independence could be a catalyst, a cathartic
mechanism, to finally focus people’s minds on Montenegro’s future.
•  Vukotiæ asserted that the resolution of Montenegro’s statehood is the pre-
condition for economic reform.
•  Gavrilo Bobar, a Bosnian Serb businessman, said that business would
rather see Montenegro independent, despite emotional attachments to the
concept of Yugoslavia.
•  International assistance to Montenegro should not be linked to political
issues but should be linked to structural reform.
•  Wisse Smit stated that foreign aid will flow whatever the outcome of the
referendum, but will continue slowing down until a referendum is held. Levi
disagreed – the outcome of the referendum, and manner in which it is held, is
important and will have implications for future aid flows.65
Session III
The Long-Term Economic Prospects
Montenegro 2010
Daniel Gros
* *
As the geopolitical environment of Montenegro becomes more stable and
predictable, policy development can shift from short-term emergency
measures to a long-term strategy. Looking at fundamental assets and
constraints of the country helps to identify possible futures. Can Montenegro
become a viable country that fully participates in the prosperity of Europe?
How will the country present itself a decade from now? What can we learn
from the experience of other small countries?
An independent Montenegro would be a small country. However with about
650,000 inhabitants, its population would be marginally larger than that of
the smallest present EU member country, Luxembourg (450,000). It could
also be comparable in size to two current candidate countries Malta
(350,000) and Cyprus (750,000). In an enlarged EU, Montenegro would thus
not be the smallest member. By comparison, Serbia, with its 10 million
might appear to be a large country. However, within the EU, Serbia (or a
Yugoslav Federation of Serbia and Montenegro) would only classify as a
small country in the same league as Portugal, Belgium or Austria.
Moreover in economic terms Serbia constitutes not even a small, but rather a
micro state. The GDP of Serbia is at present roughly equal to that of
Luxembourg, which accounts for about 3 tenth of 1 per cent of the EU-15
GDP (and the exports of goods and services from Luxembourg are about five
times those of Serbia). If Montenegro has to choose between remaining
integrated in the Yugoslav economy or choosing integration with the EU
there can be no doubt where its future lies.
At present Montenegro still trades heavily with Serbia and some ex-
Yugoslav Republics. Experience in other countries has shown that radical
opening lead to a rapid reorientation of trade flows. Slovenia is a case in
point, but the Baltic Republics constitute even a better example. Before their
independence, 90 per cent of their trade was with the rest of the Soviet
Union. But this changed quickly, and the EU is now their most important
trading partner. An independent and open Montenegro could expect to
conduct most of its trade with the EU.
The relationship between Luxembourg (population similar to Montenegro)
and Belgium (population 8 million, similar to Serbia) could be used to
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predict the future trading pattern of Montenegro. Luxembourg has been in a
monetary union with Belgium for over 50 years and both economies have
enjoyed the benefits of EU-wide integration over last decades. But Belgium
(whose GDP is about 20 times larger than that of Serbia) still takes only
about 12 % of Luxembourg’s exports.
Measured in economic terms Montenegro itself would also be only a micro
state. Its GDP is at present probably lower than that of Liechtenstein (which
has only 30 thousand inhabitants). This country (the fourth smallest in
Europe) has also chosen not to have its own currency, but uses the Swiss
Franc instead. Liechtenstein’s exports amount to about 2 billion euro
annually, more than FYROM, B-H and Albania combined.
There is no presumption in economics that small States are not viable units.
The general lesson from both theory and experience is rather that the welfare
of a small country is determined essentially by its openness and the quality of
its administration, with geography also playing an important part.
The experience of Switzerland (and Liechtenstein) is instructive in this
regard. Until the middle of last century they were both extremely poor; and
since they had neither coal nor iron, nor a strong agricultural base, it was
generally assumed that they were condemned to remain underdeveloped.
However they are now among the richest states of Europe. They were able to
grow out of poverty because they made the most from their favourable
geographical position in the heart of Europe by opening their economies and
offering investors a stable political environment plus an efficient
administration. Recent economic research confirms that this is not just an
isolated experience but a general rule.
Part I of this note comments on the lessons one can glean from the recent
economics literature on the three determinants of economic development
mentioned above. On the assumption that the long-term goal of Montenegro
is to accede to the EU by 2010, Part II briefly outlines discrete steps the
government of Montenegro might take in the immediate future to give a
“jump start” to the whole process.
Part I. An Assessment of Montenegro’s Prospects for Economic
 Development
It might be useful to stress at the outset of this section that some factors will
not be considered here. The bauxite mine, the hydroelectric potential and the
existing industrial enterprises cannot secure the economic future of
Montenegro. On the contrary, they might hinder it. Academic research has
shown that countries with abundant natural resources grow in general moreSession III. The Long Term Economic Prospects
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slowly
1 and experience in other transition countries has shown that only the
countries that do not cling to their old industries have a chance to recover.
Heavy industries survive only very close to major markets. The future of
Montenegro must thus lie in the services sector, which does not require any
natural resources. A beautiful coast line for tourism helps, but this is in
abundant supply.
1. The role of institutions
There is now a consensus among economists that the quality of institutions
has a determining influence on economic prospects. Institutions refer here to
the legal system and the administration that enforces it.
Quality is of course a difficult concept to measure, but there are now a
number of indicators collected by respected international institutions (both
official and  NGOs) that allow for cross-country comparisons. These
indicators have been used widely in the economic literature, which has found
that they help to explain development and growth in GDP per capita. Growth
will thus come only if Montenegro increases the quality of its institutions.
2
There are two issues here: what is the starting point for Montenegro and what
can one say about the likely long-term evolution?
The starting point of Montenegro is difficult to establish. The comparative
indicators of institutional quality that exist have typically not been collected
for the FRY. Hence one has to look at the neighbouring former ex-Yugoslav
republics to have some rough estimate. A good first guess would be to
assume that the quality of the administration in Montenegro is somewhere
between that of FYROM, BH and Croatia. If Montenegro were close to the
latter its starting point could actually be somewhat better than that of present
candidate countries for membership. However, Croatia is also an example of
how a relatively good starting position can deteriorate over time. The ranking
of Croatia on the EBRD indicators fell over the last years. It remains to be
seen whether the new government can use its relatively strong base in terms
of an administration that works to make up for the time lost by the previous
regime.
The big handicap of Montenegro is, however, that almost all of industry and
a large part of the tourism sector are still in state hands. Privatisation must
thus take place before Montenegro can claim to possess a functioning market
economy. Other ex-Yugoslav republics (Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia)
                                                                
1 See for example Sachs and Warner (1995) and for an application to transition
countries Gylfason (2000).
2 A high quality of institutions does not imply that there should be special
regimes for foreigners. On the contrary, foreigners (foreign firms and
individuals) should be treated in the same way as nationals.The Future of Montenegro
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started with an economy in which only about one third of all value-added
was produced in the private sector. It took them several years to double that
share. Montenegro starts later and will have to go faster if it is to catch up.
The outlook. Size is certainly no obstacle to the development of efficient
institutions. The experience of small states (Estonia, Switzerland,
Luxembourg) and micro states (Liechtenstein) proves this. The only question
can thus be how one can accelerate improvements in the quality of
institutions in Montenegro. The key here must lie in complete openness and
the massive presence of foreign experts who can monitor progress and
intervene when special interest groups block reforms.
Some authors (see e.g. Sachs, 1997) find that poor countries might end up in
a self-made poverty trap in which an inefficient political system does not
dare to reform the economy because this is feared to lead to unacceptable
social consequence. As bad policies are not reformed the country does not
grow and might even get poorer. Over time it will than remain very difficult
to implement reforms so that this situation might persist. A mechanism like
this seems to be at work currently in Montenegro. The government agreed to
increase minimal wages by over 30 per cent this year under pressure of trade
unions which argued, that this is required on social grounds. However the
wage increase have led to a fiscal deficit which makes further reforms very
difficult and thus threaten the future development of the country. The
Croatian Parliament is at present debating a proposal by the government to
cut public sector salaries by 10 % in order to bring the budget under control.
Bulgaria had to take a similar step some time ago.
The next year will thus be decisive for the future of Montenegro. At present
there is a clear danger of such a poverty trap emerging. However, the
pressure from international financial institutions and the EU, whose support
is crucial in the short term, is likely to prevent serious policy errors. The only
conclusion one can draw at this point is thus that the next few years will be
crucial as they will show whether the leaders in Montenegro will find the
courage (and wisdom) to go beyond what is required by the international
financial Community and adopt the necessary deep reforms. Ten years of
experience with transition have shown that it also useless to discuss the
relative merits of slow versus ‘big bang’ reforms. The verdict of experience
is clear: slow reformers usually stay behind forever. (See Annex II for a brief
summary of the evidence.)
2. Openness
Openness is of course essential to any small country. Openness is partially a
natural consequence of being small, but it can be greatly fostered, or
hindered, by policy. Openness is usually measured by relating exports to
GDP. On this account one can expect that Montenegro should be very open,Session III. The Long Term Economic Prospects
69
provided it pursues the appropriate policies. For Luxembourg exports
amount to about 130% of GDP. Estonia and Macedonia, although more than
twice as large in population terms, also have exports to GDP ratios of close
to 100%.
Openness can be fostered by the right policy choices in two key areas:
money and trade policy. In both areas, Montenegro seems to have opted for
maximum integration.
Money: With the adoption of the euro/DM, trade and investment flows will
be greatly facilitated, provided, of course, the reform of the banking system
is completed. Creating a separate ‘national’ currency would not make sense
anyway for an economic area of the size of Liechtenstein (and a financial
system, which even smaller). The choice of the euro/DM will thus bring
advantages not only because it provides the country with a stable currency,
but also because it will intensify the integration of Montenegro into
euroland’s economic space. It has been estimated that for the EU the
introduction of the euro should lead to direct transactions cost savings of
about 1 % of GDP although intra-EU trade accounts for ‘only’ about 15 % of
EUGDP. As one should expect for Montenegro an openness ratio of about
100 % the gains for Montenegro in terms of pure transactions cost should be
correspondingly higher, over 6% of GDP. The long term gains are likely to
be higher still as this crude comparison suggests because tourism plays such
an important role for Montenegro and the per unit transactions costs for cash
are known to be higher than for trade among enterprises.
Recent research (see Frankel and Ros (2000)) suggests that every one percent
increase in trade (relative to GDP) raises income per capita by roughly 1/3 of
a percent over twenty years. Increasing the trade to GDP ratio by 30-60
percentage points could thus increase income per capita by 10-20 %. This
might been a modest gain, but it would come in addition to other factors,
such as overall productivity and would considerably speed up the catching up
process which Montenegro must engage soon if it is not to miss the (moving)
bus called EU.
Another advantage of adopting the euro is that Montenegro in this way no
longer faces the typical current account constraint that arises in fast growing
countries which import a lot of capital because Montenegro will be
considered just like any small region of Euroland whose current account is
not relevant (and usually not even known).
Trade policy. In trade policy Montenegro has already taken the first steps in
the right direction with a very liberal trade law which foresees low and
relatively uniform tariff rates. The next challenge is to implement this law in
reality. This requires strengthening the customs service. Strengthening means
in this case not giving customs officers more power, but to provide them
with the appropriate training and introducing procedures that areThe Future of Montenegro
70
straightforward and transparent, thus minimising the potential for abuse and
corruption. This will be essential if Montenegro is become an centre for
entrepot trade (centred presumably on the Port of Bar).
All customs procedures must of course from the start be designed to be EU-
compatible. This will facilitate the next step, which will be to negotiate a
customs union, or at least free trade agreement with the EU as quickly as
possible.
3 The EU hesitates in many cases to take this step because special
interest groups want to defend the domestic market and because it can often
be argued that the partner countries are not really able to implement such far
reaching agreements because their administrations cannot cope with all the
implications that would flow from a free trade agreement or a customs union.
In the case of Montenegro the first issue should not arise because imports
from Montenegro cannot possibly threaten even the smallest EU sub-market.
The second obstacle can be overcome by Montenegro itself by strengthening
its administrative capacity.
3. The role of geography
Even the best policies cannot produce high growth in a small country that is
isolated from the major world markets (e.g. Kyrgyzstan). Gallup, John Luke,
Jeffrey Sachs, Andrew Mellinger (1999) find that distance from markets has
a decisive influence on economic development as measured by GDP per
capita. Montenegro is situated rather close to the EU market, closer than
some EU members such as Greece, Portugal or Finland. Distance from
markets is thus not a negative factor for Montenegro, and in this respect a
Federation consisting of Serbia and Montenegro would not be better placed,
although capital city of Serbia is marginally closer to the EU market than
Podgorica.
The paper mentioned above also finds that access to maritime transport is
very important. His estimates would suggest that in the long run Montenegro
should actually be 50% richer than Serbia because most of the Montenegro
population lives close to the coast and a harbour. Access to the sea would
more than offset the marginally better position of Belgrade in road transport.
These estimates of the importance of access to the sea are based on the
proportion of the population that live within 100 km (or one hour driving
distance) from the coast. This has two implications:
1.  Serbia would not lose from no longer having a harbour on its national
territory because all of its population lives too far from the Mediterranean to
                                                                
3 It should go without saying that Montenegro will also have to apply for WTO
membership. Experience has shown that membership takes years to achieve,
even if Montenegro satisfies the requirements quickly because there is a long
queue of applicants. However, this should not delay negotiations with the EU.Session III. The Long Term Economic Prospects
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benefit from access to the sea. For Serbia the quality of the rail/road
connections to Bar (and Thessaloniki) should thus be more important than
whether or not Montenegro is part of the same state or federation.
2.  Montenegro would benefit from its access to maritime transport much
more if travel time to the centre of the country (where most of the population
lives)were cut half an hour by the  Sozina tunnel project, which would
effectively transform Podgorica into a harbour city.
4. Summing up
There can be no doubt that an independent Montenegro would be
economically viable. But would it just survive, or could it prosper? This brief
review of the economic literature suggests that this should be possible.
Geography provides Montenegro with a good position relative to the EU
market, via the sea and land. It is up to economic policy to realise this
potential by integrating Montenegro in the European economic space. The
EU has always opened its market to countries with stable market economies.
It is up to the Montenegrin. authorities to ensure that they qualify for this
treatment. The policies adopted so far for money and trade are encouraging
and should lead to first results soon. The long term economic future of
Montenegro will be determined by the persistence with which these policy
choices are pursued and implemented.
Part II. A Core Programme to be Implemented before mid-2002
All institutions in Montenegro must be reformed before the country can be
taken seriously as a candidate for EU membership, but it is not possible to do
everything at once. The authorities of Montenegro must set priorities. The
following is a core programme of three concrete measures that could be
adopted and implemented quickly.
1.  Completion of the privatisation of the four largest enterprises.
Privatisation will be a success if it is managed in a transparent manner and
results in clear governance, i.e. a (probably foreign) strategic investor will a
majority share, which can be effectively used to enforce restructuring.
2.  Procedural reform of the state budget. The experience of this year has
shown that serious budget planning is useless when parts of the government
negotiate with public sector trade unions generous wage agreements that lead
to much higher expenditure on wages. In order to impose hard budget
constraints on the entire government the procedure for decision making must
be changes: Decisions leading to higher expenditure must be possible only
when they are linked to decisions that raise revenues by a corresponding
amount.The Future of Montenegro
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3.  Reform of the judiciary/administration. Given the small size of the
country it is difficult to avoid a politicised judiciary system. The general
perception in Montenegro is that the judiciary does not operate well. Outright
corruption is not the problem, but judges have difficulties to be perceived to
be impartial because they are ‘part of the system’. The system of appointing
and assigning judges needs to be made more transparent by involving non-
M. in the highest instances. Liechtenstein has adopted such a policy with
success. The highest judge in this country is usually from one of the two
‘big’ neighbours (Austria or Switzerland).
The first part of this core programme requires no legislative action and the
administrative preparations (tender documents, nomination of a commission
involving outsiders, etc.) are already well advanced.
The second part of the core programme requires an addition to a law on the
budget that is already in an advanced stage of preparation and should soon be
submitted to Parliament. In order to ensure that this provision cannot be
easily over-ridden by Parliament it would be necessary to enshrine such a
provision in the new constitution that will have to be adopted once
independence has been chosen.
The third part of the core programme requires no legislative action s ince
there appears to be no formal regulation stipulating the citizenship of judges.
The formal structure is quite simple: Montenegro’s Justice Council appoints
all judges (for life) and the presidents of courts (for four years).  This Justice
Council consists of the Minister of Justice, two members of parliament, two
law professors and two judges. Formally it proposes new appointments to the
parliament which then ratifies them. It is considered that the Minister of
Justice has decisive influence. Judges are appointed for life. But the
presidents of the courts (appointed only for four years) have a very important
role as they decide the assignment of judges and on disciplinary proceedings
(against any of the judges). The next vacancy (or vacancies) at the Justice
Council should be filled with foreigners, or at least individuals that have not
grown up within the Montenegrin political system. The best choice would be
lawyers and judges from neighbouring countries (so that they can understand
the language and the legal tradition) who are known for their independence.
Their brief would be to bring a neutral point of view into the management of
the judicial system.Session III. The Long Term Economic Prospects
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Table 1. Quality of Institutions as Measured by the EBRD
Private sector
share of GDP,
mid-2000 (in %)
Average
EBRD Transition
Indicator, 2000
Hungary 80 3,9
Czech Republic 75 3,7
Estonia 80 3,7
Slovak Republic 55 3,7
Poland 75 3,6
Slovenia 70 3,6
Lithuania 60 3,4
Croatia 70 3,3
Bulgaria 70 3,3
Latvia 65 3,3
FYR Macedonia 55 3,2
Romania 60 3,1
Albania 75 2,8
Note: This scale is based on a maximum grade of 4, which is
supposed to represent a functioning market economy. The
average rating of 3.9 for Hungary implies that this goal has
almost been reached.
Source: EBRD (2000).The Future of Montenegro
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Annex I. The Belgium-Luxembourg Example
The experience of the relation between Belgium and Luxembourg is
instructive for Montenegro because Luxembourg has about the same
population as Montenegro and the relationship in terms of population is the
same as Montenegro compared to Serbia. Moreover, Luxembourg was
traditionally much poorer than its northern neighbour.
Two features stand out in the monetary history of Luxembourg:
1.  Apart from a brief period following the first World War the country
never had an independent currency.
2.  Tensions about the monetary link to Belgium arose only when the
Belgium currency became unstable.
The end of the First World War saw also the dissolution of the economic and
monetary union of Luxembourg. with the German empire. Given the small
size of the country it felt the need to join larger area. For political and
historical reasons Belgium became the partner of choice. Luxembourg
therefore entered an economic and monetary union with that country through
a Treaty concluded in 1921.
The first step consisted of the creation of a (one sided) customs union, i.e.
Luxembourg adopted the Belgian tariff system. The economy of
Luxembourg faced major adjustment difficulties after it left the relatively
protectionist customs union with Germany and had to accept the free trade
regime of Belgium. However, it is now generally agreed that this opening
laid the foundation for prosperity Luxembourg enjoys today.
On the monetary side the nothing much changed with the conclusion of the
Treaty in 1921 because the population of Luxembourg had already de facto
adopted the Belgian franc for store of value purposes
4 and only small notes
and coins denominated in Luxembourg francs had remained in circulation
(similar to Montenegro and Serbia until recently). The Luxembourg
government took out a loan on the Belgian capital market to acquire the
notes and coins to substitute local notes and coins with Belgian money
(however, a small rest of Luxembourg notes and coins remained in
circulation). The interest payments on this loan (rate 6%) were shared, 4%
were paid by the Belgian and 2% by the L. government. There was thus
some sharing of seigniorage. The initial agreement was revised several times
and after 1944 the seigniorage was fully shared as Belgium took over 100%
of the debt service of the (then much larger) sum necessary to re-monetise
the L. economy after the devastation resulting from the war.
                                                                
4 Germany was at the time in a period of hyperinflation.The Future of Montenegro
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Luxembourg. did not establish any monetary institution until 1983. The main
functions of the  Institut  Monetaire  Luxembourgeois that was then set up
were banking supervision and some IMF related business. With the advent of
EMU, this institution was upgraded and re-named Luxembourg Central
Bank, whose governor sits on the Governing Council of the ECB.
Annex II. Big bang versus Gradualism
The academic discussion on this issue now seems definitely, well, academic.
Experience has shown that slow reformers were just that, slow reformers.
The tortoises did not overtake the hares. Countries that implemented reforms
early usually stayed ahead of the others. The figure below shows this by
plotting simply the overall EBRD reform indicator (the average of all the
indictors available) for 1994 (the first year this indictor was published)
against the value of the same indicator in 1999. It is apparent that countries
with high indicators in the first period also had higher values five years later.
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The next figure makes the same point with respect to privatisation, but in a
somewhat different way. In this figure we put the private sector share of the
economy in 1994 on the horizontal axis and on the vertical axis we put the
relative progress achieved between 1999 and 1994. Relative progress is
defined as the increase in the share of the private sector during these five
years, relative to the share of the economy that was still in state hands and
thus was still to be privatised (relative progress in privatisation = (S99 –
S94)/(100 – S 94), where S denotes the share of the private sector in the
economy). This figure suggests that countries that started to late to privatise
also did not make up the lost ground later. Slow privatisation meant in reality
no privatisation. By contrast countries which privatised early continued to
privatise the remaining parts of their economy at a faster pace.
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Annex III. How fast could Montenegro grow?
This annex provides just some simple model calculations based on economic
research about the ‘normal’ rate of catch up of poorer countries. Moreover, it
also shows what would happen if Montenegro were able to copy the
experience of another country that shares a surprising number of features:
Malta: it has as similar size in terms of population (350,000) and it also
depends mainly on tourism and one port.
There is a large literature on convergence among poor and rich countries. It
has generally been found that the rate of convergence is around 2-3% p.a.,
implying that the difference in the level of GDP per capita is reduced each
year by around 2-3% through higher growth in poorer countries. Similar
rates of convergence have also been found within the EU and even within
larger economically differentiated countries. The attached chart thus shows
what would happen under two assumptions about the rate of convergence: a
‘normal’ speed is assumed to imply a convergence rate of 0.02, faster
convergence is assumed to imply a rate of 0.04.
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The example of Malta: Malta had in 1975 a GDP per capita (measured at
PPP) of only about one fourth of the EU level. Today it stands above the EU
(at 110 % of the EU15 average). This was achieved through a very high
growth rate, which as on average 5.5 % above that of the EU. The third line
in the attached chat simply shows what would happen if Montenegro were to
be able to follow this example. Cyprus (population 750 thousand) would be
another example of a relatively successful process. The Greek part of the
divided island has now a GDP per capita (always measured at PPP) of
around 75 % of the EU average, somewhat below the level of Spain.The Future of Montenegro
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Panel Discussion of Session III
Daniel Gros (Director of CEPS) tabled a paper on Montenegro’s longer-term
economic prospects and introduced the discussion. There was no logical
reason why a small, open, economically integrated state could not prosper.
Both Malta and Luxembourg are smaller than Montenegro but with GDPs
considerably higher than the EU average.
The essential issue is how such a small state would create the conditions for
prosperity, conditions like currency stability and investor confidence. An
independent Montenegro would need to focus its attention on growth
markets. Serbia, in economic terms, was already a microstate, with a level of
imports lower than Luxembourg’s. After independence, Montenegrin trade
with Serbia would – logically and quickly – decline. The point is illustrated
by the examples of Estonian trade ties to Russia, as well as Luxembourg’s
own links to Belgium (with only 12% of Luxembourg trade directed to the
Belgian market).
Any small country, in order to be economically viable, must: 1) be open to
imports by having a low tariff rate – small countries can afford to be liberal
in their trade regimes because they have very little industry to protect – and,
2) have an advantageous geographic position – countries that are
geographically situated near a large market (like the EU) and have access to
the sea have a better chance of economic survival.
Montenegro enjoys other economic advantages, specifically its maritime
access, the relative lack of inefficient local industries claiming protection
from imports, and the fact that a move to a hard currency had already been
taken. There is cause for concern about recent public sector wage increases,
and need to avoid reliance on deficit financing.
Vladimir  Gligorov (WIIW, Vienna/OECD, Paris) emphasised that the
introduction of effective economic policies pre-supposed wider social and
economic changes. In the case of Montenegro, a serious social revolution
would be implied. Montenegro would have to learn how to compete in quite
different, large markets. The tax system would have to be re-structured, and
company taxes lowered. These shifts in policy and thinking could not be
accomplished without costs. Reforms are, without question, necessary and
painful for the population of Montenegro. The right combination of reforms,
however, could ease these growing pains. The cultural differences within
Montenegro are not insignificant. Fiscal and social sustainability is critical in
the interim period. Social support mechanisms need to be examined. An
example is Montenegro’s internal diversity – the disparity between coastal
and mountain regions. These characteristics would need to be taken into
consideration.Session III. The Long Term Economic Prospects
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Petar Ivanoviæ (Executive Director of the ISSP, Podgorica) also highlighted
the need for Montenegro to develop new economic systems, institutions and
ways of thinking. The Serbian and Montenegrin economic systems can no
longer be regarded as complementary. Montenegro needs to weigh up the
costs of economic adjustment, as compared with the costs of trying to retain
the status quo. Montenegro has numerous economic bases on which to
depend on: tourism prospects, a base in the services sector, infrastructure
adopted to maritime access as well as to Montenegro’s links with its seven
neighbours, a young workforce, a population that has widespread
competence in the English language and a promising agricultural sector.
Vujica Lazoviæ (Podgorica) discussed the importance of Montenegro seeking
new markets beyond Serbia. The proximity of the Serbian market does not,
in itself, offer Montenegro sufficient inducement to remain in the FRY.
Whether independent or not, Montenegro had to confront the same structural
issue about the size and competitiveness of its companies. Montenegro could
learn from the adaptability of other economies to structural change; Korea
was cited as an example. If Montenegro was independent, then the key issues
of economic policy might be tackled in an easier, faster way, since the
Montenegrin government would be able to assume full and direct
responsibility for setting policy directions.
During the question period, the following points were made:
•  Montenegro must introduce an extremely prudent fiscal policy.
Currently Montenegro has a large fiscal debt of somewhere near 15
percent of GDP. These circumstances are not beneficial with the
introduction of the DM, a very controlled currency.
•  The EU will be less sympathetic about financing a large deficit in
Montenegro.
•  Inflation in Montenegro is becoming a concern for everyone.
•  There must be a concentration in increasing the “top-up” skills training
•  The amount of financial aid is so far up in the air if Montenegro decides
to establish independence. What will the reaction of the EU and other
countries be? Will it have a negative or positive effect on the economy
of Montenegro?82
Session IV
Relations with Neighbours and the EU
Future Relations of Montenegro with Its Neighbours
and the European Union
Branko Lukovac
* *
Good and stable relations with its neighbours, as well as with the European
Union, are preconditions for Montenegro and a necessary dimension of its
overall development. They are of the highest importance and top priority for
us. We have many reasons for this, and on this occasion, I will mention only
three: i) Because we are open and multi-ethnic society, which, throughout the
history, in constant communication with its Mediterranean and Balkans
surroundings, confirmed and strengthened inter-ethnic and inter-religious
tolerance, ii) Because, in our internal structure, we have demographic,
cultural, economic, geographic, traffic and many other connections with our
neighbours, iii) Because, long time ago, we have determined that our
perspective is in Euro-Atlantic integration processes and organisations, and,
with that aim, we have been for years conducting necessary adjustments.
Under hard circumstances of policy of anachronism and an authoritarian
regime in Belgrade, we have managed to establish, maintain and strengthen
our relations with neighbours and the European Union, and have been
accepted into certain regional and wider initiatives and processes as precious
democratic expression, partner and fulcrum. Contrary to expectations,
representatives of new authorities in Belgrade, using present federal
provisory and international ambient, have led systematic campaign in order
to undermine or at least weaken such active international engagement and
reputation of Montenegro. Their aim is to push Montenegro out of
international programs, processes and institutions (Adriatic, Balkans,
Central-European, Stability Pact and European Union), and win them over in
favour of their position, in which they would obtain support for federal
framework, and, in regard to determinations of Montenegro, warn of dangers
it would produce on regional stability, domino effect, unilateral steps etc.
Nevertheless, their attempts to project a bad picture of Montenegro, to force
us in their frame or filter in order to gain their own affirmation and trust and
legitimacy of Montenegro, will be in vain. With this act, they may forever
lose a chance, in our mutual relations and before Europe and the world, to
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create and promote new trust, to gain respect and credibility, by efforts to
accelerate and improve the process of connecting Montenegro with the rest
of the world and integration of Montenegro into all regional processes and
institutions. This kind of treatment of Montenegro and its interests should
send the best message to our citizens not to expect any benefit from their
side.
Therefore, there is no real base to feed the illusions and hope that, in present
circumstances and kind of federal frames, the interests of Montenegro to
maintain and improve cooperation with the world could be realised
successfully. Present, most inappropriate federal frame and negative position
of Belgrade authorities derived from it, not only inhibits, but also seriously
limits realisation of good cooperation between Montenegro, its neighbours,
European Union and international community as a whole. It is time that
international policy-makers realise that federal frame, created by policy and
regime responsible for greatest crimes in the area since the Second World
War, carries within all characteristics of that very policy. They should also
realise that common interest of our nations and the international community
should be eradication of that policy, together with all institutions and
mechanisms created for its own purposes.
It is obvious that only as sovereign state and full-fledged member of the
international community, Montenegro could successfully continue to conduct
its program of democratic domestic reforms and, in accordance with its
interests, build good-neighbourly relations, and integrate into regional and
European processes and structures. Our visions and plans towards
neighbouring countries are therefore based upon assumption that
Montenegro can enter them as equal member of the international community.
Now that peaceful and democratic conditions are attained, democratic
Montenegro is determined to do what all republics, former members of
SFRY, did – to enter new relations in the area of ex Yugoslavia as a free,
sovereign and equal members, without any territorial or other pretensions
towards each other and free of danger that they could become victims of
some old and recreated political forces and aspirations. This process has
already begun and therefore Montenegro has no reason or time to further
postpone and wait to achieve the same quality all other states in the area
achieved.
In that era of new relations in Balkans and Mediterranean, Montenegro will
bring values that qualify it as a good neighbour and important factor of
peace, stability and cooperation. Montenegro has no territorial pretensions
towards any of its neighbours, and it is not under the threat by any of them.
There are no internal national, ethnic or religious conflicts or serious
problems that Montenegro could not resolve on its own. Further more, in its
inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations Montenegro has obtainedThe Future of Montenegro
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experiences that could contribute to seeking of greater harmony of relations
in wider area. The characteristics of its cultural inheritance and creativity, its
nature, geographic position, economic structure and development potentials
and needs, as well as the human factor, demand its openness towards
Mediterranean, Balkans and the entire world. That is why Montenegro
intensified and hastened facilitation of movement of goods and people, visa
abolishment, decreased customs demands and brought itself closer to all
processes and institutions of regional cooperation.
All this, together with its democratic and pro-European policy, enabled
Montenegro to significantly and rapidly improve relations and cooperation
with all states, former members of SFRY, as well as with other neighbours.
In spite of limited financial resources for funding of numerous projects
relevant for building the trust and cooperation, and insufficient support of the
European institutions for such programs, remarkable preliminary results have
been achieved. Many countries attribute great understanding and support to
policy of Montenegro, though, to some extent, they have been limited by
regional movements and interests. Many programs in the area of
infrastructure, economy, culture and information, as well as in facilitating the
movement of goods, people and capitals, are being coordinated. Frameworks
and basic principles of the Stability Pact of South Eastern Europe, as well as
of some other regional programs, have given good stimulus to these
relations.
As an equal member of the international community, Montenegro wants to
be a good neighbour and useful regional factor for development of mutual
trust and understanding, promoter of stable peace and security and initiator
and participant of processes of cooperation, association and integration in
regional and wider frames. With that aim, Montenegro is determined to
initiate and contribute to the following forms and contents of regional
cooperation:
1.  To give priority to its own and international actions in combating
corruption and organised transnational crime in all its forms, offering to
establish appropriate mechanisms and undertake necessary actions in its
own territory, with the assistance of EU, USA and specialised
international organisations.
2.  To conduct an action in its own frames, and to contribute to regional
programs of decriminalisation of the societies which have become
victims of years-long policy of war and destruction in the area of former
SFRY, with numerous and powerful structures created as profiteers of
war and isolations; to conduct investigations and judicial processes
against all those who participated in crimes in the area of ex Yugoslavia,
and extradite to the International Tribunal for War Crimes in the Hague
all those who have been indicted.Session IV. Relations with Neighbours and the EU
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3.  To undertake, i.e. intensify, activities that would lead to respect of all
principles and norms of the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe and
the EU, concerning affirmation, protection and improvement of rights of
all members of national and ethnic communities or minorities, as well as
inter-ethnic and inter-religious tolerance.
4.  To pass regulations and initiate programs which would expand regional
cooperation and cooperation among the states of former Yugoslavia: of
connecting huge traffic, energy and communication systems; of
disarmament, de-mining, creating and expansion of weapons for mass
destruction, agreements on reduction or abolishment of customs and
other barriers for flow of goods and capital, as well as of exchange of
information, scientific and cultural works and artists. To that aim,
Montenegro, as sovereign state and rightful member of the international
community, intends to continue applying present regime of visa-free
entrance in Montenegro for all citizens from ex-SFRY countries and the
region, mindful of all necessary measures of protection from organised
crime, and expects the same from other countries of the region.
5.  In this regard, in relations with Croatia, we intend to find out, as soon as
possible and acting in good faith, a solution for only unresolved issue of
Prevlaka, which has been left to us as a legacy of former regime in order
to be permanent problem-maker. Acting in good faith, it is our common
interest to make Prevlaka a bridge of cooperation between Montenegro
and Croatia which will, in accordance with our agreement, be promoted
by our two states for further tourist development of wider Dubrovnik-
Konavle and Boka Kotorska area.
6.  Montenegro expresses desire and intention to organise, on regular and
traditional bases, Mediterranean cultural games, which will bring
countries of the region closer together and facilitate understanding and
cooperation, mutual influences and cross-cultural mix of nations and
countries of Mediterranean area.
In past years, Montenegro has established significant cooperation with the
European Union through different programs of reforms, humanitarian and
macro-economic support and various forms of participation in processes
initiated by the Stability Pact. Montenegro is interested to start working on
preparation of Agreement on Process of Stabilisation and Association as
soon as possible. Once its state and international legal status is resolved, all
conditions for its participation in Process of Stabilisation and Association, as
well as for realisation of already agreed program of bringing Montenegro
closer to the European Union, will be fulfilled.
Europe, the US and the world have paid too high price of their naïve belief
that Miloševiæ was a trustworthy and mighty partner and guarantee of all
agreements, including the one made in Dayton. If today they really want toThe Future of Montenegro
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bring him before the Hague Tribunal for war crimes, then they should not so
quickly and recklessly accept projects of those who have been his spiritual
leaders or blind followers, as bases for new stability and solution of the
remaining problems. It should not happen that people, who even today stick
to nationalistic policy, as main driving force of war and crimes in former
Yugoslavia, enjoy trust, even though they now have democratic cover. It
would also not be right to forget those who, in long period and hard
conditions, proved to be reliable defenders of freedom, rights, democracy,
inter-ethnic and inter-religious tolerance and cooperation with the world.
If well-fabricated deceit that sovereign and internationally recognised
Montenegro could endanger interests and the stability of Serbia and the
region, would be accepted as truth in Europe and if it would influence its
opposition to the will of majority in Montenegro, then Europe would become
an accomplice in new injustice towards Montenegro. Even more, perhaps
unconsciously and unwillingly, it would support the policy of destabilisation
of Montenegro and spiral of bad and possibly dangerous relations between
Montenegro and Serbia creating new, long-term hot spot in the entire region.
Along with that, Europe would question the validity and credibility of its
own principle and of those promoted during the efforts to solve crises in the
area of former Yugoslavia through the work of the so-called Badinter
Commission.Session IV. Relations with Neighbours and the EU
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Panel Discussion of Session IV
Branko Lukovac, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Montenegro, began by stating
that good neighbourliness was a precondition for on-going positive relations
within the region. Montenegro’s focus was in three critical areas:
1)  Promoting an open multi-ethnic society;
2)  Promoting economic connections within the region, between the
neighbours; and
3)  Engaging in the Atlantic integration processes and organisations.
Despite ten years of a repressive Belgrade regime, Montenegro has managed
to carve out and maintain strong relations with its neighbours and the
European Union. The current Belgrade regime appears not to be adverse to
undermining Montenegro’s international programs or outlooks in its attempts
to promote its preferred resolution to the federal debate. Montenegro’s vision
and plan for the future were squarely based on the idea of the Republic as
part of and equal member in the international community.
Montenegro’s reform program would continue to contribute to the following
forms of regional co-operation:
1)  Establishing of appropriate mechanisms, policies and programs with the
assistance of the international community to combat corruption and crime.
2)  Breaking down the grey economy, war/conflict economy.
3)  Launching – where appropriate – judicial processes for crimes
committed in ex-Yugoslavia.
4)  Respecting principles, norms and values vis-à-vis the protection of
national and ethnic minorities and communities, and to promote inter-ethnic
tolerance.
5)  Supporting free movement through the continued application of no-visa
requirements within the region.
Mr. Lukovac recognised the outstanding issue of the Prevlaka peninsula, but
saw this as an easily resolvable issue between Croatia and Montenegro.
Stephan  Lehne, Policy Unit, Council of the European Union, began by
recognising the positive role played by Montenegro during the Miloševiæ era,
and anticipated the Republic’s continued contribution and development of
the region. The future of the federal state, Mr. Lehne maintained was one
that concerned directly the peoples of Montenegro and Serbia.
The EU interest in these developments and the final outcome of them were
twofold given that:
1)  Both Montenegro and Serbia aspire to be members of the Union; and,The Future of Montenegro
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2)  The EU has a strong stake in the Balkan region.
The point was reiterated – as outlined in the 22 January communiqué – that
the European Union remained opposed to unilateral steps towards
independence, that democratic principles must be observed in the upcoming
April 2001 elections and that any outcome must have full democratic
legitimacy.
The EU’s main concerns in Montenegro concern stability. As regards
internal Montenegrin stability, a significantly even split in public opinion in
a yes / no vote for independence would not be a sound basis to establish a
strong state. As regards the stability of the region, two scenarios could be
foreseen:
1.  Montenegro discounts the impact of its independence on events in the
rest of the region – Kosovo, Republika Srpska, Macedonia and Serbia itself –
and where this would implicitly accelerate the independence push in Kosovo.
2.  Montenegro accepts the impact of its independence on regional stability
but maintains that it cannot be held hostage to regional issues/concerns.
The EU focus was not on developing policy entity by entity but by
developing policy for the region as a whole, and stated that two simultaneous
processes were underway:
1)  The breakdown of multi-ethnic societies; and
2)  The growing perspective of EU integration
The question is whether the process of disintegration in Yugoslavia has to
run its full course; states breaking up into ever smaller units. The concept of
sovereignty itself – with the EU as an obvious model – had fundamentally
altered. With this in mind, the CEPS paper, promoting resolution in the
context of a European perspective, was innovative and balanced. The EU
would support an arrangement that was agreed upon consensually and which
minimised the risk to regional stability.
H.E. Ljubomir Èuèiæ, Ambassador of Croatia to Belgium, began by stating
that for Croatia, all Balkan countries were equal partners in determining the
future of their region. For example, without regional co-operation Croatia
could not see itself finalising the EU Stabilisation and Association
Agreement or looking beyond this to future membership of the EU. Above
all Croatia promoted a peaceful resolution to the Federal question in the
FRY, but it did not see itself as having any official involvement in this
process. Montenegro / Croatia relations have vastly improved, and that the
only question for Zagreb was to constantly evaluate which partner it was
necessary to speak to – Serbia or Montenegro as events unfold.Session IV. Relations with Neighbours and the EU
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Ivan Krastev, Center for Liberal Studies, Sofia, outlined two questions at the
start of his presentation. What would be the reaction of the countries of the
region? What would be their position vis-à-vis the likely outcome of the
Federal question in the FRY? The other countries were likely to follow the
EU line – which was not difficult to predict – and none would formally
acknowledge Montenegro before the EU did, if it were to become
independent. The international community were only dealing with one
reality, one outcome. The problem was not that the international community
has a preference – but rather that its preference was highly unrealistic. The
focus needed to be on the process within the federation, rather than on the
outcomes.
The legal precedent applied in the Badinter commission would confirm that
Montenegro could seek independence. Indeed, if the rules were applied to the
rest of the region, then it would be Serbia ironically who would not qualify,
given that it is not in possession of full control of its own territory.
The stress should not be on the federation or independence question, but
rather on the process, the preparation for either of the two outcomes. The
options are either unilateral independence or negotiation – the preferred
option is that which could limit the potential fallout. In terms of Kosovo,
whilst recognising the regional dimension, only Kosovo-specific issues
would finally determine the issues surrounding Kosovo.
Christopher Cviiæ, EBRD, began by stating that the will of the Montenegrin
people would ultimately decide on the independence / federation question.
There is little reason to take seriously the ‘doom and gloom’ scenario
advanced by the International community and in particular the EU over their
concerns over regional instability in the event of Montenegrin independence.
The domino theory, which had been so discredited since the end of the Cold
War, held no relevance whatsoever in the present day Balkans context. Given
Montenegro’s good neighbourly relations, its track record over the last ten
years, and its stance during the Kosovo war, there was every reason to expect
that independence would not upset the regional balance. With exception of
the former territory of the SFRY, the Balkans region had been a peaceful
one, and that with the exception of the  Presevo valley, regional elites no
longer regard the use of force as a viable option in achieving political
objectives. The preference should be to get the process of the break-up of the
Federation over quickly, rather than to engage in a long drawn out process
premised on the over-cautious perspectives advanced by Brussels. A
settlement could only be brokered and concluded by Belgrade and Podgorica.
The process could also have a positive liberating effect on Serbia itself,
ridding itself of a very difficult relationship.
Mark Thompson, ICG, said that since 1991, the Balkan elites have been
consistently interested in the crown jewels of independence – fullThe Future of Montenegro
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sovereignty and wide use of governmental prerogatives. With the exception
of Slovenia these had been generally misused by the Balkans states. Perhaps
the EU was more interested in the process as opposed to the crown jewels –
the substance or the outcome. The present Yugoslavia federal question holds
the only real prospect of a negotiated settlement throughout the ten-year saga
of the break-up of the SFRY. However, with the 22 January Council
communiqué the EU is now institutionally incapable of revising their
outlined position. Regarding the impact on Kosovo, three points can be
made. If the process was a clean and easy exercise, it could act as a good
regional precedent for  Priština and Belgrade. Negotiations between
Podgorica and Belgrade would in no way forestall the outcome of Priština –
Belgrade discussions. If Montenegrin independence provoked political
violence and extremism in Kosovo, then the place to tackle that would be in
Kosovo itself, dealing with the most contentious hot-spot – Mitrovica.
Tim Judah, journalist and writer, argued that there was lots of preparation for
events that were not going to happen. Belgrade’s position towards
Montenegro he argued was schizophrenic: on the one hand there were strong
emotional bonds, on the other hand an acceptance of the inevitable and a
preference to get things over quickly. Mr. Judah concluded by stating that the
problem in all of these discussions was not so much Montenegro, but rather
Kosovo – how to manage the issue of Kosovo and Kosovo independence.
Question and Answer Period
•  A decision of this importance needs to have a strong basis in the
population. It is theoretically possible for independence to be decided by 25
percent of the electorate, plus one voter, if only 50 percent of the population
turns out to vote.
•  Why should the majority for independence from the referendum in
Montenegro be required to be higher than that of former Soviet states or
former Yugoslav states in the past referendums?
•  The international community, running Kosovo for over a year and a half,
has not established a normative, balanced approach towards European
perspectives as the EU proposes for Montenegro. Therefore, why force
Montenegro into being a hostage of the international community’s
misperception of the whole situation? Why force Montenegro into a shotgun
marriage with a bag over the bride’s head?
•  What role could international mediation play? One side wants
independence while the other side does not, what could a mediator do? The
only service a mediator could provide between Belgrade and Podgorica is to
settle the economic, security and political links between the two places
whether they are independent or a federation.Session IV. Relations with Neighbours and the EU
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•  The feeling towards the EU’s position in Montenegro is mixed. Many
are happy with the EU’s position on the process, but unhappy with the EU
position on the outcome of the independence question. This differentiation is
quite artificial because if you want genuine negotiations there has to be
willingness to compromise. Both sides must be open and agree that the
outcome is not preordained. What we need is a genuine, original solution that
satisfies this very complicated situation. There have been promises of
negotiations from both sides but to date the actual negotiations are lacking,
especially this far into the situation. This is the central point the EU made.
The perception that the EU should have a position on the process but not on
the outcome is a very unfounded perception.
•  What makes everyone so sure that outcome is going to be so perfect and
that the EU perceptions of the outcome of the Montenegro question are
unsupported?
•  Why is the EU preparing for the less likely outcome and ignoring the
more likely outcome? Why the posture of the ostrich?
•  The attitude of the international community towards Montenegro is
partial and violates the freedom of the citizens of Montenegro to decide
independently their future. The international community also supports those
forces in Montenegro that opposes European standards and values. Victory
by these forces will be a direct threat to Montenegro and the entire region.
•  European support is directed at forces that until recently supported
dictatorship. The increasing support of such groups will increase ethnic
tensions and will destabilise democracy in Montenegro.
•  Yugoslavia can no longer exist so there is no need to have the discussion
of today concerning how to preserve the union between Montenegro and
Serbia.
•  The referendum question is a question of politics, not legal issues. The
reservations of the EU are that it is possible for the independence of
Montenegro to be decided upon a very small majority or even a minority.92
Closing Remarks
Branko  Lukovac,  Minister of Foreign Affairs, said that because of this
conference he is ever more aware of the need for the transparent and
democratic proceedings in the upcoming months over Montenegro’s question
of independence to be evident. Because of your interest and desire to assist
the regions of the former Yugoslavia the future has already begun to
brighten. Thank you everyone for helping us with your views and for your
advice.
Stefanie Ricken from the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung closed by saying that one
thing had been perfectly clear, that there is a very strong wish for
Montenegrin independence, at least among the people in attendance. There
has been numerous historical, political, legal and economic arguments
presented in favour of independence today. The most important factor gained
from this conference, however, is the sense of an urgent need to conduct a
referendum and clarify the question of statehood. A referendum in the near
future would help to develop solutions for other problems concerning
economic and social development. Another important point is the procedure
of the referendum and what amount of the vote and participation is needed to
conduct a fair referendum.
Another interesting point that has surfaced is the need for Serbia to begin the
internal debate about their future relations with Montenegro. Perhaps the
Serbs should begin with practical issues such as citizenship and customs and
not so much with the more difficult issues of a continued federation or
confederation.
Finally, the process of the Union is integration so “how much does the region
(the Balkans) have to disintegrate before they are ready for integration
again?” This is an important question because the notion of national
sovereignty has changed a lot in the process of integration. What does
Montenegrin independence mean in the further integration of Europe?
FES will continue to debate this issue and work for a positive solution to the
question of Montenegrin independence.
Daniel Gros from the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) expressed
his opinion as an economist that the size of a country is not an impediment to
prosperity as long as the economy remains open. So, the question of
independence, in terms of economic considerations, is where will
Montenegro have a better-managed economy: as an independent country or
in some sort of federation/confederation.Closing Remarks
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What is missing in the debate about Montenegro is the awareness of acute
fiscal problems that exist outside of independence. The right policies can
lead to huge payoffs but they require tough policy choices from the very
beginning. The enormity of the choice that has to be made is missing in
Montenegro. A future that could be very prosperous for Montenegro requires
a present disposition to taking greater steps that are very difficult. This
fundamental choice is being somewhat drowned by the question of
independence and is something that the government of Montenegro must
address.
Gareth Evans  from the International Crisis Group (ICG) said that his
personal position had started out with deep anxiety about Montenegrin
independence in reference to avoiding spillover conflicts at all costs and the
virtue of “hanging in there” on some sort of common sovereignty notion. As
the day progressed, the idea of a very thin federal model presented itself,
perhaps the thinnest federation ever invented in the sense of two autonomous
entities having no common institutions except for perhaps a common
notional sovereignty. This does not seem to be terribly realistic either as
reality intrudes.
As the debate closed, it has become clear that the independence option is in
fact inevitable and the international community, starting with the EU, should
begin to accept this idea. The international community should begin to:
1.  Ensure that as the courses of events unfold, both sides are prepared for
independence: Montenegro in an economic sense – the responsibility of an
independent economy – and Serbia in a political and cultural sense – what
Montenegrin independence means to Serbia.
2.  Focus on identifying the principles that are applicable to the latest stage
of disintegration of Yugoslavia, what aspects make the exercise tolerable in
the case of Montenegro. Then apply these principles to the Republika Srpska
and other areas of conflict so that the slippery slope argument is
extinguished.
3.  Finally, let both sides conduct themselves in a way that doesn’t make
more difficult the achievement of this wider pattern of regional cooperation
and a other functional issues that will be crucial in the area.
If we concentrate on damage control and maximising the positive aspects of
this process perhaps we can learn from it and avoid mistakes that have been
made in the past.
Michael Emerson concluded with a view more favourable to a continuing
union with Serbia. There are many ingenious constitutional arrangements in
the world which have been devised to conciliate conflictual situations. There
can be common citizenship with separate national identities. There could be
in this case divergences in economic and monetary policies for the timeThe Future of Montenegro
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being, to be harmonised and re-united later through common EU policies.
There could be a light institutional structure. Indeed the idea of the lightest
federation ever should not be dismissed so easily. In any case decisions over
secession and independence should not be taken on the basis of small
majorities.
The EU does not want more micro-states in the accession pipeline. As was
seen at Nice, the prospect of an EU of 30 to 40 member states poses
formidable problems for the next few decades, until and unless the EU
matures into a more federal structure itself. In the meantime Montenegro
could have better prospects for EU accession in union with Serbia. This
argument is entirely different to the worry about domino effects, causing
further Balkanisation of the region.
Currently the huge budget deficit is also a serious concern. If Montenegro
goes ahead with independence it may wake up with a big hangover. It would
have to overcome this deficit on its own – such seems to be the warning of
the EU and international community.
There are constitutional options open for dialogue and search for a
consensual outcome. The EU should itself be more forthcoming with ideas,
both constitutional and financial, if the people of Montenegro are to be
persuaded that there would be real advantages in remaining in union with
Serbia.95
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Annex II
Differences between the FRY/Koštunica and Montenegrin Perspectives
Christopher Mulkins*
Overall Perspective
FRY/Koštunica’s Perspective
•  Believes in the preservation of the joint-state between Serbia and
Montenegro.
•  Hopes to reorganise the FRY into a federal state, organised as a
“functional federation” with powers belonging to the federal state of the
FRY as well as the republics of the FRY.
•  Overall, the Serbian proposal discusses more the structure of the new
Federal Government.
Montenegro’s Perspective
•  Montenegro proposes the establishment of two autonomous states
working together in restricted areas as a “Union.”
•  A referendum should be held both in Serbia and Montenegro to establish
that a working relationship is desired between the two states.
•  Overall, the Montenegrin proposal discusses more the specific issues to
be handled in the new “Union.”
Structure of the Combined States
FRY/Koštunica’s Perspective:
Supports a bi-cameral federal system using a “Chancellor Model” of
government. The President of the Federal Government has nominal powers.
Montenegro’s Perspective:
Two autonomous, independent and internationally recognised states will
work together as a “Union” consisting of an Assembly of the Union,
President of the Union and a Council of Ministers.
* Research Assistant, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels.Expert Meeting on The Future of Montenegro
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Responsibilities of the Combined States
FRY/Koštunica’s Perspective:
The Federal Government will be solely responsible for the following issues:
-  foreign policy,
-  national defence,
-  monetary system,
-  customs system,
-  transportation,
-  obligation law,
-  securities.
The Federal Government will be jointly responsible with the Republic
Governments to establish regulation in the following issues (the Federal
Parliament is to endorse framework laws only that are made concrete by the
respective Republics’ Legislatures):
-  property relations,
-  basic rights and freedoms, including the protection of minority rights, as
well as basic social rights,
-  taxation system,
-  banking system,
-  trade law,
-  pensions,
-  insurance of property and persons.
Montenegro’s Perspective:
The “Union” would have the following responsibilities (in a sense of co-
ordinating really, not wholly deciding):
-  defence and external security of the Union,
-  foreign policy of the Union,
-  securing a common market,
-  securing a convertible currency.Annexes
99
The President
FRY/Koštunica’s Perspective:
•  The President of the Federal Government should be elected by the
Federal Legislature in its regular decision making procedure and
would be elected alternately from the two Republics.
•  Should have the powers of representation and to nominate senior and
state officials in the executive branch and judiciary (nominal powers).
Montenegro’s Perspective:
•  The President of the “Union” shall be elected by the Assembly
(and then approved by the member-states Assemblies).
Legislature
FRY/Koštunica’s Perspective:
•  The Federal Assembly would be the supreme representative and
legislative body of the Federation and have a bi-cameral structure.
•  The Chamber of Republics, the upper house, would have equal
number of deputies from each Republic and they would represent the
interests of their respective Republics in the chamber.
The Chamber of Citizens, the lower house, would exercise the constitutional
principle of equality of the citizens of the federation. These deputies represent
the interests of the federation as a whole.
Montenegro’s Perspective:
•  The Assembly of the Union would have one house – the
deputies of the assembly would be chosen on a parity basis
within the framework of exclusive legislative competence of the
member-states.
•  The President and Vice-President of the Assembly shall be from
different member-states, and shall rotate every 2 years, within a
4-year term.Expert Meeting on The Future of Montenegro
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Prime Minister/Council of Ministers
FRY/Koštunica’s Perspective:
•  The Federal Government should be organised following the “Chancellor
Model.”
•  The Prime Minister would be elected alternatively from the two Republics
and accounts to the Federal Assembly, while ministers account to him/her.
•  There should be five ministers (apart from the Prime Minister) in charge of
the ministries:
-  Minister of Justice,
-  Minister of Defence,
-  Minister of Foreign Relations,
-  Minister of Finance,
-  Minister of Transportation.
Montenegro’s Perspective:
•  The Council of Ministers will be composed of a President (i.e.
Prime Minister), Vice-President and Ministers of Foreign Affairs,
Defence, Finance and Economic Relations.
•  The Vice-President and President of the Council should be from
different member-states and the Deputy Ministers shall be from a
different member-state with respect to the Ministers.
•  The President of the Union and the President of the Council of
Ministers shall be from different member-states and shall represent
the “majority parties” or coalitions in the member-states.
Defence
FRY/Koštunica’s Perspective:
•  The issues of defence would be under the control of the Federal
Government.
Montenegro’s Perspective:
•  Montenegro and Serbia will have their own armies.
•  The common activities of the army will be under control of the
President of the Union, exclusively on the basis of decisions of the
Supreme Defence Council (which will consist of the member-states
Presidents and the President of the Union).
•  The President of each state shall be in command of that state’s army.
•  Defence ministers rotate every second year within a four-year term of
office.Annexes
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Foreign Policy
FRY/Koštunica’s Perspective:
•  Foreign policy is under the direction of the Federal Government,
however, the Republics may be allowed to exercise autonomously
different forms of international co-operation in the spheres of economic
relations and diverse modes of regional integration.
Montenegro’s Perspective:
•  Foreign policy shall be conducted autonomously but the member-states
should work together to facilitate incorporation into all European and
Euro-Atlantic organisations.
•  The Council of Ministers will have a Minister of Foreign Affairs that
will be rotated between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the two
member-states, each for a 2-year period. The Union’s Minister of
Foreign Affairs will harmonise and co-ordinate the foreign policies of
the member-states of the Union.
•  Each member-state shall be autonomous in establishing their
diplomatic and consular offices, however, the member-states can work
together to harmonise their policy, interests and activities in this sphere
and perhaps jointly use facilities abroad.
•  If a member-state does not have a direct interest in an international
organisation, then it trusts the other member-state to act on its behalf.Expert Meeting on The Future of Montenegro
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Common Market and Currency
FRY/Koštunica’s Perspective:
•  The Federal Government would be in control of establishing a
market economy and a single national bank.
Montenegro’s Position:
•  A common currency will be established and free flow of goods,
capital, people and information will be allowed.
•  The Union will be a single customs area with no internal tariffs.
•  Customs systems shall be under the competence of the member-
states but will be harmonised through special agreements
between the member-states.
•  There shall be a common convertible currency, however, each
member-state shall retain the right to its own monetary system if
the constraints are too large.
•  Each member-state shall have its own central bank.
EU Integration
FRY/Koštunica’s Perspective:
•  Supports Integration into the EU.
Montenegro’s Position:
•  Supports Integration into Euro-Atlantic structures.103
Annex III
Government of Montenegro Platform for Talks with
Government of Serbia on New Relations
between the Two States
I. Past Montenegro-Serbia Relations in Fry
1. On the grounds of the historical and centuries-old sovereignty of
Montenegro and the inalienable right of Montenegro to self-determination,
verified by the decisions of the United Nations and by the Badinter
Commission and proclaimed by the Montenegrin Constitution of 1992:
-  The Citizens of Montenegro decided to form a common state with
Serbia – the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Citizens of Montenegro
wanted and expected FRY to be a democratic community of equal Republics
and equal citizens. Nevertheless, many abuses of the FRY institutions and
bodies occurred during its existence, which resulted in undemocratic
relations and gross violations of the Constitutional principles of equality of
the Republics and citizens, at the expense of Montenegro.
-  After the parliamentary elections in Montenegro in May 1998, the
Federal Government and the Chamber of the Republics of the Assembly of
the FRY were constituted in a fashion that flagrantly violated the FRY
Constitution, the constitutional rights and the will of the citizens of
Montenegro expressed in these legal, legitimate and democratic elections.
All federal institutions, and in particular the judicial and the administrative
ones, were functioning and taking decisions in contravention to the legal
order of the FRY, carrying out undemocratic and unitary policies of the then
federal administration and thus violating individual and collective rights of
citizens of the Republic of Montenegro. The most blatant manifestations of
such policies were the unconstitutional declaration of state of war and the
abuses thereof, as well as decisions that ignored fundamental rights of
citizens of Montenegro, which must never be violated, not even during
circumstances of war.
-  The FRY competences in the field of foreign affairs, border crossings
and control of goods, services and passenger transport across the borders, as
well as the status of foreigners were discriminative and with elements of
obstruction against Montenegro.
-  The formulation and implementation of the FRY foreign policy was
conducted without participation of and contrary to the political positions of
the Montenegrin authorities, as well as in defiance of modern concepts of
international relations. The equal participation principle of Montenegro andExpert Meeting on The Future of Montenegro
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Serbia in appointments and staff recruiting for the diplomatic and consular
missions was not respected either.
-  The principle of a single Yugoslav market was being constantly
infringed upon, such infringements involving illegitimate checkpoints with
the character of customs posts between the two Republics and violation of
basic rights of citizens of Montenegro. Their property was being confiscated;
the flow of goods and capital was being prevented, as well as free
entrepreneurship and equal treatment of economic entities.
-  The monetary and the foreign exchange policy were conducted
without Montenegro’s equal participation in decision-making and control,
and in contravention to the Constitution and the Laws, especially in issuing
new money and setting interest rates.
-  The VJ (Yugoslav Army) was particularly misused, especially its
commanding system (military and civilian). The Montenegrin President was
excluded from the commanding system and the VJ became an instrument
used for political purposes with the intention of destabilising Montenegro’s
legitimate authorities.
-  After the Presidential elections in Montenegro there were
encouragements and attempts to overthrow by force the democratically,
legally and legitimately elected Montenegrin authorities.
-  On 6 July 2000, illegal and illegitimate changes of the FRY
Constitution were carried out; they meant constitutional violence against
Montenegro. These changes instituted procedures for the election of the FRY
President and the Chamber of the Republics of the Federal Assembly
appropriate for a unitary rather than a composite state. Montenegro, given its
significantly smaller constituency, lost the possibility to influence the
election of the Federal President. Also, now that the Republic Assemblies no
longer have the right to elect deputies to the Chamber of the Republics, this
Chamber has ceased to protect the interests of the Republics. In an exercise
of constitutional violence, and without the obligatory agreement of the
Republic Assemblies, federal electoral legislation was taken away from the
republican and transferred to the federal competence. These changes
highlighted the absence of a constitutional mechanism that could protect
equality and sovereignty of Montenegro against political violence.
2. Therefore, it is necessary to redefine the relations between Montenegro
and Serbia on a new basis. The fact that the Serbian Constitution has never
been brought in line with the FRY Constitution (this has never been even
attempted ) makes the political conditions for restructuring the relationship
between Montenegro and Serbia still more complicated.Annexes
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3.
- The FRY Constitution of 1992 cannot be a basis for establishing a
new relationship between Montenegro and Serbia.
-  The relationship between the states of Montenegro and Serbia should
be secured through new procedures.
Montenegro has been seriously and responsibly preparing for talks with
Serbia on the subject of the basis, framework and directions of their future
relationship. This relationship can only be based on:
-  The historical, state, national and cultural identity of the two states
and two peoples, as well as on the sovereign right of citizens of both states to
autonomously make decisions regarding their destiny.
-  The tasks of common interest to Montenegro and Serbia are to be
entrusted to the Union and to be conducted on an equal footing and subjected
to the same level of control.
-  On that ground, Montenegro offers the Platform for talks on a future
Union, which should be based on a common interest of both states, as well as
on the historical and current realities.
II. The Character of a Future Union of the Internationally
Recognised States of Montenegro and Serbia
The starting point for a new Union of Montenegro and Serbia lies in the
inalienable right of the citizens to decide upon their national and state
destiny. This can be the only basis for determining the common interest of
the Union of Montenegro and Serbia. This will create conditions to
overcome the obstacles in their mutual relationship.
-  Montenegro and Serbia will be independent and internationally
recognised states.
-  The independence of Montenegro and Serbia will be decided through
a referendum of their citizens, who have the sovereign right to determine the
destiny of their state.
-  Independent and internationally recognised Montenegro and Serbia
will constitute the Union of two states by referendum vote of their citizens.
-  Montenegro and Serbia shall form a Union, aware of the common
interest and the utility of such association, building a structure based on the
principles and relations acceptable for both.
-  In this Union, the citizens, their associations, companies and
institutions should have a wide range of opportunities to fulfil their needs
and interests. Instead of the hierarchical pyramid of alienated andExpert Meeting on The Future of Montenegro
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bureaucratised state institutions, the new model of the Union of Montenegro
and Serbia should provide decision-making on clear and easily applicable
principles governing conduct of the states.
-  Montenegro and Serbia, independent from each other regarding
questions of national and state sovereignty, in fulfilling the common interest
should function without centralisation.
-  For the Union of Serbia and Montenegro the only acceptable concept
is the one that has as the basis the constitutional position of the states as
genuine holders of sovereignty, delegating part of their competences, those
that can effectively be carried out in the Union on an equal footing and in a
rational manner.
III. Principles of the Union of Montenegro and Serbia
The principles of the Union:
-  The equality within the Union of states
-  Each state conducting in a sovereign fashion all the state affairs within
its competence
-  The Union carrying out only those activities entrusted to it
-  Competences of the Union to be interpreted restrictively
-  Competences of the Union to be performed, as a rule, by bodies of the
member states and exceptionally by bodies of the Union.
-  Bodies of the Union constituted on the basis of the principle of
equality and consensual decision-making
-  Open society
-  Respect of international standards, human rights and freedoms,
including special minority rights
-  Market economy with domination of private ownership and private
entrepreneurship
-  Rule of law
-  Constitutionality and legality of Montenegro and Serbia.
IV. Competences of the Union of Montenegro and Serbia
The competences of the Union should be considerably narrower than today’s
competences of the FRY. This should minimise potential conflicts, while at
the same time expressing a new character of the Union.
The Union would have the following responsibilities:Annexes
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-  Defence and external security of the Union
-  Foreign policy of the Union
-  Securing a common market and a convertible currency
Given the negative experience in the functioning of the FRY bodies, the
bodies of the Union and the procedure for their formation and decision-
making should be defined by an act of the Union
1. Defence and External Security of the Union
-  Montenegro and Serbia shall have their own armies.
-  The army must be professional; the military service shall be done in
one’s member state and shall not last longer than six months.
-  The common activities of the army, of importance for both
Montenegro and Serbia, shall be under command of the President of the
Union, exclusively on the basis of decisions of the Supreme Defence
Council.
-  The Supreme Defence Council shall decide by consensus of the
member states presidents and the president of the Union.
-  The president of the state shall be in command of the army of the
member state of which he is the president.
-  Having in mind the character of the Union it is suggested that defence
ministers rotate every second year within a-four-year term of office.
2. Foreign Policy of the Union
Member states, as separate persons in terms of international law, shall be
autonomous in formulating and conducting foreign policy and international
cooperation and shall do so in accordance with their constitutional capacity,
their principles, goals and priorities. Foreign policy activity of the Union
shall be aimed at facilitating integration of its member states into the
international community, particularly into the Euro-Atlantic organisations
and institutions, and making possible a better and more successful
international cooperation and development. To this end the Union shall be
engaged in harmonising and coordinating the policies, priorities and
activities of its member states.
Foreign policy activity of the Union shall be harmonised and coordinated
according to the foreign policy priorities, tasks and activities of its member
states. The member states shall participate in these affairs on an equal basis
and shall have equal control in the matters of the Union with clearly
differentiated responsibilities of the Union from those of the member states.Expert Meeting on The Future of Montenegro
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Within the Council of Ministers of the Union, the functions of the
Coordinator - Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union shall be rotated
between the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the two member-states, each of
them performing the function during a 2-year period. The  Coordinator -
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union, shall perform, with the assistance
of the Union’s institutions, the tasks of harmonisation and coordination of
foreign policy and of the activities of the member-states of the Union. The
Coordinator - Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union shall discuss, in
regular consultations with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the other
member state, all foreign policy and international cooperation issues of
common interest.
The member states shall be autonomous in establishing their diplomatic and
consular offices, appointing ambassadors and consuls general in accordance
with their policy, interests and priorities. In mutual consultations and within
the Union they shall  coordinate and harmonise their policy, interests and
activities in this sphere, and discuss the manner and conditions for joint use
of buildings and the overall infrastructure abroad. Also, one member-state
shall entrust the other member-state with the duties and tasks of representing
her interests in certain countries and/or international organisations where one
member-state does not have an interest or possibilities for direct presence
with her own diplomatic/consular office.
3. Common Market and Convertible Currency
The Union would have a common, externally convertible, currency and free
flow of goods, capital, people and information.
V. Union Institutions, Electoral Procedures and Decision-Making
Processes
The responsibilities under the competence of the Union would be conducted
through the Assembly of the Union, President of the Union and the Council
of Ministers.
1. The Assembly of the Union
The Assembly of the Union would have one ‘House’ and the deputies would
be chosen on a parity basis within the framework of exclusive legislative
competence of the member-states. The deputies would be obliged to keep the
Assemblies of their member-states informed on the approved agenda.
The President of the Assembly and the Vice-President shall be from different
member-states, and shall rotate every 2 years, within a 4-year term of office.
The member-state, through its Assembly, would have the right to initiate a
separate protection procedure regarding the acts from the competence of the
Assembly of the Union.Annexes
109
2. The President of the Union shall represent the Union.
The President of the Union shall be elected to and dismissed from the post by
the Assembly of the Union, subject to prior agreement of the Assemblies of
member states.
The President of the Union and the President of the Council of Ministers
shall be from different member-states and shall represent the ‘majority
parties’ or coalitions in the member states.
At the request of the Government members from the Social Democratic Party
(SDP) the Government has taken note of the position of SDP that office of
President of the Union is not in accordance with the character of a Union of
internationally recognised states of Montenegro and Serbia.
3. The Council of Ministers of the Union
The Council of Ministers of the Union shall perform the assigned executive
tasks within the competence of the Union and shall include the President, the
Vice-president and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Defence, Finance, and
Economic Relations.
The Vice-president of the Council of Ministers shall be from a different
member-state with respect to that of the President, just as the Deputy
Ministers shall be from a different member-state with respect to the
Ministers.
The member-state, through its government, would have the right to initiate a
special protection procedure regarding the acts from the competence of the
Council of Ministers.
VI. The Basis of Economic Relations between Serbia and
Montenegro
In the sphere of economic relations, the Union will have:
-  A common market -  free flow of goods, capital, people and
information in the territory of the Union with protected ‘property rights’,
freedom of establishment of economic entities, as well as freedom of
contract.
-  A single customs area - the Union shall be a single customs area
without internal tariffs, in conformity with WTO regulations deriving from
developing country status.
The customs system shall be under the competence of the member states.
Customs policy and tariff rates could be harmonised through special
agreements that would secure specific interests of the member states
(strategic goods, strategic development ideas, customs free zones and off-
shore companies, etc.).Expert Meeting on The Future of Montenegro
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-  A common convertible currency - The currency of the Union shall
have external convertibility and shall be backed by reliable hard currency
reserves.
Convertibility would be defined by an act of the Union.
Each member-state shall retain the right to its own monetary system should
the monetary union prove a constraint to the realisation of its strategic
commitments due to impaired monetary stability or influence of other
factors. Each member state shall have its own central bank.111
Annex IV
Koštunica/Yugoslavia Proposal of January 2001
Throughout their contemporary history, Serbia and Montenegro aspired to
state unification. They deemed the creation of a joint state their natural
objective and a key precondition for materialising their interests and securing
their internal and external freedoms. There is no doubt that our joint efforts
produced many good things, but it is also true that it is only now that the road
to a comprehensive and democratic transformation of the country has opened
to us, and that we have just entered the process of creating conditions for
proper constitutional restructuring of relations in the federation and the
establishment of a stable joint state.
There are a large number of historical and actual reasons in favour of the
preservation and restructuring of the Serbian-Montenegrin joint state. They
exceed by far those in favour of the separation of the two republics, a larger
part of the executive authorities in Montenegro have been insisting on. The
reasons for preserving the state alliance are deep historic links between the
two peoples, their language and tradition, religion and culture, firm family
and property ties, and those granted citizens one republic, who enjoy
permanent residence in the other or have inhabited it for quite a long time.
What Serbia and Montenegro also share are a single economic environment,
joint development interests, as well as the interests of common defence.
Another important fact is that Serbia and Montenegro are equally multi-
ethnic and multi-cultural states, with approximately for identical population
share of different language, religion and culture. After the democratic
changes, they are supposed to share the state responsibility for minorities and
guarantee their position by sound constitutional and legal mechanisms. In
less than two months, the FRY managed to improve considerably its standing
within the international community. Moreover, it gained the reputation of a
country international organisations can rely on in establishing understanding
and cooperation in the region.
The task of restructuring the state is responsible and difficult indeed. This
task, however, is not unsolvable if there is a political goodwill and readiness
for compromises. We should not be afraid of the fact that Montenegro and
Serbia, as old European states, internationally recognised two centuries ago,
have every right to seek to safeguard their important national attributes in
their joint state as well. Quite the contrary, it is precisely this fact that can
make the challenge easier, because the need for both federal units for
political autonomy within the state alliance can be fulfilled permanently by
modern and specific federal solutions. After all, federalism emerged in
contemporary history as a response to the question of how to organise
complex states that comprise several political units. Federalism responds toExpert Meeting on The Future of Montenegro
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their readiness to unite on the basis of common goals, while maintaining
their autonomy and specific national attributes in the spheres falling within
their autonomous jurisdiction. Each federation resolved this problem in its
own way, having no model at all, since it was always a specific case of the
creation and operation of a complex state. Just like all others, the federation
of Serbia and Montenegro is also specific. This means that it has to identify
individual and atypical solutions for its specific internal structure.
What has always been pointed out as the major obstacle to a healthy federal
balance is the existing difference in the size and population of the two federal
units. For that reason, the system is allegedly to incline to the two extremes,
both of them being equally dangerous to the operation of the system.
Basically, we are talking about the tendency of centralisation on the one
hand, and the tendency of internal blockade on the other. To say the truth, the
two tendencies had torn apart the present-day two-member federation indeed,
all until they began to question its existence. However, this is not the
consequence of the federal structure itself, as the advocates of Montenegro's
secession are trying to prove, but rather the fact that the existing Constitution
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is the result of party deal made by the
then ruling parties in Serbia and Montenegro, which, with the passage of
time, they ceased to comply with themselves. We now have a unique chance
of devising better constitutional solutions, endorse them in a legitimate
procedure, and, as democrats and legalists, abide by them consistently.
It is precisely because of the set structure of the Serbian- Montenegrin
federation, and the existing disproportion in size, the concept of functional
federation, adapted to the local circumstances, is the most purposeful one.
There are three basic characteristics of such a concept.
1) The number of functions to be performed at the federal level should be
minimal, basically defined by the federal units' need for the joint and
effective resolution of issues of common interest;
2) Cooperation between federal and republican bodies must exist in the
processes of decision-making and performing joint functions alike.
3) All functions that are not referred to the federal level are performed
autonomously by the republics, which also means that they can establish
direct cooperation in the joint performance of those functions.
These three important characteristics will secure that the two following basic
principles be exercised in theory and practice alike; the equality of the
federal units and the operability of the federation as a whole.Annexes
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A. Power-sharing and operations of the federation
The number of federal powers is defined by the elementary functions that
make a federal state operable in its internal and external public life. These
are:
•  protection of basic rights and freedoms, with the necessary minimum of
social rights;
•  foreign policy;
•  national defence;
•  basics of economic system;
•  transportation and communications.
These are also the minimal powers a state should exercise if strategically
oriented to European integration, which is no doubt the wish and substantial
orientation of the citizens of Serbia and Montenegro.
In order to secure simultaneously the equality of the two federal units and the
operability of the federation as a whole, I propose several principles that
would pave the way to the establishment of a system of multiple balances.
The first principle implies the bi-cameral adoption of all fundamental federal
decisions - laws and other regulations, on the basis of absolute majority in
both chambers. Due to the specific structure of our federation, the upper
house, as a body directly representing the republics, should have general
jurisdiction, just like the lower house.
When it comes to the exercising of federal powers, a difference should be
made between those fully exercised by federal bodies - legislative, executive
and judicial, and those exercised jointly by federal and republican organs. In
the first case, all regulations are adopted and implemented by the federal
bodies.
They include the following federal powers:
•  foreign policy
•  national defence,
•  monetary system,
•  customs system,
•  transportation,
•  obligation law,
•  securities.Expert Meeting on The Future of Montenegro
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When it comes to implementation of the laws relevant to the above-listed, the
Federal Government may delegate its executive power to the republican
executive and administrative organs.
In the second case of mixed powers, the federal parliament is to endorse
framework laws only that are made concrete by the republics' legislatures,
and those legal regulations are implemented by their executive and
administrative organs. These powers are as follows:
•  basic rights and freedoms, including the protection of minority rights, as
well as basic social rights,
•  property relations,
•  taxation system,
•  banking system,
•  trade law,
•  pensions,
•  insurance of property and persons.
When it comes to foreign policy and international relations, the future federal
constitution should allow for the possibility that the republics exercise
autonomously different forms of international cooperation in the spheres of
economic relations and diverse modes of regional integration.
B. Federal Institutions
Their composition and powers, as well as the way in which they are elected
and the way in which they make decisions should make the federal
institutions a consistent reflection of the functional federation concept.
As the supreme representative and legislative body of the federation, the
Federal Assembly should have bi-cameral structure, that is, comprise the
Chamber of Republics and the Chamber of Citizens. It is understood that the
Chamber of Republics has the equal number of deputies from the federal
units, who represent the interests of their respective republics in the chamber.
Having in mind the local circumstances, it would be most purposeful if the
deputies to the upper house were elected in republican legislatures in
accordance with the principle of proportionality, so that their composition
could reflect the will of the voters expressed through the structure of the
republican parliaments. Given the fact that this chamber has general
jurisdiction in the parliamentary decision-making, its deputies, even though
they are representatives of the republics, should not have imperative
mandates. Renouncing their imperative mandates would help the
parliamentary life develop, which is the sine qua non condition for each andAnnexes
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every form of democracy, including that in federations. This does not mean
that the legislatures will not establish guidelines for the activity of deputies
to the Chamber of Republics. Such guidelines are assumed in federations, but
not with the intention of blocking the decision-making process in federal
assemblies.
The Chamber of Citizens of the Federal Assembly should exercise the
constitutional principle of equality of the citizens of the federation. Given the
specific structure of the federation, a corrective mechanism is needed here in
the form of a clause specifying the smallest mandatory number of
representatives of a republic to the chamber. Although this might provoke
the objection that this would affect to a degree the principle of equality of the
citizens represented in the chamber, I am convinced that a certain correction
of the "one man-one vote" principle would be beneficial to the parliamentary
life. This would secure that the smaller federal unit is represented in
parliamentary committees and commissions without exception. Furthermore,
this would facilitate the election of the Prime Minister, when he/she is
elected from Montenegro. Needless to say, the deputies to the lower house
have free mandates, regardless of election units they are elected in, and they
represent the interests of the federation as a whole.
It is necessary that the joint state of Serbia and Montenegro should have the
President of the Republic. The president should have the powers of
representation and nominate senior state officials in the executive branch and
judiciary. The president would also chair the Supreme Defence Council that
would also include the presidents of the republics. The president of the
Republic should be elected by the Federal Assembly in its regular decision-
making procedure. The dismissal of the president, however, is to be carried
out solely on the basis of a ruling by the Federal Court that would determine
whether the president violated the FRY Constitution by his conduct. The
President of the Republic would be elected alternately from the two
republics.
The Federal Government should be organised following the chancellor
model. It is the most appropriate mode for the existing overall organisation
of the federal authority. Given the small number of federal powers and the
complexity of the decision-making process, it is of utmost importance that
the executive branch and its major organ, the government, be organised in
the most efficient manner possible. In this context, it is only the prime
minister, elected alternately from the two republics, that accounts to the
Federal Assembly, while ministers account to him/her. The ministerial
composition depends solely on the choice by the prime minister, taking
utmost care about the equality of the two republics. The government should
be independent, responsible to the assembly and rational. Apart from the
prime minister, it should include only five ministers in charge of the federal
ministries of justice, defence, foreign relations, finance and transportation.Expert Meeting on The Future of Montenegro
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The Federal Government is elected by the two parliamentary chambers, but
its dismissal will require a majority in one of them only. Proceeding from the
specific federal structure, it is likely that the government will be formed by
inter-republican party coalitions, because this is the only way for the
government to secure a stable majority in both houses.
The federation should have a single court only, the Federal Court, which
would perform both the constitutional and regular court functions. The usual
constitutional and judicial control of constitutionality and legality on the
federal level is also provided for. In the sphere of regular judiciary, the
Federal Court would decide solely on extraordinary legal instruments, after
all legal instruments within the two republics' judicial system are exhausted.
Given the fact that the federation will join important international
conventions to protect basic rights and freedoms, the citizen and other legal
entities will be able to initiate court proceedings in order to protect their
violated rights with competent international courts as well.
Although the federation has minimal functions and rational bodies for their
implementation, it should dislocate the headquarters of some of its
institutions. Some of them would be in Podgorica or Cetinje.
Finally, draft constitutional amendments should by all means specify
procedure by which the constitution is to be amended. Bearing in mind that
in this concept the exponents of sovereignty (constituency power) are the
citizens of the republics, a procedure should be defined to make it sure that
their will is expressed efficiently. In this context, when it comes to changes
relevant to the issue of the state statuses of the republics and the federation,
the citizens of the republics will be those deciding the final instance.
I believe that a constitutional concept like this can secure to the utmost the
common interests of Serbia and Montenegro and at the same time make it
possible for the republics to achieve their own, special interests. However,
even the best and most optimal of constitutional concepts will not be
implemented in reality if the two basic preconditions are not fulfilled -
political goodwill and the spirit of the rule of law. Once they are met, the
citizens will be able to enjoy their rights and freedoms, and political power
will be curbed by legal regulations formulated by the constitution and laws.
This is also the only way for Serbia and Montenegro, on the one hand, and
their joint state, on the other, to become part of modern Europe, with a good
chance of being admitted to the democratic and prosperous community of
European peoples and states.117
Annex V
Former Montenegrin Platform, August 1999
I.  The Basis of Defining the New Relationship between Montenegro and
Serbia
1. Relationship between Montenegro and Serbia in FRY
Mindful of a century-old sovereignty of Montenegro, its inalienable right to
self-determination which was verified by the decisions passed by the United
Nations and the Badinter Commission as well as laid down by the
Constitution of Montenegro from 1992:
-  The citizens of the Republic of Montenegro decided to establish together
with Serbia a joint state – the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).
Montenegrin citizens wished and expected FRY to be a democratic state
founded on the equality of the citizens and its member republics. During
the existence of FRY, the bodies and institutions of FRY have been
misused which has resulted in undemocratic relations and the severe
violation of the constitutional principle of the equality between the
republics and citizens, at the expense of Montenegro.
-  The Federal Government and the Upper House of the FRY were
constituted by severe violating of the Constitution of the FRY,
constitutional rights vested in the citizens of Montenegro, their will
expressed at the legal, legitimate and democratic elections .All the
federal institutions, particularly those from the area of judiciary and the
government, worked and passed decisions by violating the FRY legal
order, implementing undemocratic and unitary policy of the current
federal government, by violating individual and collective rights of the
citizens of the Republic of Montenegro . This was easily seen and
obvious when the state of war was unconstitutionally declared and
misused, and when they made decisions which disregarded elementary
rights of the Montenegrin citizens, which should be safeguarded both in
the time of peace and the state of war.
-  The authority of the FRY in the area of international relations, border
crossing, control of goods, services and transportation of the passengers
abroad, status of foreigners has been carried out with discrimination and
with the purpose to make pressure on Montenegro and blockade it.
-  The FRY foreign policy has been determined and carried out opposite to
the Montenegrin state policy, and in contrast to the contemporary
concepts of international relations. The principle of equal participation of
Montenegro and Serbia has not been followed when it came to carrying
out personnel policy, diplomatic and consular activities.Expert Meeting on The Future of Montenegro
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-  The unity of the Yugoslav market has been repeatedly disrupted by the
introduction of customs control points at the borders between the
Republics. Thus, the elementary rights of the citizens of the Republic of
Montenegro have been violated. Their property has been confiscated, the
trade of goods and money has been frustrated, entrepreneurship and
equal treatment of enterprises prevented which is in contrast to
obligatory law and economic procedures.
-  Monetary and foreign currency policies have been carried out without
the equal decision-making power and control of Montenegro opposite to
the Constitution and the law, with regard to putting currency into
circulation and determining interest rates.
-  Yugoslav Army has been misused in particular. The power of the
military Supreme Command has been usurped. The President of
Montenegro has been excluded from the commandment structures of the
Army and the Army has become a tool activated for political means,
particularly with a purpose to destabilise legitimate authorities in
Montenegro.
-  After the presidential elections attempts to forcefully overthrow the
democratically elected government were made in Montenegro.
2.
Therefore, it is necessary to re-define relations between Montenegro and
Serbia on new basis. The fact that the Constitution of Serbia has not been
harmonised with the Constitution of the FRY, nor have there been any
attempts in this regard either, as well as international isolation of the most
accountable persons in the FRY and Serbia additionally complicates political
circumstances for a settlement of the relations between Montenegro and
Serbia.
3.
The Constitution of FRY from 1992 can not be used as basis for the
establishment of new relations between Montenegro and Serbia.
-New constitutional procedures should ensure legitimacy of the union and
the implementation of the principles the union will be based on.
4.
Montenegro has definitely decided to negotiate with Serbia the basis,
framework and the guidelines of their future relations. These relations can be
merely based on:
-  historical, sovereign, national and cultural identity of the two states and
the two nations, and the sovereign right vested in the citizens of each
state respectively to make decisions on its future independently.Annexes
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-  the functions of the union, which functions will define the way in which
the organisation of the union will be ordered, will be laid down by the
Constitutions of the state members which state members will assign
these functions i.e. competences to the union in order to benefit from it.
-  this is the basis of the Platform that Montenegro has proposed to Serbia
in order to define future relations of the union which is to be established
on the mutual interest of the two states, which interest is based on
historical and present realities.
II. The Character of the Future Union between Montenegro and
Serbia
1
The only acceptable conceptual starting point for the Union between
Montenegro and Serbia is the inalienable right vested in its citizens to make
decisions independently on their national identity. Only on such basis can the
redefinition of the relations between Montenegro and Serbia carried out.
Such union must ensure the development of democracy, rule of law,
economic development, and linking up into European and transatlantic
integration. This will mean the end of pressures and tensions in the mutual
relations between the member states on the one hand and the end of its
isolation by the international community on the other.
-  Montenegro and Serbia will agree to found a union, aware of the benefits
they will enjoy as a result of such an association. The legal order will be
structured on the basis of principles and relations that are acceptable for
them.
-  This new union between Montenegro and Serbia should ensure a
successful development of the two states in all the areas of the society.
Within such dual structure, the citizens, the associations, enterprises and
institutions should be able to carry out their rights and safeguard their
interests in wide range of activities. A new model of the union between
Montenegro and Serbia, which is to create an environment in which both
states will participate in decision making process, should take place of a
rigid hierarchy of government agencies prone to bureaucratism and
alienation.
-  Montenegro and Serbia will be independent of each other, separate, in
matters pertaining to their state and national sovereignty, and
achievement of their joint interests. Their functioning should be
decentralised.
                                                                
1 Alternative: The character of the future union between Montenegro and Serbia,
which could be the name of the future union too (hereinafter called the union
between Montenegro and Serbia).Expert Meeting on The Future of Montenegro
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The only acceptable conceptual starting point for the Union between
Montenegro and Serbia is one that assumes the member states being the
sources of sovereignty which will assign those authorities to the union which
can be carried out at this level, at the level of the union, in a manner which
will ensure equality, rationality and realism.
III. The Principles of the Union between Montenegro and Serbia
The principles will be as follows:
-  the equality of the member states and citizens
-  Each member state will carry out its state jobs independently within its
jurisdiction.
-  The union will carry out only those jobs that are assigned to it
-  the authority of union is limited
-  the authority i.e. the competences of the union , as a rule, will be carried
out by the bodies of the member states, and the bodies of the union will
do it on exceptional basis
-  the bodies of the union will be constituted on the parity basis for the
most important bodies, and other bodies will be constituted on the basis
of the principle of proportionality
-  Foreign policy will ensure linking up to the European and transatlantic
integration (UN, OSCE, EU, Partnership for Peace, World Trade
Organisation, IMF, the World Bank, Stability Pact for the South East
Europe).
-  open society
-  abiding by international standards, human rights and freedoms including
the special rights of the minorities
-  market economy, private property and entrepreneurship
-  rule of law
-  legality
IV. The Authority of the Union of Montenegro and Serbia
The jurisdiction of the union of Montenegro and Serbia needs to be
significantly smaller than is the case at present in FRY.
The following areas would be under the jurisdiction of the union:
-  Defence and security of the union
-  Foreign policyAnnexes
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-  The basis of the economic system of the union
The security system in road, railway and air traffic whilst maritime transport
would be under the jurisdiction of Montenegro and the river transportation
under the jurisdiction of Serbia.
Scientific and technical developments and the development strategy of the
technical and technological system(system of energy, telecom system,
transportation system, development of the system of quality and
standardisation).
In view of negative experiences with regard to the functioning of the
government agencies of the FRY it is necessary to establish the bodies of the
union, the way in which the given bodies will be established and the
decision-making system.
The decision-making system in the bodies of the union has to be organised in
such a way which will exclude the marginalisation [of one of the entities]
and safeguard the interests and ensure the equal status of both member states.
In order to adopt subsidiary laws regulating the functioning of different
bodies of the Union, a separate protection procedure in which a by-law or a
regulation will be adopted should be laid down by Constitution. This
separate protection procedure would be carried out when so requested by a
member state if it considers that a proposed law or a decision jeopardises or
violates interest, rights or its equality within the union. The regular procedure
for a by-law to be adopted would be suspended until the separate protection
procedure is completed. In the separate procedure, the competent body,
composed on the parity basis, would consider the bill or decision and submit
their report and assessment, in due time. Following the completion of the
separate protection procedure, the regular procedure for the adoption of the
law or a decision or it will be continued or closed. The time envisaged for the
special procedure should be cut in order to eliminate its misuse.
In line with the given principles, jobs that are under the jurisdiction of the
union should be carried out as follows:
1. Defence and External Security of the Union
-  Under the jurisdiction of the union will be the declaration of the state of
war, imminent state of war and the state of emergency, but only with
previous consent of both member states.
-  The Military Supreme Council will make decisions through the
consensus among the presidents of the member states and the president
of the union.
-  The President of the member state, as a member of the Military Supreme
Council, will command the military units on the territory of his memberExpert Meeting on The Future of Montenegro
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state, the member state of which he is the President , in accordance with
the defence strategy which has been defined by the Military Supreme
Court
-  Joint military activities important for the entire territory of the union will
be under the command of President of the union whose command will be
based exclusively on the decisions made by the Military Supreme
Council.
-  The army has to be professional, military service will be completed
within one’s state of origin and will not last longer than 6 months.
-  The Commanders of the armies and the commander of the Navy will be
appointed by the president of the member state to which the
commandment applies. The commanders will be appointed to their posts
at the proposal of the Head of the Chief of Staff and on the basis of the
consent given by the Military Supreme Council. At the proposal of the
Army’s Commander i.e. Navy’s Commander, the President of the
member state will appoint the heads of the corpuses and services
operating in the territory of the member state of which he is the
President.
-  In view of the character of the union , it is proposed that the
representatives of the member states take it in turns to hold the office of
the Minister of Defence in the Council of Ministers, for the period of two
years within the four-year mandate.
2. Foreign Policy of the Union
Foreign policy of the union will be devised and implemented with equal
participation and control of member states, with a divided jurisdiction
between the union and member state authorities.
As an optimal model, it is proposed that the representative of the member
states take it in turns to hold the office of the Foreign Minister in the Council
of Ministers for the period of two years within the four year mandate.
Foreign policy of the union has to be based on a platform that would secure
the return into international institutions and the integration into European and
Euro-Atlantic integration.
According to this platform, the member states will have full independence to
carry out foreign affairs within their constitutional capacities.
The member states have to be substantially represented in embassies and
other diplomatic representative institutions abroad. Member states may have
their own representation bodies abroad, when they have particular interests to
do so.Annexes
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3. The Basis of the Economic System of the Union
It would be under the jurisdiction of the union to determine the basis of the
economic system in line with the principles and relations of the economic
system laid down by the Platform.
The jurisdiction would have to secure full economic independence of the
member states so that they can promote and safeguard their particularities
and achieve full economic growth of the member states and at the same time
of the union.
4. The security system in road, railway and air  traffic whilst maritime
transport would be under the jurisdiction of Montenegro and the river
transportation under the jurisdiction of Serbia.
The competences of the union with regard to the security system in road,
railway and air traffic would be determined under the security system, whilst
the rest would be under the jurisdiction of the member states. It is necessary
for the maritime transport to be under the jurisdiction of Montenegro and for
the river transportation to be under the jurisdiction of Serbia.
5. Scientific and Technical Development and the Strategy of the
Development of the Technical and Technological Systems
The activities in these areas must be under the jurisdiction of the union
because of their character and importance for the state members, whereas the
joint interests of the member states must be respected.
V. The Union Bodies, Election Procedures and Decision-Making
Procedures
Responsibilities under the jurisdiction of the union would be carried out
through the parliament of the union, the president of the union, the
ministerial council and the union court.
1. Parliament of the Union
The parliament of the union would have only one chamber whose MPs
would be elected on the parity principle between the member states and
under their exclusive legislative jurisdiction. The MPs would be obliged to
inform their member states’ Parliament of the agreed agenda.
The President of the parliament and the Vice-president of the Parliament will
have to come from different member states and they will rotate every two
years within the four-year mandate.
The member states would have the right to initiate , through their own
parliament a separate protection procedure in relation to the laws and other
regulations which are under the jurisdiction of the Parliament of the Union.Expert Meeting on The Future of Montenegro
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2. The President of the Union
The President of the union will represent the union.
The President of the union is elected and dismissed by the Parliament of the
union on the basis of the previous consent of the member states.
The president of the union and the president of the ministerial council have
to be from different member states and must represent the ruling party or the
coalition of a member state.
3. Ministerial Council
The Ministerial Council of the union will have executive power under the
jurisdiction of the union. There is President, one Vice-president of the
Council, foreign minister, defence minister, justice minister, finance minister
and the minister for economic relations.
President and the vice-president of the Council will have to come from
different states. The ministers and the deputy ministers will have to be from
different states as well.
Through its government, a member state will have the right to initiate a
separate protection procedure in relation to the laws and other regulations
that are under the competence of the government of the member state.
4. Judicial Bodies of the Union
The court of the union will be a judicial body of the union, which will hold
the constitutional and judicial authority.
The member state that has appointed the president of the court of the union
will have one judge less than the other member state.
The jurisdiction of court of the union will be adapted to the concept of the
union, and the president of the court of the union cannot be from the same
member state in two mandates running.
VI. The Basis for the Economic System of the Union between
Montenegro and Serbia
Elementary principles of the level of authority:
Given that Montenegro and Serbia associate into a union for the mutual
benefit and the need to safeguard their interest, the establishment of a new
economic system will call for the following:
-  that member states retain their functional sovereignty in decision-making
that is in the interest of the member states
-  that member states secure institutional sovereignty as well as the right to
found new market institutionsAnnexes
125
-  securing rationality and efficiency at the level of the union. It should be
organised as follows:
a)  enable free flow of commodities, capital, people and information
within union
b)  facilitate and secure integration into international organisations
c)  reduce costs of organising and carrying out certain functions
-  that the differences between Montenegro and Serbia should be respected
-  that it is possible to suspend the power given to the union in
extraordinary circumstances
-  that the transition program , the transition into a new institutional system
is defined.
VII. Dimensions of the Economic System
The market: free flow of commodities, capital, people and information
within union.
The legal position of economic entities: the basis of the legal system will be
defined at the level of the union, but all other regulations will be defined at
the level of member states.
Foreign trade regime: Oriented toward liberalisation of the import-export
regime in line with the regulations and procedures of the World Trade
Organisation for developing countries.
The Customs System: The union will be one customs zone with no internal
customs controls with a shared system of customs duties in line with the
regulations of the World Trade Organisation for developing countries.
The implementation of the customs system will have to be under the
authority of the member states.
The Fiscal System: will run a responsible fiscal policy, a public and
transparent budget, a will have a productive policy of public expenditures
and will change in order to harmonise policies with EU regulations.
Fiscal sovereignty will belong to the member states. A percentage of the
income will be transferred from the member states to the union for carrying
out shared responsibilities.
The basis of the tax system will be defined at the level of the union, whilst
the fiscal system and its policy will remain under the jurisdiction of the
member states.
Monetary Policy: A united monetary region oriented towards full
independence of monetary decision-making power, this independence beingExpert Meeting on The Future of Montenegro
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controlled by the member states; the introduction of a monetary board and a
convertible currency and creating the conditions for integrating into the
European monetary region.
The union will have to have a convertible currency with adequate foreign
currency support and a currency board.
The member states will retain the right to developing an autonomous
monetary system if the monetary union presents limitations for implementing
strategic decisions as a consequence of the destruction of monetary stability
or other factors.
Foreign currency system and foreign credit relations-free use of foreign
currency, currency exchange and urgent normalisation of the relations with
the international financial institutions. Foreign currency system will be under
the jurisdiction within which monetary decision-making power is exercised,
whilst the executive power will be executed under the jurisdiction of the
member states.
Payment operations – Payment operations will be united for the union and
harmonised with the regulations of the EU.
Banking system- joint basis of the banking system in line with regulations of
the EU.
Legislation-Member states ill define system laws. if they are agreed a joint
law will be passed. The system laws should be harmonised with the laws of
EU.
The parliament of the member states is to determine the terms of assigning a
proportion of the sovereignty in this area onto the union.127
Annex VI
Departments of the Governments of Serbia
and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
Yugoslav Government:
President: Vojislav Koštunica
Prime Minister, Zoran Žižiæ
Deputy Prime Minister, Miroljub Labus
Foreign Affairs, Goran Svilanoviæ
Defence Slobodan Krapovic
Economy Danilo Vuksanoviæ
Internal Affairs Zoran Živkoviæ
Finance Dragiša Pešiæ
Justice Momèilo Grubac
Agriculture Saša Vitoševiæ
Transportation Zoran Šami
Telecommunications Boris Tadiæ
Labour, Health and Social Work Miodrag Kovac
Sport Vojislav Andriæ
National and Ethnical Groups Rasim Ljajiæ
Religions Bogoljub Šijakoviæ
Minister without Portfolio Velimir Radojeviæ
Federal Secretary for Information Slobodan Orliæ
Serbian Government:
President: Milan Milutinoviæ
Prime Minister, Zoran Djindjiæ
Deputy Prime Ministers
Nebojša Æoviæ
Dušan MihajloviæExpert Meeting on The Future of Montenegro
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Žarko Korac
Jozsef Kasza
Momèilo Perišiæ
Aleksandar Pravdiæ
Vuk Obradoviæ
Ministers:
Foreign economic matters, Goran Pitiæ
Economic restructuring and privatisation, Aleksandar Vlahoviæ
Telecommunications, Marija Raseta-Vukosavljeviæ
Education, Gašo Knezeviæ
Social and veteran matters, Gordana Matkoviæ
Science and technology, Dr. Dragan Domazet
Construction, Dragoslav Šumarac
Health, Obren Joksimoviæ
Culture, Branislav Leèiæ
Justice, Vladan Batiæ
Employment, Dragan Milovanoviæ
Interior minister, Dušan Mihajloviæ
Agriculture, Dragan Veselinov
Trade and tourism, Slobodan Milošavljeviæ